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SUMMARY 
 
 
 
Climate change is increasingly recognized as an urgent threat to humanity, and instruments for 
promoting international cooperation in reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) that 
generate climate change have been established. The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change established legally binding emission reduction targets for 
a group of industrialized countries and economies in transition (Annex I countries). To facilitate the 
achievement of these targets, it established three flexibility mechanisms: Emissions Trading, Joint 
Implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).  
 
Under the CDM, projects that reduce GHG emissions in countries without emission reduction 
commitments (non-Annex I or developing countries) can generate certified emission reduction 
credits (CERs), which can be acquired and used by Annex I parties as part of their mitigation 
commitments. By providing flexibility on where to reduce emissions, the CDM is expected to reduce 
the cost of compliance. In addition, the CDM has the second aim of promoting sustainable 
development in its host countries. 
 
Despite its clear success in terms of number of projects, the CDM has been confronted by criticism 
of: (i) its unequal geographical distribution; (ii) a failure to generate the expected sustainable 
development benefits in developing countries; (iii) its focus on cheap emission reduction options, 
leading to windfall profits; and (iv) its failure to reduce emissions in developing countries beyond 
those that are offset. As a result, several proposals for reforming the CDM have been put forward. 
 
This dissertation is motivated by the recognition that climate change mitigation needs to be 
strengthened both in industrialized and developing countries. Its main objective is to analyse 
empirically the role of the CDM and some of its reform proposals in creating incentives – or disincentives – for 
developing country action towards reducing emissions. Throughout its chapters, four research questions are 
analysed: 
1.- Does the introduction of preferential access measures (such as those adopted unilaterally by the 
EU in its new Climate and Energy Package) improve the geographical distribution of the CDM?  
2.- Does discounting the value of emission reductions with differentiation by host countries improve 
the geographical distribution of the CDM? 
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3.- Does the CDM discourage advanced developing countries from taking up emission reduction 
commitments by exhausting the cheap emission reduction opportunities in these countries and 
making such commitments more expensive for them to comply with? 
4.- Why are there expensive emission reduction projects (with abatement costs above the price of 
carbon) in the CDM pipeline? Do domestic policies that support such expensive projects have an 
effect on investment in them under the CDM?  
 
These questions all relate to the central discussion on whether the CDM can generate positive 
incentives towards climate change mitigation in developing countries. This discussion is presented in 
Chapter 2. Through an analysis of the relevant environmental economics, political economy and 
public policy literature, this chapter concludes that the CDM can have both positive and negative 
incentives on mitigation in developing countries. Five negative incentives were identified, which may 
affect the amount of emission reductions achieved through the CDM itself, the potential mitigation 
through domestic climate-friendly policies in developing countries, and the willingness of CDM host 
countries to adopt future emission reduction targets. Two positive incentives for mitigation were 
found: the first one is the potential of the CDM to capitalize on the window of opportunity in Least 
Developed countries (LDCs) and contribute to fostering investment in clean technologies, thereby 
contributing to a lower long-term emissions path; the second one considers that the CDM may help 
expensive, immature emission reduction technologies achieve cost effectiveness earlier, by financially 
supporting their diffusion in developing countries. In summary, I assume that the CDM can generate 
positive incentives for climate change mitigation in developing countries if: (i) it prevents a lock-in to 
more emissions intensive technologies in LDCs, by promoting low-carbon investment there; (ii) it 
creates incentives for a transition towards non-offset mitigation instruments in advanced developing 
countries; and (iii) it incentivizes investment in expensive and immature low-carbon technologies, 
contributing to learning effects and cost reductions.  
 
To address the first research question presented above, Chapter 3 analyses the impact of preferential 
access measures for CDM projects in LDCs on the carbon market and the geographical distribution 
of the CDM. By addressing this geographical distribution and promoting more CDM projects in 
LDCs, it is expected that such measures may improve the CDM’s contribution to improving the 
long-term emissions path of these countries. The empirical analysis in Chapter 3, based on a 
quantitative comparison of several future emission reduction credit supply and demand scenarios, 
shows that even under quite strict preferential access schemes, LDCs cannot compete with other 
CDM host countries in terms of supply of CERs to the market.  
 
Chapter 4 answers the second research question by analysing another measure proposed to improve 
the geographical distribution of the CDM: discounting of the value of emission reduction with 
differentiation across countries. The analysis, based on the creation of CDM-specific marginal 
abatement cost curves for four non-Annex I regions under two different discounting schemes, 
reveals again that even with discounting, the supply of CERs from LDCs is still very small compared 
to the one from large CDM host countries. 
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The analysis in these two chapters thus questions the ability of these two measures to achieve the 
goal of improving the geographical distribution of the CDM. More generally, it also questions the 
ability of the CDM to significantly address the long-term emissions path of LDCs. 
 
In answering the third research question, Chapter 5 looks at a specific form of perverse incentive 
that the CDM may be generating in advanced developing countries: the argument that, by exhausting 
the cheaper emission reduction options in these countries, the CDM will make it more expensive for 
them to comply with future emission reduction targets. Using again marginal abatement cost curves 
based on my own estimation of abatement costs of CDM projects, and comparing them to 
abatement cost curves that represent the theoretical abatement potential in six of the most important 
CDM host countries, this chapter concluded that the CDM has so far not been large enough to have 
such an effect, and that there are still many theoretically low-cost abatement opportunities in the 
analysed host countries. 
 
Finally, in Chapter 6 I look at a way in which the CDM might be contributing to the diffusion of 
more expensive emission reduction technologies, thus inducing learning effects and cost reductions. 
The chapter starts from the observation that there are many expensive projects within the CDM 
portfolio, whose abatement costs cannot be covered under current CER prices. I thus hypothesize 
that domestic climate-friendly policies might be adding a further financial incentive to these 
expensive technologies, which, coupled with the CDM subsidy, makes them attractive. This 
hypothesis – which is the fourth research question of the dissertation - is tested econometrically on 
the example of policies supporting the investment in renewable energy. Using panel two-part and 
pooled Heckman selection models, as well as instrumental variables estimation, I analyse the effect 
of domestic renewable energy support policies on investment in renewable energies under the CDM, 
after controlling for all other factors that may also have an effect on such investment. The statistical 
results indicate that national support policies are indeed contributing to make expensive CDM 
projects possible.  
 
In Chapter 7 of the dissertation, finally, these results are summarized and conclusions are drawn 
regarding the role of the CDM and its reform proposals for creating incentives for climate change 
mitigation in developing countries. Some ideas for further research arising from the results of the 
dissertation are presented. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
 
 
 
Der Klimawandel wird zunehmend als eine akute Bedrohung für die Menschheit anerkannt. 
Instrumente wurden verabschiedet, die die internationale Kooperation zur Verringerung von 
klimaschädigenden Treibhausgasemissionen fördern sollen. Das Kyoto-Protokoll zur UN 
Klimarahmenkonvention legte 1997 rechtlich bindende Emissionsminderungsziele für eine Gruppe 
von Industrie- und Transformationsländern („Annex I“ Länder) fest. Um die Erreichung dieser Ziele 
zu erleichtern wurden drei Flexibilitätsmechanismen eingeführt: Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation 
und der Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
 
Unter dem CDM werden Projekte gefördert, die Treibhausgasemissionen in Entwicklungsländern 
ohne Emissionsminderungsziele („non-Annex I“ Ländern) verringern. Diese Projekte generieren 
Emissionsreduktionszertifikate („certified emission reduction credits“ oder CERs), die von Annex I 
Ländern erworben und als Teil ihrer Minderungsverpflichtungen benutzt werden können. Der CDM 
bietet Flexibilität bezüglich der Länder in denen die Emissionen verringert werden können. Dadurch 
soll er die Kosten der Einhaltung der existierenden Minderungsverpflichtungen für Annex I Länder 
senken. Darüber hinaus hat der CDM als zweites Ziel, eine nachhaltige Entwicklung in 
Entwicklungsländern zu fördern. 
 
Im Hinblick auf Projektanzahl ist der CDM offensichtlich erfolgreich gewesen. Jedoch sind mehrere 
Aspekte dieses Mechanismus scharf kritisiert worden:  
- (i) seine ungleichmässige geographische Verteilung in den Herkunftsländern;  
- (ii) sein unzureichender Beitrag zur nachhaltigen Entwicklung der Herkunftsländer;  
- (iii) sein Fokus auf billige Emissionsminderungsprojekte und die resultierenden 
übermässigen Gewinne für Projektentwickler; und  
- (iv) seine Unfähigkeit, Emissionen in Entwicklungsländern über das Niveau hinaus zu 
reduzieren, welches für Emissionen in Annex I Ländern kompensiert wird („offsetting“).  
Als Antwort auf diese Kritik sind mehrere Vorschläge zur Reformierung des CDM ausgearbeitet 
worden.  
 
Diese Dissertation wurde durch die Erkenntnis angeregt, dass eine Reduktion von Treibhausgasen 
nur in Annex I Ländern nicht ausreichen wird, um eine gefährliche Störung des Klimasystems zu 
verhindern. Emissionen müssen also auch in Entwicklungsländern reduziert werden. Das Hauptziel 
der Dissertation ist die empirische Analyse der Rolle des CDM – oder eines reformierten CDM – für die 
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Erzeugung von positiven – oder negativen – Anreizen für eigene Emissionsreduktionen in Entwicklungsländern. Die 
sieben Kapitel der Dissertation befassen sich mit vier Forschungsfragen: 
1.- Wird die geographische Verteilung von CDM Projekten durch die Einführung einer Förderung 
für Projekte in den am wenigsten entwickelten Ländern (Least Developed Countries oder LDCs) 
gleichmässiger gemacht? 
2.- Wird die geographische Verteilung des CDMs durch eine auf Länderbasis differenzierte 
Diskontierung des Wertes der Emissionsreduktionszertifikate (CERs) verbessert? 
3.- Werden Schwellenländer vom CDM entmutigt, eigene Emissionsminderungsziele zu 
übernehmen, weil der CDM die kostengünstigeren Emissionsminderungsmöglichkeiten in diesen 
Ländern ausschöpft und dadurch die Einhaltung eigener Ziele teurer macht? 
4.- Warum gibt es teure Emissionsminderungsprojekte im CDM, deren Vermeidungskosten über 
dem internationalen CO2-Preis liegen? Haben nationale Politikmassnahmen, die solche teuren 
Projekte unterstützen, einen Effekt auf deren Existenz innerhalb des CDM? 
 
Diese Fragen betreffen alle die zentrale Diskussion, ob der CDM positive Anreize für eigene 
Emissionsreduktionen in Entwicklungsländern schaffen kann. Diese Diskussion wird in Kapitel 2 
vorgestellt. Aus einer Analyse der relevanten Literatur in den Bereichen Umweltökonomie, politische 
Ökonomie und Public Policy lässt sich folgern, dass der CDM sowohl positive wie auch negative 
Anreize für Emissionsreduktionen in Entwicklungsländern bietet. Fünf negative Anreize wurden 
identifiziert, die die durch den CDM selbst erreichte Menge an Emissionsreduktionen, die potentielle 
Reduktionen durch nationale klimafreundliche Politikmassnahmen in Entwicklungsländern, und die 
Bereitschaft der CDM-Herkunftsländer, zukünftige Emissionsminderungsziele anzunehmen, 
beeinträchtigen können. Zwei positive Anreize wurden gefunden: der erste ist die Möglichkeit, dass 
der CDM die Chance ergreift, in den LDCs Investitionen in saubere Technologien zu fördern, und 
ihnen dabei hilft, einen langfristigen kohlenstoffarmen Entwicklungspfad zu erreichen; der zweite 
besteht darin, dass der CDM innovativen klimafreundlichen Technologien ermöglicht, früher 
kosteffektiv und kompetitiv zu werden, indem er ihre Verbreitung in Entwicklungsländern 
unterstützt.  
 
Ich nehme also an, dass der CDM positive Anreize für Emissionsreduktionen in 
Entwicklungsländern schaffen kann, wenn (i) er Investitionen in klimafreundliche Technologien in 
LDCs fördert und dadurch eine Festlegung von Investitionen in emissionsintensivere Technologien 
verhindert; (ii) er Anreize für eine Transition zu nicht-offsetting Emissionsminderungsinstrumenten 
in Schwellenländern bietet; und (iii) er Investitionen in innovative klimafreundliche Technologien 
fördert, wobei er zu Lerneffekten und Kostenreduktionen beiträgt. 
 
Kapitel 3 beantwortet die erste obengenannte Forschungsfrage, indem es die Auswirkungen der 
Förderung von CDM Projekten in LDCs auf den CO2-Markt und auf die geographische Verteilung 
der CDM Projekte analysiert. Es wird erwartet, dass solche Massnahmen die geographische 
Verteilung des CDM zugunsten von LDCs verschieben, und dadurch den Beitrag des CDM zu 
einem kohlenstoffarmen Entwicklungspfad in LDCs erhöhen. Die empirische Analyse in Kapitel 3 
basiert auf einem quantitativen Vergleich zwischen mehreren zukünftigen Szenarien für Angebot 
und Nachfrage an Emissionsreduktionszertifikaten. Sie zeigt, dass sogar unter sehr stringenten 
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Vorzugsbedingungen für LDCs diese Länder nicht mit anderen CDM-Herkunftsländern auf dem 
CER-Angebotsmarkt mithalten können. 
 
Kapitel 4 befasst sich mit der zweiten Forschungsfrage und analysiert eine weitere Massnahme, die 
für eine gleichmässigere Verteilung des CDM vorgeschlagen wurde: eine je nach Herkunftsland 
differenzierte Diskontierung des Wertes der Reduktionszertifikate, die aus CDM Projekten stammen. 
Die Analyse beruht auf der Erstellung von Grenzvermeidungskostenkurven für den CDM in vier 
nicht-Annex I Regionen bei zwei verschiedenen Diskontierungsschemen. Sie macht deutlich, dass 
auch bei Diskontierung das Angebot von CERs aus LDCs noch sehr klein im Vergleich zum 
Angebot aus grossen CDM-Herkunftsländern ist.  
 
Die Analyse in diesen beiden Kapiteln stellt also die Fähigkeit dieser zwei Massnahmen, die 
geographische Verteilung des CDMs zu verbessern, in Frage. Allgemein stellt sie auch die Fähigkeit 
des CDM selbst, den langfristigen Emissionspfad von LDCs signifikant zu beeinflussen, in Frage. 
 
Die dritte Forschungsfrage wird im Kapitel 5 angegangen, indem ein potentieller negativer Anreiz 
des CDM auf Schwellenländer untersucht wird: die Idee, dass der CDM die günstigsten 
Emissionsreduktionsmöglichkeiten in diesen Ländern erschöpft, und es dadurch teurer für sie macht, 
zukünftige Emissionsminderungsziele einzuhalten. CDM-Grenzvermeidungs-kostenkurven werden 
geschätzt und mit Kurven verglichen, die das theoretische Emissionsreduktionspotential in sechs der 
wichtigsten CDM-Herkunftsländern darstellen. Diese Analyse zeigt, dass der CDM noch nicht gross 
genug ist, um einen solchen Effekt zu haben, und dass es noch viele theoretisch günstige 
Treibhausgasreduktionsmöglichkeiten in den analysierten Ländern gibt. 
 
In Kapitel 6 wird untersucht, ob und wie der CDM die Diffusion von teureren 
Emissionsreduktionstechnologien gefördert hat, sowie Lerneffekte und Kosteinsparungen ausgelöst 
hat. Das Kapitel beruht auf der Erkenntnis, dass es beim CDM viele Projekte gibt, deren 
Emissionsreduktionskosten beim derzeitigen CO2-Marktpreis nicht gedeckt werden können. 
Aufgrund dieser Beobachtung treffe ich die Annahme, dass nationale klimafreundliche 
Politikmassnahmen einen zusätzlichen finanziellen Anreiz für diese Projekte bieten müssen, der sie 
(zusammen mit dem CDM-Zuschuss) attraktiv macht. Diese Hypothese, die die vierte 
Forschungsfrage dieser Dissertation darstellt, wird nun ökonometrisch untersucht. Mithilfe von 
Paneldatenanalysen und Instrumentalvariablen analysiere ich den Effekt von nationalen Politiken zur 
Förderung erneuerbarer Energien auf Investitionen in erneuerbare Energien innerhalb des CDM, 
unter Berücksichtigung aller anderen Faktoren, die solche Investitionen auch beeinflussen können. 
Die statistischen Ergebnisse weisen auf einen positiven Einfluss solcher nationaler Politiken hin. 
 
Alle diese Ergebnisse werden schlussendlich in Kapitel 7 zusammengefasst. Schlussfolgerungen über 
die Rolle des CDM und der untersuchten Reformvorschläge bei der Schaffung von Anreizen für 
Treibhausgasminderungen in Entwicklungsländern werden gezogen. Ideen für eine weiterführende 
Forschung aus den Ergebnissen dieser Dissertation werden dabei diskutiert.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
‘We are not only losing land but also agricultural productivity due to frequent salt water incursion which has affected five 
square kilometres of our land since 1969…Either our island is sinking or the sea is rising.’ 
(Jalaluddin Saha, India, in WWF 2007) 
 
‘[T]o limit the temperature increase to 2°C above pre-industrial levels, developed countries would need to reduce emissions in 
2020 by 10–40% below 1990 levels and in 2050 by approximately 40–95%. Emissions in developing countries would need 
to deviate below their current path by 2020 […].’  
(Gupta et al. 2007a, p. 748) 
 
‘The natural next step in the evolution of the Kyoto Protocol, and the climate change regime as a whole, is to create clear 
opportunities and financial incentives for developing country Parties to participate in international emissions trading if they so 
choose.’ 
(AOSIS 2011, p. 43) 
 
 
In the past two decades, man-made climate change has become increasingly recognized scientifically 
and politically as a real and urgent threat to humanity and a relevant consideration in shaping future 
development paths (Parry et al. 2007, pp. 44-47; Solomon et al. 2007, pp. 24-32). It has thus emerged 
as a rapidly growing international policy arena. Due to the far-reaching implications of the actions 
needed to tackling the climate change threat, enormous challenges subsist in the political sphere for 
reaching agreements on how, when and where to act.  
 
Tackling climate change implies several types of complementary responses. Mitigation implies 
reducing the emissions of anthropogenic carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases (GHG) 
to the atmosphere, in order to slow down climate change and prevent it from reaching dangerous 
levels. It, thus, addresses the causes of climate change. Adaptation aims to reduce the – already 
occurring – adverse consequences of climate change and to enhance positive impacts. Enabling 
measures encompass supportive actions towards developing and vulnerable countries, which lack the 
means or capacity to mitigate or to adapt to climate change by their own. They hence comprise 
capacity building activities, technology development and transfer and the provision of financial 
support. While all these types of measures are recognized as important constituents of a successful 
climate policy regime, the Climate Change Convention and its Kyoto Protocol have so far focused 
mainly on mitigation measures. The Bali Action Plan, agreed at Conference of the Parties (COP) 13 
in 2007, and the subsequent agreements in Copenhagen (COP 15, 2009) and Cancún (COP 16, 2010) 
provide for a stronger focus on adaptation, financing, capacity building and technology transfer in 
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the framework of a new international climate agreement still under negotiation. These new 
developments, however, are out of the scope of this dissertation. 
 
Signed in 1992 and ratified by 195 parties so far, the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) was the first international treaty agreed to promote global action 
towards preventing dangerous climate change. The Convention has the objective of achieving a 
‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’ (UN 1992, Art. 2). While it asks 
parties to report on progress towards this goal and also states the aim, for a group of countries, to 
return to the 1990 levels of GHG emissions, it lacks legally binding emission reduction targets for 
individual countries and an enforcement and compliance system. The UNFCCC places the heaviest 
responsibility for combating climate change on 27 industrialized countries and 12 economies in 
transition, which are the source of most past and current GHG emissions. Based on its principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities (UN 1992, Art. 3.1), and acknowledging that economic 
development is vital for developing countries, the Convention accepts that their emissions will 
continue to rise in the foreseeable years (UN 1992, chapeau). It nevertheless intends to help these 
countries to limit their emissions without compromising their growth.  
 
The Kyoto Protocol, the first legally binding treaty under the Convention, was adopted in 1997 and 
entered into force in February 2005. As of July 2011, 192 countries and the European Union are 
parties to the Protocol. Under Article 3.1 of the Kyoto Protocol (UN 1998), industrialized countries 
(known as Annex I or Annex B Parties)1 agreed to reduce their aggregate GHG emissions to at least 
5% below 1990 levels by 2008-2012.2  
 
From a macro-economic perspective, mitigation implies adopting low greenhouse-gas processes and 
technologies, ideally without slowing growth and development. In general, it is accepted that 
mitigation measures are more expensive in industrialized countries, where efficient and state-of-the-
art technologies are more common (Stern 2007, pp. 245-246). Furthermore, as climate change is a 
global problem, in terms of the environmental outcome it does not matter where the emission 
reductions take place, but how much is reduced overall. Hence, to facilitate that Annex I countries 
achieve their emission reduction targets in a cost-effective manner, the Kyoto Protocol established 
three market-based flexible mechanisms: International Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation (JI) 
and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The first mechanism allows for trading of 
emissions allowances between countries with reduction targets, while JI refers to investment in 
 
                                                      
1 Annex I of the UNFCCC lists the industrialized countries that were members of the OECD (Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development) in 1992, plus countries with economies in transition, including the Russian Federation, the 
Baltic States, and several Central and Eastern European States. Under the Convention, these countries agreed to reduce 
GHG emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol is an update of Annex I and lists those 
industrialized countries with mandatory emission reduction targets for the period 2008-2012. Countries in both lists are the 
same, except for Belarus and Turkey that do not appear in Annex B, and the US, which has not ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol. Following the commonly used terminology, throughout this dissertation the terms ‘industrialized countries’ and 
‘Annex I countries’ will be used indistinctly to denote those countries that currently have emission reduction commitments 
under the Kyoto Protocol. Countries without such emission reduction commitments will be denoted ‘developing countries’ 
or ‘non-Annex I countries’. It should be noted however that this concept of developing countries also includes rapidly 
industrializing economies such as China, south-eastern Asian countries, and others.  
2 Due to the fact that the US did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, this overall target will likely not be met. 
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emission reduction projects in other Annex I countries, and the CDM allows for emission reduction 
or sequestration projects in developing countries without emission targets (non-Annex I countries). 
CDM projects generate certified emission reduction credits (CERs)3 that can be acquired by Annex I 
parties and used for offsetting emissions in excess of their targets. Because CERs are used for 
offsetting (or compensating for) emissions made in Annex I countries, the CDM does not lead to 
more emission reductions, but only to a reduction in the cost of achieving the Annex I targets. 
 
The CDM is thus the only Kyoto Protocol instrument in which developing countries participate in 
climate change mitigation. It has the double aim of ensuring cost-effectiveness of mitigation 
measures, while at the same time assisting ‘Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable 
development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention’ (UN 1998, Art. 12.2). 
The need to ensure that CDM projects have an equitable geographic distribution across host 
developing countries emerged as a condition for the CDM’s second aim to be fulfilled (UNFCCC 
2001b, p. 20). 
 
In order to ensure that the CDM fulfils its double aim, a complex project cycle and governance 
system was established (see Figure 1.1). Proposed CDM projects first need to be approved by the 
Designated National Authority (DNA) of the country in which the project is located, which 
establishes the necessary criteria for the project to contribute to the country’s sustainable 
development priorities. A standardized Project Design Document (PDD) describing the project’s 
aims, baseline calculation,4 additionality determination,5 estimated emission reductions, monitoring 
plan and environmental impacts needs to be submitted to an independent auditor (the Designated 
Operational Entity or DOE), who validates that the project fulfils all the requirements for 
registration. Once the project has been validated, its registration by the CDM Executive Board (EB) 
is requested.6 If three or more members of the EB consider that some of the CDM requirements are 
not clearly substantiated, the project is subject to a review, otherwise it is registered. A review may 
result in requests for corrections; once these are fulfilled the project is registered, otherwise it is 
rejected. Once a project is registered, its emission reductions need to be monitored continuously and 
reported each year. A DOE verifies the monitoring report, and if everything is correct, the CDM EB 
issues the corresponding CERs. Here again, if the CDM EB detects any problems in the verification 
 
                                                      
3 CERs (Certified Emission Reductions) are the trading currency of the CDM. One CER corresponds to one tonne of 
CO2-equivalent emission reductions. Once a project’s reductions have been verified and certified by an independent 
auditor (so-called validator), it is issued the corresponding amount of CERs, which can be traded (or have been traded in 
advance) in the international carbon market. 
4 A CDM project’s baseline is the ‘scenario that reasonably represents the anthropogenic emissions by sources of 
greenhouse gases that would occur in the absence of the proposed project activity’ (UNFCCC 2005a, p. 16). It is thus the 
basis upon which the emission reductions accruing from a project are calculated. 
5 A CDM project is said to be additional if ‘anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases by sources are reduced below 
those that would have occurred in the absence of the registered CDM project activity’ (UNFCCC 2005a, p. 16), this is, if it 
demonstrates that the situation without project (baseline) is the most credible course of action in the absence of the CDM 
incentive. A more detailed discussion of the concept can be found in the introduction to Chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
6 The CDM EB is the body that supervises the operation of the CDM, and is responsible, inter alia, for the accreditation of 
DOEs, the approval of baseline and monitoring methodologies, the provision of recommendations to the COP/MOP on 
further modalities and procedures of the CDM, maintenance of a database of all projects, and the provision of guidance to 
CDM projects. The EB is fully accountable to the COP/MOP (UNFCCC 2005b). For fulfilling these tasks, it is assisted by 
several advisory bodies, such as the Methodologies Panel, the Accreditation Panel, the Registration and Issuance Team, the 
Small-Scale Working Group, the Afforestation and Reforestation Working Group, as well as the UNFCCC Secretariat. 
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of the monitoring report, it may request a review of the proposed issuance of CERs (UNFCCC 
2005a).  
 
 
Figure 1.1: The CDM’s project cycle 
 
Source: Adapted from (UNFCCC n.d.).  
 
 
At first sight, the statistics about the CDM depict the large success of this mechanism so far: with 
3337 registered projects in 70 countries as of August 2011, the CDM is expected to reduce almost 
500 million tCO2e emissions per year. Another 3222 projects still in the process of validation or 
registration will add about 380 million tCO2e annual reductions if they are successful (UNEP Risoe 
Centre 2011b).  
 
Substantial criticism has nonetheless overshadowed this success. Firstly, CDM projects are highly 
concentrated in a few advanced developing countries, particularly China, India and Brazil. While this 
geographical distribution closely mirrors the available emissions reduction potential and the 
investment conditions in the host countries (Dol!ak and Crandall 2007; Flues 2010; Lütken 2011; 
Winkelman and Moore 2011), it is perceived by some parties as unequal (see e.g. Government of Sri 
Lanka (2008, p. 24)), particularly in view of the benefits the CDM is expected to generate for the 
host countries: besides financial flows for emission reductions, technology transfer and sustainable 
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development benefits. The complexity of the CDM’s project cycle and the high transaction costs that 
it entails make it comparatively more difficult for poor countries and small projects to access the 
mechanism (Ellis and Kamel 2007).  
 
Secondly, many CDM projects have not brought about the expected sustainable development 
benefits, and in some cases there are substantial doubts about their social and environmental 
integrity (Lenzen et al. 2007; Borges da Cunha et al. 2007; Rudolph 2007; Sirohi 2007; Cole and 
Roberts 2011). While several schemes about how to effectively assess the sustainable development 
contribution of CDM projects have been proposed in the literature (e.g. Sutter and Parreño 2007; 
Olsen and Fenhann 2008), due to sovereignty concerns it is the prerogative of the host countries to 
decide upon and assess such sustainability criteria. Schneider (2007, p. 46) points out that ‘[g]enerally, 
it can not be observed that host countries prioritize projects with high sustainable development 
impacts by rejecting projects with little or no sustainable development impact’. 
 
Thirdly, the quality of the achieved emission reductions – in terms of being “real” and “additional” – 
has repeatedly been put into question (Michaelowa and Purohit 2007; Schneider 2007; Castro and 
Michaelowa 2008; Haya 2009). If emission reductions from CDM projects are not real but just 
artefacts of accounting tricks, then the mechanism is actually leading to an increase in emissions to 
the atmosphere. 
 
Fourthly, the CDM, relying on the market, focuses mostly on the cheap emission reduction options, 
leading to high rents and windfall profits for project developers (Wara 2008), and/or to the fear that 
selling the cheap emission reduction opportunities now will make mitigation in developing countries 
more expensive later (World Bank 2003, pp. 31-32). 
 
Finally, given the size of the mitigation challenge, not only industrialized countries need to have 
more ambitious emission reduction targets, but also developing countries need to contribute to 
reductions beyond offsetting (Gupta et al. 2007a). Demands for reforming the CDM, or creating 
other market mechanisms, so that corresponding incentives for developing countries are created, 
have become louder since Copenhagen, and the academic discussion has also embraced proposals on 
how to reform the CDM so that it can contribute to emission reductions beyond offsetting (see e.g. 
Schneider 2009). 
 
The CDM is a very innovative instrument. It is hence bound to have deficiencies. Table 1.1 presents 
an overview of the developments that the CDM has experienced since its creation, on the basis of 
the decisions taken by the COP and the COP/MOP (the Conference of the Parties acting as the 
Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol) each year. The table makes clear that, besides 
continuous managerial and operational improvements to the CDM, including transparency of EB 
decisions, several larger issues have been discussed (and in most cases solved) over time, such as:  
- the non-eligibility of policies as CDM projects, but the possibility to register programmes of 
activities as single projects;  
- whether new project categories, such as new HFCF-22 facilities, carbon capture and storage 
(CCS), or forests in exhaustion can be considered CDM projects;  
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- improvements to the demonstration of additionality;  
- improvements to the governance of the CDM and the competences of all the involved 
bodies, including the work of DOEs, through e.g. an accreditation standard and a manual;  
- several measures to improve the geographical distribution of the CDM, such as the 
identification of barriers, the launch of the Nairobi Framework, the elimination of fees for 
projects in Least Developed Countries, and more recently, the establishment of a loan 
scheme for CDM project development in underrepresented countries, and the development 
of top-down methodologies appropriate for their circumstances;  
- the simplification of baseline methodologies, e.g. through establishing simple methods for 
small-scale and micro-scale projects, and through the development of standardized 
baselines;  
- the treatment of national policies that support emission reductions in relation to the CDM. 
 
But negotiations about how to improve the CDM have also been embedded in a larger effort to 
agree on a new (or improved) climate change regime for the period after 2012. The entry into force 
of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005 and the recognition of the need to continue the efforts to combat 
climate change after the end of its first commitment period in 2012 led to renewed negotiations in 
the climate regime. In December 2005, the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for 
Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) was created in order to decide upon new 
emission reduction targets for Annex I parties after 2012. In December 2007, within the process of 
periodic review of the Kyoto Protocol established in its Article 9, the COP/MOP decided that the 
second review shall consider, among other topics, ‘[t]he scope, effectiveness and functioning of the 
flexibility mechanisms, including ways and means to enhance an equitable regional distribution of 
clean development mechanism projects’ (UNFCCC 2008d, p. 19). Also in December 2007, the Bali 
Action Plan agreed at COP 13 created the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative 
Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA), which negotiates a new agreement that will enable the 
broader implementation of the Convention.  
 
The negotiations in these fora include further proposals on how to address the different 
shortcomings of the CDM described above, and on the role of the CDM and other market or non-
market mechanisms in the post-2012 climate change regime. See, e.g. UNFCCC (2008a; 2008e) for 
syntheses of proposals relating to the CDM made under the Subsidiary Body for Implementation 
and under the AWG-KP. While some of these proposals – particularly those related to reforming the 
CDM – are already being implemented, as shown in Table 1.1, and others – especially those related 
to other mechanisms – are still under discussion, there has been very little empirical research on their 
expected effects on climate change mitigation in the South. 
 
This dissertation is thus motivated by the recognition that climate change mitigation needs to be 
strengthened, both in industrialized and developing countries. As the quotations at the beginning of 
this introduction illustrate, addressing the causes of climate change requires ambitious action by all 
countries. While this dissertation does not deny that such efforts are to be lead by industrialized 
countries, through emission reduction targets that need to be much more ambitious than they are at 
present, its focus is on incentives for action by developing countries.  
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In general terms, incentives for emission reduction action are similar for all countries: they will act if 
the benefits accruing from action are higher than the costs (Olson 1971). As will be described in 
Chapter 2, the public good nature of the climate makes such cooperation very difficult to achieve, 
both among industrialized and developing countries. Still, the Kyoto Protocol with its (albeit lenient) 
targets is a reality, and the negotiations towards a post-2012 climate regime are still (albeit very 
slowly) moving forward.  
 
Assuming that cooperation is, in general terms, possible, this dissertation looks at the effect of the 
design of the pre-2012 climate regime on future cooperation by developing countries, specifically at 
the role of the CDM in creating incentives – or disincentives – for developing country action 
towards reducing emissions. This implies action that will not only reduce the costs of mitigation 
elsewhere through offsetting, but that will itself generate short- or long-term emission reductions. 
Academically, the dissertation thus seeks to contribute to the literatures on international cooperation, 
environmental economics and public policy design. In practical terms, it expects to provide new 
insights in the analysis of proposals to reform the CDM. 
 
For doing this, the dissertation relies on three general assumptions about how the CDM may create 
positive incentives towards reducing emissions in developing countries:7  
(1) Positive incentives can be created if the CDM is successful in facilitating investment in low-
carbon technologies in countries in which these technologies would otherwise be out of 
reach. Even if CDM credits are used for offsetting, the investments incentivized would 
generate a more climate-friendly long-term development path and prevent a lock-in to 
emissions intensive technologies. I assume that this condition is applicable to Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs), in which poverty alleviation concerns have a clear priority 
over global environmental goals.  
(2) In countries that are already able to afford less emissions-intensive technologies (advanced 
developing countries),8 the CDM can create positive incentives by setting the ground for a 
transition towards non-offset mitigation instruments. 
(3) Both in advanced and in less developed countries, the CDM can incentivize mitigation if it 
promotes investment in low-carbon technologies that are not yet completely mature or 
commercially competitive, contributing to learning and scale effects that make these 
technologies more competitive in the long term.  
 
 
                                                      
7 The theoretical rationale behind these assumptions will be explained in detail in Chapter 2. 
8 For the purposes of this dissertation, advanced developing countries are defined on the basis of the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, this is, in terms of the countries’ responsibility for causing 
climate change and capabilities for dealing with it. Under this rationale, countries with high GHG emission levels (high 
responsibility) and with high income per capita (high capability) are considered ‘advanced’. I do not define a threshold for 
how high these indicators should be, as this is a political decision that will eventually need to be negotiated by the 
UNFCCC parties. However, several authors have proposed different ways of differentiating among developing countries in 
the climate regime (see e.g. Berk and den Elzen 2001; Ott et al. 2004, p. 26ff; Michaelowa et al. 2005; Karousakis et al. 
2008; Bakker et al. 2009).  
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Starting from these assumptions, I seek to address the gap in empirical research on the potential 
effects of the CDM and some of its reform proposals on climate change mitigation in the South, 
through an empirical assessment of: 
(a) Concrete measures that have been proposed to address barriers to its implementation in 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and make its geographical distribution more equitable; 
(b) Potential perverse incentives that the CDM may generate in its major host countries; and 
(c) The effect of domestic climate-friendly policies in non-Annex I countries on investment in 
expensive emission reduction opportunities through the CDM. 
 
Figure 1.2 graphically presents the structure of the dissertation, in relation to the assumptions and 
the research objectives listed above. Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, Chapter 2 details 
the conceptual framework that guides the study. 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Structure of the dissertation 
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Chapters 3 and 4 address the objective (a) described above, by looking at measures proposed to 
generate incentives for increased CDM participation in LDCs and other poor countries with limited 
emission reduction potential and financial capacity. Such increased participation is desirable from 
two points of view. On the one hand, LDCs would benefit from more CDM projects because they 
would generate an inflow of financial resources, technology transfer and, per the CDM’s objectives, 
sustainable development. On the other, while the climate change regime explicitly recognizes the 
limited capabilities of LDCs (UN 1992, Art. 4.9; Decision 5/CP.7 in UNFCCC 2001a, p. 33), so that 
they are not expected to undertake mitigation actions on their own, it is desirable that they should 
achieve growth in a more climate-friendly manner, to avoid a lock-in to high emitting technologies 
(assumption (1) above). The CDM, which was expected to contribute to this goal, has not been able 
to do so due to its limited presence in these countries.  
 
The establishment of preferential access measures for CDM projects from LDCs is one of the 
measures that have been proposed to address the issue of the unequal geographical distribution of 
CDM projects. While the UNFCCC has granted financial support for projects in underrepresented 
CDM host countries (UNFCCC 2009), the EU has unilaterally introduced quality restrictions on the 
CDM projects that will be accepted in its carbon market from 2013 on. Among these restrictions is a 
clause establishing that, in case no new international climate change agreement is reached, only CERs 
from LDCs, SIDSs (Small Island Developing States) or countries with bilateral agreements with the 
EU will be accepted in the European Emissions Trading System (European Parliament 2009b). So 
far, very little research has been carried out on whether such preferential access measures will have 
the desired effect of improving the geographic distribution of the CDM. To my knowledge, only a 
very recent article by Bakker et al. (2011) has assessed the potential impacts of preferential treatment, 
discounting and other forms of CDM differentiation on the future market. This research, however, 
was not yet published at the time of writing of the related sections of this dissertation. 
 
In Chapter 3, this gap in research is addressed by assessing the impact of such preferential access 
measures on the carbon market through the comparison of several emission reduction credit supply 
and demand scenarios for the post-2012 period. The main methodological contribution of the 
chapter consists of a new approach for estimating future CER supply on the basis of data on the 
current CDM pipeline, which is more accurate than a simple aggregation of the existing figures, as it 
incorporates the effects of failing to achieve registration at the different stages of the CDM project 
cycle. Furthermore, lessons for preferential treatment for LDCs under the CDM are drawn from a 
comparison with preferential access measures that have been implemented in the past in another 
international policy area: agriculture. The contribution of the chapter to the general goals of the 
dissertation is an empirical exploration of the potential ability of preferential access measures to 
improve CDM activity in LDCs. The chapter has been written with Axel Michaelowa. My 
contribution comprises the literature review on the situation and barriers of CDM projects in LDCs 
and on the existing preferential access measures in the climate regime; the conceptualization of the 
supply and demand scenarios; data collection and all calculations leading to the estimation of supply 
and demand of CERs for each scenario; the comparison with the preferential access agreement in 
agriculture; and writing up. Axel Michaelowa’s contribution was on defining the research question; 
providing the input and discussion for the sections about the role of Programmes of Activities for 
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CDM in LDCs; he also provided suggestions on relevant parameters for the supply scenarios (e.g. 
probability of validation, delay function) and had previous work on estimating CER supply for the 
2008-2012 period, on which basis the formulae for supply in the 2013-2020 period were built; he 
provided expert knowledge about possible future pledges by Annex I parties, as the basis for 
calculating demand from some countries; and made editorial suggestions to the latest versions of the 
chapter. 
 
Chapter 4 analyses the introduction of discount factors for emission reductions achieved in advanced 
developing countries and its effect on the geographical distribution of the CDM, with particular 
focus on LDCs and Sub-Saharan Africa. Under discounting, each tonne of emission reductions 
achieved through the CDM would have a value of less than one tonne in the international carbon 
market. Depending on its concrete design, discounting the value of emission credits could be used to 
compensate for non-additional CDM projects; to increase the incentive for advanced developing 
countries to move from the CDM to own mitigation commitments (if the discount rates are set up to 
be more stringent for more advanced countries); and to improve the competitiveness of less 
developed countries as hosts for CDM projects (Chung 2007; Michaelowa 2008b; Schneider 2009). 
While there has been substantive discussion in the literature on how discounting of emission 
reductions could be implemented, and with what purposes it could be used, there has been little 
analysis on what would be its effects on the carbon market. Stoft (2009) makes a stylized analysis of 
the effects of discounting (and other proposed reforms of the CDM) on the basis of microeconomic 
theory, but does not look at implications for geographical distribution of projects. In Chapter 4, the 
impact of discounting on the competitiveness of CDM host countries is analysed by creating and 
comparing CDM-specific marginal abatement cost curves for four regions under two different 
discounting schemes.  
 
This chapter (as well as Chapter 5) relies on the creation of a new dataset of CDM projects’ 
abatement costs, which were estimated on the basis of information provided in the projects’ public 
documentation. The main methodological contribution of the chapter is thus the method for 
estimating these abatement costs in a credible and comparable manner, the compilation of the 
dataset, and the presentation and analysis of the information on the basis of marginal abatement cost 
curves, including the effect of discounting. The chapter was written in collaboration with Axel 
Michaelowa. My contribution was the literature review on discounting and marginal abatement cost 
curves; all data collection, methodology and estimation of CDM abatement costs and marginal 
abatement cost curves, as well as the discussion of these results; writing up of the chapter. Axel 
Michaelowa’s contribution was on the definition of the research question; the definition of the 
discounting schemes differentiated by host countries; part of the discussion of the effects of 
discounting on geographical distribution of the CDM; quality control over cost data; and editorial 
reviews to the latest versions of the chapter. 
 
In a second part of the dissertation (Chapters 5 and 6), I look at the situation for advanced 
developing countries, which have been successful in the CDM, and which are under pressure for 
taking on own mitigation actions beyond offsetting soon (objective (b) above). Some undesired 
perverse incentives that the CDM might generate for the countries that are benefitting the most 
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from it have been identified early on. Firstly, the financial transfers provided by the CDM to 
developing countries may make them unwilling to depart form the CDM to a more costly emissions 
reduction target (Wara and Victor 2008; Burniaux et al. 2009; Hagem and Holtsmark 2009). 
Secondly, the need to demonstrate the additionality of CDM projects may discourage host country 
governments from adopting policies that may contribute to reduce emissions (Hepburn 2007). 
Thirdly, even before the full implementation of the CDM, developing country experts feared that it 
would exhaust the cheap emission reduction opportunities in these countries, leaving them with only 
more expensive options to address eventual emission reduction targets of their own (World Bank 
2003, p. 32; Narain and van't Veld 2008). Such concerns affect the negotiations about the future of 
the CDM and of other market mechanisms even today.  
 
Chapter 5 thus focuses on analysing whether such a “low-hanging fruits” problem has arisen in the 
current CDM. Theoretical economic models have been used to analyse under which conditions the 
low-hanging fruits problem would arise (e.g. Akita 2003; Germain et al. 2007; Narain and van't Veld 
2008). However, as these analyses were made before the CDM had started to work, there was no 
empirical evidence yet of the problem. Chapter 5 addresses this gap by looking empirically at the 
question whether the CDM has so far exhausted many of the emission reduction opportunities 
existing in its most successful countries, using again marginal abatement cost curves for six of the 
countries that currently host most CDM projects, and relying on a larger, self-compiled dataset of 
CDM project abatement costs. The chapter thus seeks to contribute to the more general discussion 
on the role of offset mechanisms in achieving global GHG emission reductions. 
 
Among other things, the abatement cost analysis in Chapter 5 reveals that there are some surprisingly 
expensive projects in the CDM. This appears puzzling from the point of view that rational economic 
actors would exhaust the cheap emissions abatement opportunities first, before investing in more 
expensive ones. It also seems to contradict the CDM critics’ argument that its focus on cheap 
credits, coupled with its project-by-project nature and the low carbon price, is not contributing to a 
real systemic change in energy or industrial systems in developing countries. Chapter 6 investigates 
this phenomenon starting from the hypothesis that domestic-level financial incentives are 
contributing to finance relatively expensive CDM projects (objective (c) above). Using econometric 
techniques, this chapter thus analyses whether domestic policies providing financial incentives to 
climate friendly projects – specifically renewable energy projects – in developing countries have an 
effect on the size of the CDM investment in renewable energy projects, after controlling for all other 
factors that may be influencing such investments as well. This chapter addresses several gaps in the 
literature. In general terms, I am not aware of any cross-country study that systematically analyses the 
factors leading to investment in renewable energies, especially in developing countries. While the 
chapter is focused on renewable energy investments within the CDM, it also controls for other 
drivers, and analyses in particular the effect of national policies. Furthermore, it combines insights 
from the general literature on investment in renewable energy, with insights from the more specific 
literatures on barriers to CDM investment and factors leading to CDM investment, and with the 
literature on determinants of the adoption of environmentally friendly policies, in order to develop a 
theoretical framework for the empirical assessment. More specifically, within the literature on the 
CDM, the discussion about the interaction between national policies and the CDM incentive has 
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been theoretical (e.g. Hepburn 2007) or based on case studies (He and Morse 2010). This chapter 
provides first systematic empirical evidence that such an interaction exists. 
 
In the last part of the thesis (Chapter 7), a summary of the conclusions and main contributions of 
this dissertation to the literature are presented.  
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2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
In this chapter, insights from the environmental economics literature on addressing public goods 
problems – in this case, the Earth’s climate – are combined with insights from political economy and 
public policy on international environmental regimes and their effectiveness, in order to describe the 
incentives framework in which the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism and its 
implications for climate change mitigation in developing countries will be analysed empirically later.  
 
 
2.1 Climate change as a global public good problem 
The economics literature describes public goods as those that are non-rival (their enjoyment by an 
individual does not reduce the possibility for others to enjoy them as well) and non-excludable (no 
one can be excluded from enjoying them) (Samuelson 1954; Cornes and Sandler 1996, pp. 8-9). The 
Earth’s climate is a public good and as such, in the absence of public policy, there are no incentives 
to bear the costs of reducing emissions to avoid dangerous climate change, if others will benefit 
without bearing any costs (free riding problem). It is additionally a global good, both in terms of its 
causes (greenhouse gases can be emitted anywhere on Earth with the same effect on the atmosphere) 
and its consequences (while unevenly distributed, dangerous climate change will eventually have 
impacts worldwide). Furthermore, it is a long-term problem, in which the effects of today’s 
emissions will mostly be felt in the distant future (Stern 2007).  
 
To address global public goods, international cooperation is necessary. The collective action 
literature emphasizes that, in the absence of coercion from above, actors will cooperate and adopt 
institutions that regulate the use of the public good only if their private benefits from cooperation 
are positive (Olson 1971; Ostrom 1990). The climate change problem thus constitutes a setting in 
which cooperation is very difficult to achieve, because an individual country’s mitigation efforts will 
not bring about positive benefits unless global emissions do not increase. Since most countries’ 
emissions levels are small compared to the total, controlling global emissions depends on the 
probability that other countries cooperate, which is difficult to enforce in an international setting, 
thus leading to free-riding problems (Dol!ak 2001).   
 
The economics game theoretic literature on the stability of coalitions (e.g. Barrett (1990) and Carraro 
and Siniscalco (1992; 1997)) explains why in the climate regime, few countries are willing to join the 
coalition of those cooperating in reducing GHG emissions. It discusses how to expand such 
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coalition and incentivize emission reduction efforts by those countries unwilling to cooperate, and 
suggests that side payments – trading emission reduction commitments with other benefits such as 
financial aid, favourable trade policies or technology transfers – are useful in achieving this goal 
(Kverndokk 1993; Fankhauser and Kverndokk 1996). 
 
In line with the above, the neoliberal school of thought in international relations posits that countries 
act as self-interested rational actors pursuing absolute gains rather than gains relative to those of 
other countries, and that cooperation among them can be achieved through international regimes 
(Keohane and Nye 1989). The focus of analysis is here the international organizations and 
institutions and their effects on countries’ behaviour (e.g. Keohane et al. 1993; Bernauer 1995). This 
theory can be applied to international environmental agreements, as has been done for example by 
Sprinz and Vaahtoranta (1994). They argue, also in line with public choice theory, that country 
delegates negotiating international environmental agreements pursue the interests of their domestic 
actors, such as preventing the effects of pollution on their own citizens, avoiding high costs of 
compliance and benefitting their own pollution abatement industry (see also Michaelowa (2000) for 
an application of the public choice framework to European climate policy).  
 
The Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism, which is the focus of this dissertation, can be 
understood in these terms, as it has been designed with the aim of satisfying the interests of the 
stakeholders involved in negotiating its creation: industrialized countries looking for ways to reduce 
the costs of compliance with their emission reduction targets; developing countries interested in 
attracting foreign investment and transfer of clean technologies; actors that are vulnerable to climate 
change, interested in ensuring as much mitigation as possible; actors that are looking for business 
opportunities, such as clean energy providers; and actors advocating fair outcomes, such as a 
distribution of climate policy obligations according to the polluter pays principle, and a distribution 
of benefits that is equitable. The CDM as an instrument thus seeks to reconcile environmental 
integrity (“additionality”), economic efficiency and sustainable development (“equitable geographic 
distribution”) goals, in an attempt to satisfy the preferences of all involved. 
 
As described in the introduction, however, the CDM has not been capable of fully reconciling these 
goals. Furthermore, new scientific findings make now clear that action towards preventing dangerous 
climate change needs to be much broader than so far, involving deeper emission cuts by 
industrialized countries and action towards stabilization of emissions by developing ones. A process 
of regime transformation has thus started (Young 1982), comprised of the international negotiations 
towards a new (or reformed) post-2012 climate agreement that is envisaged to improve cooperation. 
 
Insights from the environmental economics, public policy and innovation economics literature are 
used next to discuss and analyse the attempts that are currently being made to reform and improve 
the CDM. 
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2.2 Policy instruments to tackle climate change 
In the face of environmental externalities such as those arising in the climate change problem, the 
environmental economics literature indicates that the costs of the externality need to be internalized 
– this is, a price needs to be set on the polluting GHG emission – in order to change the incentives 
structure for the polluters (see e.g. Turner et al. 1993).  
 
The Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC thus established a cap-an-trade system. Following the 
principles of polluter pays and historical responsibility (known in the climate regime as the principle 
of “common but differentiated responsibilities”), emission targets were only set for the group of 
industrialized and transition parties listed in its Annex B (for a discussion of the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities, see e.g. Rajamani 2000; Matsui 2002; Hepburn and 
Ahmad 2005). Cost effectiveness and “when” flexibility (Goulder and Pizer 2006) were granted 
through the establishment of the three flexibility mechanisms introduced in the previous chapter: 
international emissions trading, Joint Implementation, and the Clean Development Mechanism.  
 
Emissions trading and Joint Implementation take place among countries with emission reduction 
targets, so that they provide flexibility without potentially affecting the emission reductions to be 
achieved. With the CDM, the case is different. In theory, it is a zero sum game: each tonne of 
emission reductions achieved through the CDM can be used to offset one tonne of emissions in 
industrialized countries. CDM emission reductions are so to say added to the emissions allowance of 
the buyer country. However, as it allows to borrow emission reductions from countries that do not 
have an emissions cap themselves, the achieved reductions cannot be measured against an 
observable reference level. Thus, CDM project proponents need to demonstrate that their project 
reduces emissions below an hypothetical (non observable) baseline that would have happened in the 
absence of the CDM. Furthermore, they have to show that the project would not have happened in 
the absence of the CDM incentive (“additionality”).  
 
This unique feature of the CDM motivated since its beginnings a vast literature on how to establish 
the counterfactual baseline and demonstrate that projects are “additional” (Carter 1997; Baumert 
1999; Sugiyama and Michaelowa 2001; Bode and Michaelowa 2003; Greiner and Michaelowa 2003; 
Dutschke and Michaelowa 2006). Already at this stage it was noted that the characteristics of the 
CDM, including the need for demonstrating additionality, might generate perverse incentives for 
developing countries (e.g. Bode 2005).  
 
 
2.3 Incentives generated by the CDM 
2.3.1 A framework for analysis 
The literature summarized above has provided an overview of the general incentives existing for 
cooperation in the management of an international public goods problem, and the characteristics of 
the policy choices that have been taken to address the problem of climate change internationally. 
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The CDM as an international offset mechanism has however unique characteristics that make it 
generate unexpected incentives that affect the willingness of developing countries to engage in 
further mitigation action. Due to the novelty of the CDM, the literature dealing with these incentives 
is relatively limited and mainly based on analysis of the observed performance of the mechanism.  
 
However, the policy analysis literature can be helpful in systematizing and analysing this aspect of the 
CDM. Policy analysis can be defined as ‘a process of multidisciplinary inquiry designed to create, 
critically assess, and communicate information that is useful in understanding and improving 
policies’ (Dunn 2004, p. 2). It is thus problem-oriented and pragmatic. One of the schools of 
thought within policy analysis seeks to explain the results and effects of public action, both in terms 
of the realization of their objectives and of the appearance of unintended or undesirable effects 
(Knoepfel et al. 2007). The perverse incentives generated by the CDM as an international public 
policy can be analysed in these terms.  
 
The analysis of policies and international regimes considers three levels of effectiveness of 
institutions. At the output level, the actual rule-making and negotiation behaviour is analysed. At the 
outcome level, the implementation of the rules and the resulting behavioural change of the involved 
actors are assessed. Finally, at the impact level, the real contribution to the ultimate target of the 
policy or regime is evaluated (Easton 1965; Underdal 2004; Young 2004). Due to the interrelatedness 
of policies from different issue areas and their overall complexity, policies may often result in 
unintended consequences (Dunn 2004). Unintended effects of policies are not necessarily 
undesirable (Merton 1936). They can involve positive unexpected benefits (windfalls) or negative 
unexpected effects (perverse results or incentives).  
 
For the CDM case, the sets of rules, methodologies, procedures for implementation and the 
decision-making processes leading to them could be considered the outputs. The actual CDM 
projects; their quality, functioning and distribution; the appearance of new actors involved in 
designing, assessing and approving these projects and their functioning; and the participation of 
countries in the system would be some outcomes of the policy. Finally, the environmental 
effectiveness – the amount of real reductions in greenhouse gas emissions – and the contribution to 
sustainable development in the host country would be the main impacts. In addition, there are 
feedbacks between these three levels. The current incentives and performance of the CDM in terms 
of project quality, type and distribution and especially environmental effectiveness will have an 
important role in the decision-making towards a new (or reformed) climate agreement (future 
output). These incentives and their relation to decisions about a new (or reformed) climate 
agreement are the focus of this dissertation, and due to the fact that they were mostly not foreseen 
by the policy-makers designing the CDM, they can be considered as unintended consequences that 
this instrument may have on the participation of its host countries in a future climate regime.  
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2.3.2 Unintended consequences 
2.3.2.1 Positive incentives 
This section describes how the CDM can have positive incentives towards climate change mitigation 
in developing countries.   
 
The CDM can have a positive long-term effect on broader technological paths and on the evolution 
of the energy systems of developing countries towards a more sustainable, diversified system, which 
could be considered a contribution of the CDM towards environmental effectiveness (GHG 
emission reductions) in a long-term perspective. It can be argued that more advanced developing 
countries should use more effective means of achieving such broad transformation of the energy 
system, because the project-by-project nature of the CDM is too limited in scope (e.g. Figueres and 
Newcombe 2007), and because these countries may already be capable of adopting sectoral or 
national emission reduction actions (or targets). However, poorer countries with smaller economies, 
in particular Least Developed Countries, still need a substantial amount of external support for 
achieving such transformation.  
 
Especially as economies in poor countries still need to develop and infrastructure – including in the 
energy sector – still needs to be constructed, there is a window of opportunity for cleaner 
technologies to be used in achieving this development. The window of opportunity concept, derived 
from the evolutionary innovation economics (see e.g. Dosi (1982) or Nelson and Winter (1982)) ‘is 
based on the observation that, owing to lock-in effects, the diffusion of new technologies, 
particularly in the field of major technologies and the framework of technological trajectories, is 
scarcely possible. A window of opportunity only opens if the existing technology development 
system becomes unstable and thus allows for new technologies to hit the market’ (Rennings 2007, p. 
21). While in more developed economies this may happen whenever the dominant technology needs 
to be replaced or expanded (reinvestment cycles), in LDCs the technology still needs to be 
established in the first place.  
 
From a theoretical view, it is generally argued that the changes brought about by the CDM are used 
to offset emissions generated in industrialized countries, so that these changes should not be counted 
towards a reduction of GHG emissions in the host countries. A possible counter argument could be 
that CERs for CDM projects are issued only up to a maximum of 21 years, while capital investments 
could last longer, so that the reductions achieved after the crediting period could be counted towards 
the host country’s own reductions. Another counter argument is related to the window of 
opportunity concept explained above: if the CDM can contribute to fostering investment in clean 
technologies in LDCs (and using the window of opportunity), it will thus contribute to a lower long-
term emissions path.  
 
A second potential positive incentive of the CDM towards mitigation relies on the fact that it 
contributes to covering the incremental costs of clean technologies (in comparison with traditional, 
more emissions intensive ones). If the CDM can help to cover the incremental costs of technologies 
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that are still not mature, helping to induce learning effects and cost reductions, then it might generate 
positive spillover effects beyond the individual CDM projects.  
 
Technological innovation is a process over time, covering from research and development to 
invention, to the first commercial application, to the diffusion of the technology by means of the 
market. But it is not a linear process; it rather has complex feedbacks: The transition between the 
three stages is not automatic; technologies may fail along the process; further progress in research 
and development might affect products already in the market; learning from products already in use 
can have an impact on research and new innovations (Stern 2007). 
 
These learning effects and other dynamic increasing returns, such as economies of scale, can arise 
throughout the diffusion of the technology, and lead to diminishing costs of its production and use. 
These diminishing costs are usually reflected in experience curves (for a recent example of the 
application of experience curves to renewable energy technologies, see Junginger (2005)). New 
technologies may not become cost effective until significant investment has been made and 
experience developed. In some sectors, as in power generation, this may mean decades of time and 
very high costs. Public policies are thus needed to support the diffusion of such immature 
technologies. The CDM, by financially supporting such diffusion (by itself or coupled with other 
supportive policies) may thus contribute to long-term learning effects and cost reductions that make 
the clean technologies competitive in an earlier moment (Stern 2007). 
 
This section has described two potential positive incentives of the CDM, one related to the window 
of opportunity to achieving a cleaner energy system in LDCs, and the other one related to the 
possibility to contribute to long-term cost reductions of immature clean technologies. The empirical 
analyses in Chapters 3 and 4 relate to the first of these positive incentives, by looking at the 
effectiveness of proposals that have been made to improve the participation of LDCs in the CDM. 
The analysis in Chapter 6, by looking at why the CDM portfolio includes expensive emission 
reduction options, seeks to provide insights into the second of these positive incentives. 
 
2.3.2.2 Perverse incentives  
Within the existing literature on the performance of the CDM, I have identified five potential 
perverse incentives that may be generated by this instrument, which can be summarized in three 
types of effects, as shown in Table 2.1. These five perverse incentives are described in the following 
paragraphs. 
 
A first way in which the CDM generates disincentives for action is the ‘paradox of participation’ 
described by Gupta et al. (Gupta et al. 2007b, p. 409), which relies on effects of the balance between 
supply and demand for carbon credits: the more CDM projects are developed and generate credits, 
the lower will be the price for such credits, given a fixed demand for carbon credits (which is 
determined by the emission reduction targets of Annex I countries and their domestic policies to 
reduce emissions). This, in turn, may affect the financial feasibility of the projects, in case they 
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require the CDM income for assuring such feasibility (which should be the case for “additional” 
projects). 
 
 
Table 2.1: Perverse incentives characterizing the CDM and their potential effects 
Perverse incentive Potential effect 
Paradox of participation Affecting the amount of emission reductions 
achieved through the CDM  Asymmetric nature of the CDM  
Trade-off between CDM additionality and 
domestic policies 
Affecting potential mitigation through own 
climate-friendly policies in developing 
countries  
The CDM as a financial transfer instrument Affecting the willingness of CDM host 
countries to adopt future emission reduction 
targets 
The fear that the CDM might exhaust cheap 
emission reduction options 
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of the literature review below. 
 
 
Secondly, the CDM has an asymmetric nature, which means that it rewards emission reductions but 
does not penalize emission increases, thus working as a subsidy to emission reductions.  If the price 
of emission reductions is much higher than the abatement costs, such a subsidy may create the 
perverse incentive to invest in emissions intensive activities first, so that credits can be earned later 
for reducing their emissions (Burniaux et al. 2009). There are fears that such perverse incentives may 
affect projects that reduce the emissions of industrial gases. Projects that reduce the emissions of the 
greenhouse gas HFC-23 from facilities manufacturing the refrigerant HFCF-22 are an example: as 
HFC-23 is a very potent GHG, revenues accruing from the sale of CERs in projects reducing such 
emissions may even be higher than revenues from the sale of the plant’s HFCF-22 production (Wara 
2008). Due to concerns that this could result in the installation of new manufacturing facilities solely 
for the purpose of earning CERs, CDM projects are so far not allowed in new HFCF-22 facilities. 
On top of this, there are concerns that individual installations may be increasing production 
artificially in order to earn more CERs (CDM Methodology Panel 2010; Schneider et al. 2010; 
Schneider 2011). 
 
Thirdly, as will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6, the CDM has also created moral 
hazard problems for developing country governments, which may be discouraged by the CDM 
additionality rule from enacting policies that contribute to reducing emissions (Hepburn 2007). To 
avoid this perverse incentive, the CDM authorities adopted the E+/E- rule in November 2005, 
which states that climate-friendly policies passed after the year 2001 are not to be counted towards 
the additionality constraint of CDM projects. Since this rule was adopted, developing countries have 
been allowed to combine new domestic policies that support climate friendly investments with the 
CDM subsidy, up until 2009, where debate on this issue started again in the case of Chinese wind 
energy projects (He and Morse 2010).  
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Fourthly, besides being a mechanism that improves the “where” flexibility of the carbon market 
established by the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM is also a financial transfer from industrialized to 
developing countries that provides a subsidy to emission reduction projects. As a result, the mere 
existence of the CDM and the opportunity to receive financial transfers from it means that those 
actors benefitting from it (both private and government actors in CDM host countries and in 
countries that wish to host CDM projects in the future) will be interested in maintaining such 
transfers in the future. This means that the CDM itself may discourage its host countries from taking 
a step further in climate change mitigation and, for example, adopting own emission reduction 
targets (Wara and Victor 2008; Burniaux et al. 2009; Hagem and Holtsmark 2009).  
 
The extent to which this happens depends on how much the country is profiting from the CDM, on 
the price difference between CDM emission reduction credits and emission allowances from 
countries with reduction targets, and on how stringent the emission reduction target is. If a country 
adopts a very lenient target that can be met by applying policies it had anyways envisaged to adopt, 
then it may easily achieve a surplus of allowances, which can be sold in the international carbon 
market at a price that is usually higher than the CDM credit price (CDM credit prices are negatively 
affected by performance and delivery risks that arise because credits are only issued ex-post, after the 
emission reductions have taken place). The importance of this effect is that, while the CDM has 
been conceived as a transitional mechanism for developing countries to prepare for adopting 
mitigation commitments in the future (Hepburn 2007), it itself may undermine this goal.  
 
Given the already existing unwillingness of developing countries to adopt emission reduction targets 
discussed above, and the postulated need to encourage them to do so through, e.g. side payments, 
the effect of the CDM is that, in addition, developing countries will also need to be compensated for 
the benefits they will potentially lose from no longer being able to participate in the CDM once they 
adopt emission reduction targets.  
 
Fifthly, CDM project opportunities have been characterized as exhaustible resources (Rose et al. 
1999): developing countries fear that participating in the CDM will exhaust the cheap emission 
reduction opportunities and leave them only with more expensive reduction options for compliance 
with future reduction targets. While the strength of this argument is limited, due to the characteristics 
of the carbon market (see e.g. Akita 2003; Germain et al. 2007; Narain and van't Veld 2008; as well 
as Chapter 5 of this dissertation), it has repeatedly been used in the climate change negotiations. 
Hence, the potential trade-off between present rents from the CDM and future low cost abatement 
opportunities is another source of disincentives for CDM host countries to adopt emission reduction 
targets.  
 
The theory so far says that the CDM may in many ways discourage climate change mitigation in 
developing countries: by affecting the amount of emission reductions that the CDM itself may 
generate, by preventing developing country governments from adopting domestic climate friendly 
policies that contribute to reduce emissions (even in the absence of emission reduction targets), and 
by discouraging developing countries from adopting emission reduction targets.  While a more 
detailed analysis of all of these types of perverse incentives is out of the scope of this dissertation, 
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the empirical analysis in Chapter 5 will look deeper into the one described in the fifth place, and 
analyse whether such the CDM has so far exhausted an important share of the cheap emission 
reduction opportunities in some of its main host countries (see Figure 1.2).  
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3. WOULD PREFERENTIAL ACCESS MEASURES BE SUFFICIENT TO 
OVERCOME CURRENT BARRIERS TO CDM PROJECTS IN LEAST 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES?9 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
As described in the introductory chapter, the CDM has been an overall success in terms of the 
amount of projects and the projected emission reductions that have been mobilized. However, its 
project portfolio is very unevenly distributed across host countries. China, India and Brazil account 
for about 73% of all projects in the pipeline and 76% of expected annual CERs. Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) host just 68 CDM projects in the pipeline (1.2%), out of which only 23 projects 
are registered (UNEP Risoe Centre 2011a).  
  
This uneven distribution of the CDM has been repeatedly criticized, as it directly affects both 
countries’ expectations of receiving CDM-related financial flows, and the realization of the second 
goal of this mechanism, which is to contribute to sustainable development in its host countries. 
Several studies have discussed the impact of this distribution on equity, efficiency and environmental 
considerations (Cosbey et al. 2005; Keller 2008).  
 
The Marrakech Accords that specify the detailed rules of the mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol 
emphasize the importance of an equitable geographical distribution of CDM projects across 
countries and regions (UNFCCC 2001b). Thus, already in 2001, the Conference of the Parties to the 
UNFCCC called for the CDM Executive Board (EB) to report ‘to the COP/MOP on the regional 
and subregional distribution of CDM project activities with a view to identifying systematic or 
systemic barriers to their equitable distribution’ (UNFCCC 2001b, p. 28). The COP/MOP 
confirmed this at its first meeting in 2005, asking the EB also to suggest options to address these 
barriers, and to broaden participation in the CDM (UNFCCC 2005c, p. 98). The Copenhagen 
conference in 2009 decided that simplified procedures for demonstrating the additionality of very 
small projects would be introduced, payment of registration fees would be postponed and upfront 
financing for CDM project validation and registration would be provided for projects in hitherto 
underrepresented countries (UNFCCC 2009).  
 
                                                      
9 This chapter is largely based on following article: Castro, P. and Michaelowa, A. (2011), ‘Would preferential access 
measures be sufficient to overcome current barriers to CDM projects in least developed countries?’, Climate and Development 
, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 123-142.  
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Also, for the period after 2012, the EU – currently the main market for CERs – has established 
special import quotas for CERs from LDCs or Small Island Developing States (SIDSs). Additionally, 
in the case that no new international agreement on climate change mitigation is reached, specific 
qualitative restrictions on CERs will apply, some of them specifically favouring LDCs over other 
CDM host countries, as will be discussed in section 3.3.2.  
 
Another specific measure taken with the aim of addressing the high transaction costs of the CDM, 
especially for small-scale activities that can be replicated many times, was the introduction of 
Programmes of Activities (PoAs)10 in 2007. While not specially designed to improve the participation 
of LDCs in the CDM, it is believed and expected that the types of activities suitable for PoAs are 
more in accordance to the needs of LDCs than the activities typical in larger-scale CDM projects 
(Figueres and Newcombe 2007).  
 
Analysts are also discussing other ways of differentiating countries in the CDM. Proposed means 
include: differentiated eligibility of CDM host countries, discounting of emission reduction credits 
from different host countries, introducing a cap to the amount of emission credits that can be issued 
from projects in each country, and a more directed allocation of demand towards particular host 
countries (Bakker et al. 2009; Castro and Michaelowa 2010).  
 
While all these proposals to improve the geographical distribution of CDM projects are on the table, 
and in particular measures for granting preferential access to CERs from LDCs are already being 
implemented, there is very limited research on whether these proposed solutions will have the 
desired effect.  
 
The following questions thus arise: Could preferential access measures such as the ones described 
above really improve the participation of LDCs in the CDM? Can new modalities of CDM projects, 
such as the PoAs, which aim to target more distributed emission sources, provide a contribution? 
What are the general risks of preferential access measures? 
 
This chapter seeks to address this gap in research by developing a general market model for CDM 
emission reduction credits supply and demand under different post-2012 climate policy scenarios, 
which reflect the preferential access measures described above. Its main methodological contribution 
relies in a new approach for estimating CER supply from the CDM portfolio, which is more accurate 
than a direct aggregation of the existing portfolio, as it incorporates the effects of failing to achieve 
registration at the different stages of the CDM project cycle. This supply is contrasted with the 
projected demand for CERs from industrialized countries after 2012, which is based on official 
emission projections and plausible assumptions about the stringency of emission reduction targets 
 
                                                      
10 Programmes of Activities are a modality of CDM projects, which allows for bundling similar activities taking place in 
different locations into one single project. Their aim is to simplify access to the CDM to emission reduction activities that 
are dispersed in nature and can begin in different points in time, such as the distribution of efficient cooking stoves, or the 
installation of micro hydro power stations. 
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they will adopt for the period 2013-2020.11 In terms of the general goals of the dissertation, the main 
contribution of this chapter is an empirical exploration of the potential ability of preferential access 
measures to improve CDM activity in LDCs.  
 
We start by discussing the current and potential supply of the CDM in LDCs, and presenting an 
overview of the barriers limiting CDM development in poor countries. In section 3.3, we describe 
the proposals in the international climate negotiations and in the EU climate and energy package to 
promote CER supply from LDCs and underrepresented CDM host countries. Section 3.4 develops 
possible CER supply and demand scenarios for the period 2013-2020. For estimating the supply, we 
use an extrapolation of the figures provided by the UNEP Risoe Center CDM Pipeline on the 
current CER supply, corrected for the project approval and credit issuance rates, and assuming 
different post-2012 regulatory scenarios. For the demand, we project the baseline emissions of 
developed countries until 2020 and assume a range of likely emission reduction targets and of 
supplementarity in the use of CDM credits. In section 3.6 we assess the impact of preferential access 
policies on CER supply from LDCs, and the potential sustainable development benefits from CDM 
projects and PoAs in LDCs. In section 3.6 we draw a comparison between a preferential access 
agreement in the agricultural trade system and the climate regime, before concluding in section 3.7.  
 
 
3.2 The CDM in LDCs 
3.2.1 Current and potential supply of CDM projects from LDCs 
As described above, LDCs currently host about 1.2% of the CDM projects in the pipeline. In terms 
of volume of credits, they are expected to generate just around 0.5% of all CERs projected by 2012 
(UNEP Risoe Centre 2011a). The foreseeable short-term CER supply from LDCs, including projects 
that are in the pipeline and project ideas mentioned in country-specific studies or CDM promotion 
websites (Chea 2006; Uprety 2006; Waste Concern 2006; Ministry of Water and Environment, 
Republic of Yemen 2008), amounts to about 115 million CERs over the whole lifetime of the 
projects. This supply is dwarfed by the potential in just China, India and Brazil, which will reach 
about 6.7 billion CERs by 2020. 
 
However, a recent World Bank study on the abatement potential in the energy sector in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (De Gouvello et al. 2008) estimated a potential of about 4 billion CERs from Sub-Saharan 
LDCs over a project lifetime of 10-21 years. The study used existing CDM methodologies to identify 
technologies that could both promote GHG emission reductions and support energy supply in the 
region. It made a bottom-up inventory of over 3200 potentially feasible clean energy projects 
applying 22 technologies in 44 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Comparing this theoretical potential 
 
                                                      
11 Note that both the supply and the demand scenarios presented in this chapter were developed before the Copenhagen 
meeting took place, so that the assumptions made here relate to the situation in the international negotiations during that 
time – this is, many industrialized countries had not yet announced their emission reduction pledges for the post-2012 
period. 
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with the real number of CDM projects from these countries gives an idea of the scale of the barriers 
for implementation the LDCs face. 
 
The emergence of the Programmes of Activities (PoAs), bundles of decentralized projects 
(Component Project Activities or CPAs) within the umbrella of one individual CDM programme, 
could provide an inroad for the type of small-scale projects that are expected to be most likely 
hosted by LDCs. When in June 2007 the CDM Executive Board agreed on rules for PoAs, it was 
hoped that they would significantly reduce transaction costs and mobilize the diffusion of small 
technologies, where the exact number and location of projects would not be known ex ante. 
However, for over two years, PoAs did not really move forward. The main reasons were regulatory 
barriers, such as the liability of the project validator for any part of the PoA that might be found 
faulty even years after its registration, the limitation to one baseline methodology and the debundling 
rules for application of small-scale methodologies. The liability requirement in particular led 
validators to refuse to validate PoAs. After a long regulatory tug of war, the EB removed most of the 
barriers in May 2009. Moreover, validators now shift the liability to the PoA developer through a 
private law contract. Nevertheless, even after the May decision, PoAs only moved slowly – until 
December 2009, when submissions actually exploded. As of January 2011, 77 PoAs have been 
submitted for validation, and 6 have been registered (UNEP Risoe Centre 2011a). 
 
The distribution of PoAs among host countries differs considerably from standard CDM projects. 
The large players are comparatively underrepresented, whereas countries that have set up good CDM 
institutions such as Bangladesh, Indonesia and Vietnam have several PoAs. LDCs have a share of 
10.4% of projects compared to about 1% in the normal CDM pipeline. 
 
3.2.2 Barriers 
What are the reasons for the marginal involvement of LDCs in the CDM? Mitigation potential, 
institutional CDM capacity and the general investment climate have been used as predictors of 
attractiveness of host countries for CDM projects, with the finding that about 74% of LDCs are very 
unattractive, 24% have limited attractiveness, and only 1% are attractive for CDM projects outside of 
the forestry sector (Jung 2006). Several econometric studies have confirmed these expectations 
(Dol!ak and Crandall 2007; Flues 2010; Winkelman and Moore 2011). Three arguments may be at 
play here. On the one hand, income and growth are indicators of the availability of domestic 
resources to finance CDM investments. On the other, growth, but also population size, carbon 
intensity and other general indicators of the size of the economy indicate the existence of emission 
reduction opportunities (mitigation potential). Finally, good macroeconomic indicators encourage 
foreign investors to enter these attractive markets, which is relevant for the case of bilateral CDM 
projects. For such bilateral CDM projects, in addition, the existence of past bilateral relationships 
(such as high trade volumes, bilateral aid or past colonial ties) also helps to explain the projects’ 
geographical distribution, as found by Dol!ak (2007). More radically, in a recent working paper, 
Lütken (2011) shows that defining what is “equitable” in terms of CDM project distribution depends 
strongly on how this distribution is measured. He argues that attempts to qualify the geographic 
distribution of the CDM need to take into account circumstances that make certain countries highly 
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unlikely to host CDM projects, such as on-going armed conflicts, or very small size as in several 
small island states. In addition, he shows that when measuring CDM project distribution in different 
ways (e.g. in terms of number of projects per level of national CO2 emissions or per GDP level), 
very different pictures may be drawn. For example, if the number of expected CERs is compared to 
the current national CO2 emission level, then LDCs on average outperform all other regions 
analysed in Lütken’s study. Similarly, Flues (2010) discusses that, comparing across otherwise similar 
countries, a 1% increase in population on average leads to a 1% increase in the number of projects 
hosted.  
 
More specific barriers for CDM implementation in LDCs, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, have 
been thoroughly discussed within the Nairobi Framework. This initiative was launched at 
COP/MOP2 in Nairobi (2006), with the aim of helping these countries to improve their level of 
participation in the CDM. This initiative was useful for launching a discussion of the specific barriers 
that hinder CDM project implementation in these countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa (for 
further details, see Muyungi 2006; Agyemang-Bonsu 2007; UNEP 2007; World Bank 2007; Kinkead 
2007; Ellis and Kamel 2007).  
 
Following Ellis and Kamel (2007), Michaelowa (2003) and Silayan (2005), important general 
characteristics of successful CDM host countries are: 
- An enabling business environment: stable and transparent general institutional framework, 
stable and predictable investment laws 
- The existence of relevant financial incentives, such as tax reductions for renewable energies, 
import tariff reductions for CDM technology, etc. 
- Reduced ownership restrictions for foreigners 
- Undistorted energy pricing policies 
- Local technical capacity and awareness of the CDM as a project financing option 
- Availability of underlying project finance, especially through local financial capacity 
- Availability of CDM project options that are sufficiently large to compensate for the CDM 
transaction costs; this is coupled to the country’s emissions mitigation potential 
- Ability to minimize other country or project-related risks that may render the performance 
of the project uncertain 
- Existence of historical business or aid relationship with emissions credit buyers (Dol!ak and 
Crandall 2007). 
 
CDM-specific characteristics are: 
- Existence of CDM-related institutions: Kyoto Protocol ratification and establishment of an 
operational national CDM approval authority  
- Clear, capable and effective CDM policy framework: clear rules for national approval, timely 
and simple procedures, low national transaction costs, experience and continuity of national 
approval staff 
- Existence of CDM promotion offices 
- CDM awareness in government, industry, consultants and financial intermediaries 
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- Existence of baseline data for project design 
- Existence of applicable CDM methodologies for the desired project type 
- No constraints on eligibility of potential project types – for example by the EU ETS or 
other major credit buyers, or due to temporary nature of credits (in the case of forestry 
projects) 
- Capacity of auditing companies (validators or ‘Designated Operational Entities’) in the 
relevant region. 
 
One of the barriers most frequently mentioned is the limited institutional and technical capacity to 
develop and implement CDM projects. In the public sector, it is not only the Designated National 
Authorities (DNAs) for the CDM that need to be established and have a minimum budget, but also 
the institutional framework for the sectors involved in the project (e.g. energy) is crucial. In the 
private sector, the presence of trained national CDM consultants is essential for coping with the 
complex CDM rules at affordable costs. The limited access to financing is an equally important 
barrier. On the one hand, domestic financial institutions lack capacity and awareness of the CDM as 
an investment option. On the other, the unattractive investment climate in these countries 
discourages foreign investors. Indeed, the CDM mainly functions as an additional revenue source for 
companies that already have financing. Annex I countries and companies are investing in CDM 
projects only in countries where they are already present (e.g. through subsidiary electricity 
companies), where they see a market for their products, and where stability is guaranteed (Lütken 
and Michaelowa 2008). 
 
There are few possibilities to develop large CDM projects in LDCs, as the energy demand and 
industry are still small in these countries.12 In Africa, the largest emission reduction potential lies in 
sectors that are not significant in the CDM at present (forestry, agriculture, reducing the use of non-
renewable biomass). As many countries already rely heavily on hydroelectric power, their baseline 
grid emissions are low. This makes grid-connected renewable energy and energy efficiency projects 
less viable, as their potential to earn CERs is reduced. However, while many observers assumed that 
small projects were not viable through the CDM due to the high transaction costs (Michaelowa and 
Jotzo 2005), nowadays there is a noteworthy amount of very small CDM projects and a substantially 
higher amount of very small CPAs in the pipeline (see Figure 3.1), which suggests that the 
transaction cost barrier can be overcome.  
 
Another important barrier is the availability of data for baselines and monitoring: gathering this 
information is too costly for just one or two projects. Hence, in countries where the emission 
reduction potential is low, nobody makes this effort. Finally, the lack of infrastructure (roads, large 
equipment but also laboratories for calibrating measurement devices) is another limiting factor for 
the CDM in LDCs. 
 
                                                      
12 Poverty and lack of infrastructure reduce the demand for energy services in poor countries: energy use would be higher if 
people could afford it or the infrastructure was in place. Depending on whether this suppressed demand is taken into 
account or not, baselines for CDM projects may change significantly (for a discussion of the issue see Winkler and Thorne 
2002). 
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It is however possible to overcome these barriers, as the case of Honduras shows. Honduras is not a 
LDC, but a small and poor country, with an unstable political regime and unattractive investment 
climate. Corruption and crime are high, access to finance difficult. Despite substantial CDM capacity 
building and financial support for establishing a functional DNA, staff replacement after changes of 
government has led to losses in institutional capabilities. As most of its electricity is produced from 
fossil sources, Honduras has some mitigation potential from renewable energy. Additionally, 
Honduras was an early mover in the privatization of the electricity sector in Central America, and 
financial incentives for renewable energy are in place. However, its electricity system is highly 
inefficient, and prices can only be sustained due to subsidies (Figueres 2002; Keller 2008; Lokey 
2009). Nevertheless, Honduras hosts 30 active CDM projects, 16 of which are registered (UNEP 
Risoe Centre 2011a). Honduras has apparently benefited from the leadership of a strong group of 
entrepreneurs in the renewable sector, who initiated all the CDM projects and created an association 
that allowed them to pool and share their experience. There is also a local CDM consultancy and a 
couple of international ones with a presence in the country (Keller 2008; Lokey 2009). This domestic 
leadership, coupled with the early support from international donors, may be the key for the success 
of Honduras in the CDM.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Share of very small projects in CDM pipeline (%) 
 
Source: UNEP Risoe Centre (2011a). 
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3.3 Preferential access measures in the climate regime 
3.3.1 In the international climate negotiations 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, several measures to improve the regional distribution of 
CDM projects have been discussed in the international climate negotiations. However, the 
negotiations at COP 15 in Copenhagen proved a roller-coaster ride for LDC interests. The initial text 
proposed a subsidy for development of the CDM project documentation (Project Design Document 
or PDD) and for validation of projects in LDCs with less than 10 registered projects. A second text 
version referred to ‘less developed’ countries, without specifying what countries were referred to. But 
the final text just kept the reference to countries with less than 10 registered projects, without 
limiting the subsidy to any group of countries, so that now even rich Middle Eastern oil-exporting 
countries qualify. Moreover, the initially foreseen grant mutated into a loan that would have to be 
repaid upon the first issuance of CERs, and the total volume of the fund is capped at the interest 
accruing on the surplus funds of the EB, which will limit it to 1-2 million US$ per year. On a positive 
note, the COP decision also states that grid emission factor calculations in LDCs should be more 
flexible13 and that suppressed demand will be taken into account in baselines (UNFCCC 2009).14 It 
remains to be seen, however, what impact these provisions will have on actual project 
implementation.  
 
3.3.2 In the EU climate and energy package 
In the European Climate and Energy Package for 2013-2020, the EU has committed itself to 
reducing its overall emissions to at least 20% below 1990 levels by 2020, and to 30% below 1990 if a 
new global climate change agreement with comparable efforts by other developed countries is 
reached (European Parliament 2009a; European Parliament 2009b). It imposes new limits on the 
amount of CERs from CDM projects and ERUs (Emission Reduction Units) from JI projects that 
will be allowed to be imported into the EU between 2008 and 2020. Different provisions apply for 
the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), which covers the electricity generation sector and all 
heavy industries (iron and steel, cement, oil refining, glass, lime, bricks, ceramics, and pulp and 
paper), amounting to about half of the EU-27’s CO2 emissions (European Commission 2010), and 
for the sectors outside the ETS (so-called non-trading sectors), such as households and agriculture. 
Assuming that the EU ETS credit imports would be distributed linearly along all years in the period 
2008-2020, Table 3.1 presents the potential CDM/JI credit demand from the EU for the period 
2013-2020, in the scenarios with and without an international agreement.  
 
 
 
                                                      
13 Grid emission factors are used in the CDM to estimate the baseline GHG emissions from the production of electricity in 
each land or region. This information is then used to calculate how much abatement a project in the electricity sector 
generates. The calculation of grid emission factors requires data from all installations producing electricity in the respective 
land or region, which poses a barrier especially in LDCs. 
14 For a definition of suppressed demand, see Footnote 12 above. 
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Table 3.1: Potential credit demand from the EU for the period 2013-2020 
Source 
20% reduction  
(MtCO2e) 
30% reduction  
(with international agreement)  
(MtCO2e) 
EU ETS   954 1824 
Non-trading sectors   750 1300 
TOTAL 1704 3124 
 
 
The package includes a provision with high relevance for LDCs. For the non-trading sectors, the 
limit for credit imports under the 20% reduction scenario has been generally set at 3% of the sectors’ 
emissions in 2005. Twelve countries are allowed to import up to 4% of their 2005 emissions.15 The 
extra 1% granted to these countries – around 80 million CERs - can be imported only from LDCs or 
Small Island Developing States (SIDSs) (European Parliament 2009a). 
 
There are some additional conditions for the acceptance of CERs or ERUs in the European system, 
one of them again particularly relevant for LDCs. While the restrictions on approved project types 
sought by the Commission (on the basis of a consideration of ‘high quality projects’) were not 
approved, forestry credits will still be banned from the EU ETS, but are accepted for the non-
trading sectors. Additionally, if no new climate agreement is reached, only the following CERs or 
ERUs will be accepted: 
- Credits issued during 2008-2012 
- Credits from projects registered before 2013, but issued later 
- CERs from projects registered after 2012 in LDCs 
- Credits from projects in countries where a bilateral agreement has been reached with this 
aim. 
Thus, in the case that no international agreement is reached, the EU is very clearly attempting to 
direct its demand for carbon credits towards LDCs. In the case that a new international climate 
agreement is reached, such restrictions do not apply, but from 2013 onwards the EU will accept 
credits only from countries that have ratified this agreement (European Parliament 2009b). 
 
The original EU agreement provided for the possibility to add further qualitative criteria restricting 
the acceptance of credits in the EU system from 2013 onwards. Criteria discussed at the time 
included accepting only renewable energy and energy efficiency projects, or only ‘high quality’ 
projects, which were however not concretely defined. In 2010, a debate emerged about the quality of 
the emission reductions generated by CDM industrial gas projects. Industrial gas projects reduce the 
emission of gases with very high global warming potential from industrial facilities – notably the 
emissions of HFC-23 from the production of refrigerants, and of nitrous oxide from adipic acid and 
nitric acid production. Although the additionality of these projects was initially not contested (in the 
absence of related legislation, there is no incentive other than the CDM revenue to implement the 
 
                                                      
15 Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. 
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projects), they have been criticized because the CDM revenue largely exceeds the cost of reducing 
the emissions and can even exceed the value of the actual feedstock production at the plant (Wara 
2008). The CDM may thus provide the perverse incentive of increasing production in order to 
receive more revenues from the CDM. Criticism increased due to apparent flaws in the baseline 
methodology for some of these projects, which would allow such perverse incentives to subsist 
(CDM Methodology Panel 2010; Schneider et al. 2010; Schneider 2011). In response to this debate, 
in 2011 the EU adopted a ban on the use of CERs from projects that destroy HFC-23 and nitrous 
oxide from adipic acid production (European Commission 2011). 
 
Since the international negotiations under the Climate Change Convention and the Kyoto Protocol 
have so far not yielded any new legally binding emission reduction targets for industrialized countries 
after 2012, the EU climate package is currently the only legally-defined market for CDM projects 
after 2012. This is why Europe’s decisions regarding the CDM are so important for the future of this 
mechanism.  
 
Some questions remain as to the extent to which these measures can boost CDM development in 
LDCs: Are other Annex I countries going to match this EU initiative, and to what extent? Will the 
financial and technical barriers for CDM development in LDCs be overcome through these 
measures? And even if they are, will LDCs be able to match potential demand with an adequate 
supply? In the following section, in order to try to answer some of these questions, a few possible 
post-2012 climate policy and carbon demand scenarios are presented. They will then be matched 
with our estimations of carbon credit supply from the CDM. 
 
 
3.4 Post-2012 climate policy and market demand-supply scenarios  
In order to assess the effect of possible preferential access for LDCs and other policy scenarios for 
the future CDM, we create carbon credit demand and supply scenarios with and without an 
international agreement for the period 2013-2020.  
 
3.4.1 The market for CDM emission reductions credits 
The demand and supply scenarios that will be presented below are based on the consideration that 
the CDM is a market that was initiated by regulation. As a result, both the supply of credits and the 
demand for them respond to the characteristics of the regulations concerning the CDM. 
 
While the main regulatory body governing the CDM consists of the Kyoto Protocol, subsequent 
COP/MOP decisions (importantly the Marrakesh Accords), and more specific guidance issued by 
the CDM EB, the discussion of preferential access measures above demonstrates that also 
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regulations from buyer countries on the acceptability of CERs in their internal emissions trading 
systems may affect CDM supply and demand.16  
 
Under these circumstances, there may be different views about what constitutes the demand for 
CERs and what constitutes supply. In this chapter, we thus define potential demand for CERs as the 
difference between projected baseline emission levels and emission reduction targets in buyer 
(Annex I) countries for the period 2013-2020, accounting additionally for regulations on the amount 
of CERs allowed to contribute to filling this difference (“supplementarity”).17 CER supply is defined 
as the projected amount of emission reduction credits that will be issued from CDM projects in the 
2013-2020 period, considering the effects of barriers and delays within the CDM project cycle on 
such issuance, and considering also regulations that establish what kind of CERs are eligible during 
that period. 
 
3.4.2 Demand scenarios 
Three potential CER demand scenarios are defined on the basis of the status of UNFCCC 
negotiations and pledge announcements as of mid-2009: scenario 1, in which no international 
agreement on post-2012 emission reduction targets is achieved; scenario 2, in which such an 
agreement is realized; and scenario 3, in which an agreement is realized but a financial crisis reduces 
the demand for CERs by slowing down growth and reducing emission levels in Annex I countries.  
 
For the demand scenario with no international agreement, we take the announced 20% reduction for 
the EU, and the greenhouse gas reduction targets announced by other Annex I governments till mid-
2009 that are not contingent on an international agreement. For countries that by that time had not 
made any announcements on reduction targets, we assume plausible ones. For the scenario with an 
international agreement, we take the 30% target for the EU and tighter targets for other Annex I 
governments, which we expected could be agreed during the negotiations. The scenario with 
financial crisis presupposed that an international agreement is reached, thus taking the same targets 
as scenario 2, but it assumes that the baseline emissions in Annex I countries will be lower than in 
the base case during the first two years due to the effects of the financial crisis. Table 3.2 presents 
the concrete assumptions of the original demand scenarios. 
 
To estimate emission demand in the described scenarios, the baseline emission levels of Annex I 
countries18 are taken from projections from the EU climate package described above; European 
 
                                                      
16 Also regulations of CDM host countries can affect supply, for example by defining the characteristics of the projects that 
are acceptable in the national context (sustainability criteria). This aspect is however not analysed here, as there is no 
evidence so far that CDM host countries have been keen on adopting such restrictions for CDM projects. 
17 The Kyoto Protocol established that using of CERs from CDM projects to meet Annex I countries’ emission reduction 
targets has to be supplementary to domestic action. However it was never defined how much domestic action should be 
done, and how large would the CDM contribution be allowed to be. This definition is thus de facto left to each individual 
Annex I party.  
18 Baseline emission levels are those that are expected to happen in the absence of emission reduction targets, but 
considering the effect of other climate-friendly policies and measures that countries have already adopted or envisage to 
adopt for reasons other than meeting those targets. Official figures exist for many Annex I countries, as they use them to 
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Environmental Agency (EEA) projections for non-EU European countries (EEA 2005); energy-
related CO2 emissions from the Energy Information Administration (EIA) of the US Department of 
Energy and extrapolations of UNFCCC inventories for forestry and non-CO2 emissions for the 
USA, Canada and Russia (UNFCCC 2008b; US EIA 2008a; US EIA 2008b); projections from the 
Australian Government (2008) for Australia; and extrapolations of UNFCCC emissions inventories 
for the years 2000-2005 for other countries (UNFCCC 2008b).  
 
In the EU-27 case, we assume that CERs are required to be supplementary to domestic emissions 
reductions, as this group has already announced that only 50% of the effort may be covered by 
CDM emissions credits. All other countries have not yet defined whether and how they will define 
supplementarity. For them, we assume that a range between 50% and 100% of the required 
reductions could be covered through the CDM. We choose, where available (Australia and other 
European countries), the low emissions path projections, which also account for some domestic 
mitigation action. The resulting demand scenarios are shown in Figure 3.2 to Figure 3.4. 
 
 
Table 3.2: Carbon credit demand scenarios 2013-2020: assumed emission reduction targets  
Country / 
Group 
Scenario 1:  
No agreement 
Scenario 2: International 
agreement 
Scenario 3:  
Financial crisis 
EU-27 20% below 1990, credit import 
up to 50% of reduction effort 
30% below 1990, credit import 
up to 50% of reduction effort 
Same as in 
Scenario 2, but 
baseline 
emissions during 
first two years 
are 3% less than 
in the base case 
US Back to 1990 emission levels 10% below 1990 levels 
Canada Back to 1990 emission levels 10% below 1990 levels 
Japan 10% below 1990 levels 20% below 1990 levels 
Australia 5% below 2000 levels 15% below 2000 levels 
Russia 20% below 1990 levels 30% below 1990 levels 
Belarus and 
Ukraine 
20% below 1990 levels 30% below 1990 levels 
Other Annex I 20% below 1990 levels 
(including Turkey with 5% below 
2012 levels) 
30% below 1990 levels (including 
Turkey with 10% below 2012 
levels) 
Note: During the Copenhagen meeting and in the Copenhagen Accords, some of these pledges were 
restructured or strengthened. However, the new pledges are non-binding and most of them are also 
conditional on, e.g., a legally-binding agreement. Thus, the reduction levels assumed here are still realistic. 
 
 
 
                                                      
project the level of effort that will be required to meet their targets or pledges. We take these official figures wherever 
possible.  
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Figure 3.2: Carbon credit demand 2013-2020 for the “no agreement” scenario 
 
Note: The main bars indicate demand when countries are only allowed to cover up to 50% of their emission 
reductions through the use of CDM credits; the ‘error bars’ show demand when there is freedom to use the 
CDM for offsetting as much as desired. As the EU has already established by law that only 50% of emission 
reductions can be covered by the CDM, no ‘error bar’ exists in this case. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Carbon credit demand 2013-2020 for the “international agreement” scenario 
 
Note: The main bars indicate demand when countries are only allowed to cover up to 50% of their emission 
reductions through the use of CDM credits; the ‘error bars’ show demand when there is freedom to use the 
CDM for offsetting as much as desired. As the EU has already established by law that only 50% of emission 
reductions can be covered by the CDM, no ‘error bar’ exists in this case. 
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Figure 3.4: Carbon credit demand 2013-2020 for the “financial crisis” scenario 
 
Note: The main bars indicate demand when countries are only allowed to cover up to 50% of their emission 
reductions through the use of CDM credits; the ‘error bars’ show demand when there is freedom to use the 
CDM for offsetting as much as desired. As the EU has already established by law that only 50% of emission 
reductions can be covered by the CDM, no ‘error bar’ exists in this case. 
 
 
Figures 3.2 to 3.4 show that the demand for CERs will mainly be affected by whether there is an 
international agreement on climate change mitigation or not (with agreement, demand for CERs is 
roughly double than with agreement), and by how supplementarity is defined in the Annex I 
countries outside of the EU (a lax supplementarity rule adds between 65% and 109% more demand 
for CERs, depending on the scenario). The financial crisis has only a small negative impact on CER 
demand as compared to the scenario with international agreement.  
 
3.4.3 Supply scenarios 
How will CDM project submission develop in the future? As in the past, the start-up of new project 
types such as supercritical coal power plants, carbon capture and storage (CCS) and forestry could 
lead to rapid changes in the composition of the inflow. Moreover, the interpretation of additionality 
by the EB and changes in baseline methodologies can have sudden and massive impacts. Supply 
would decrease if a project category is suddenly deemed non-additional as happened with cement 
blending.  
 
Another key influence is the development of post-2012 negotiations, including present Annex I 
countries pressing for increased mitigation actions by developing countries, and, as outlined above, 
possible limitations on the import of CERs on the basis of quality considerations.  
 
Due to these manifold influences, it is very difficult to forecast future CER volumes. We deal with 
these difficulties by proposing seven different supply scenarios that consider potential changes in 
regulations that may affect the eligibility of different CDM project types (or sources). We additionally 
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attempt to make the projections as realistic as possible, by accounting for the effects of failures in 
registration and validation and delays during the CDM project cycle. 
 
Besides the inflow of new project types and projects of types that are already in the CDM pipeline, 
the key parameters influencing supply are the delay of project implementation, non-validation rate of 
submitted projects, the rejection rate of validated projects and the performance rate of registered 
projects. We therefore derive our supply scenarios based on the projected 2020 CERs from UNEP 
Risoe Centre’s CDM Pipeline as of end of 2008 (UNEP Risoe Centre 2009), modified in order to 
account for these parameters. None of the following estimations include the potential supply from 
Programmes of Activities, since so far there are very few PoAs registered, making projections very 
uncertain. It should be noted that the resulting projections are based only on extrapolation of the 
observed amount of projects that have been submitted for validation and registration, accounting for 
observed trends of submissions and approval rates over time. No economic modelling or 
equilibrium analysis has been used in deriving the scenarios. Thus, the only way in which we make 
the demand influence our supply estimations is when we assume some policy-related restrictions to 
the acceptability of CDM projects.  
 
Equation 3.1 estimates the amount of CERs that will be generated until 2020 from projects that are 
registered until 2012, by adding up the CERs projected from CDM projects submitted for validation 
up to 2008, to CERs projected from CDM projects that will be submitted in the following years up 
to 2012 (data not yet observed), correcting both for the probability of a failure in the validation stage 
and the probability of a rejection in the registration stage, to the CERs projected from CDM projects 
that are already registered, including finally a correction factor for the performance of projects in 
terms of issuance of credits:  
 
 
,    (3.1) 
 
where: 
CERsubm = CER volume by 2020 listed in PDDs of projects submitted up to 2008 
CERinfl,y = CER volume by 2020 listed in PDDs of projects to be submitted in each year between 
2008 and 2012  
pvalid = probability of validation of projects submitted until 2012 
prej = probability of rejection of validated projects by the CDM EB 
CERreg = CER volume by 2020 listed in PDDs of currently registered projects 
pperf = CER issuance rate in % of CERreg 
 
We do not include possible delays in this formula because, for projects with a 10-year crediting 
period starting before 2010, any delay will not change overall CER volumes. Delay only matters for 
renewed projects with 7-year crediting periods.  
 
Equation 3.2 then estimates the amount of CERs that will be generated from projects to be 
registered between 2013 and 2020, by taking the projected annual inflow of CERs from projects to 
perfregrejvalidylsubmsum pCERppCERCERCER !+"!+= # ))1()((
2012
2008
,inf2020
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be submitted for validation and correcting it for delays in the registration cycle, the probability of a 
failure in the validation stage, the probability of a rejection in the registration stage and the 
performance in terms of issuance of credits: 
 
 
,            
(3.2) 
 
where: 
CERinfl,y = CER volume by 2020 listed in PDDs of projects to be submitted in each year between 
2013 and 2020 
ddelay, y = percentage of pre-2021 CERs remaining due to delay of project implementation, for each 
year, calculated according to equation 3.3 below. 
 
The data for CERsubm, CERinfl,y and CERreg. has been obtained from the UNEP Risoe Pipeline (2009), 
and result from the projections by the project developers of how many emission reduction credits 
they expect to obtain until the year 2020. The figures for CERinfl,y have been adjusted to account for 
the shorter crediting period up to 2020 that projects being submitted in the future will have.  
 
Until recently, it was unknown which projects have failed validation as validators did not publish 
their rejections. In January 2008, the head of the DOE Forum stated in the context of the 38th EB 
meeting that the five largest DOEs had rejected 369 projects during validation. About two thirds of 
the rejections were due to a lack of additionality. If one puts the number in relation with all projects 
registered and submitted for registration by January 2008, the share of rejections would be 32%. 
Thus, for the probability of validation of projects we assume, for a business-as-usual case, 70%.19 
 
Rejection rates have increased over time, from less than 2% in 2005 to 10% in 2007 and early 2008 
(UNEP Risoe Centre 2009). We thus take 10% as input for our business-as-usual projection of CDM 
supply in 2013-2020. Average CER issuance performance is set at 98% of predicted CER generation 
as achieved in the past. We use this figure for the CER issuance rate in the business-as-usual case. 
However, issuance performance varies greatly across project types, so that the median performance 
is only 82%. We use this median for modelling stricter CDM supply scenarios. 
 
Delays in project development lead to loss of CERs before a certain date (2012 or 2020), even if not 
all of them lead to an overall loss of CERs if the CDM continues afterwards.20 The effect of this 
delay on estimated CER volumes depends on a specific project’s remaining crediting period and 
 
                                                      
19 The UNEP Risoe Centre CDM pipeline started to include information on failure in validation from June 2009 onwards 
and now uses these figures to also provide a failure-corrected estimation of future CER supply. These figures were, 
however, not publicly available when the analysis in this chapter was made.  
20 If a project suffers a delay in its registration when its operations have already started, it will lose the CERs for the 
emission reductions achieved before the date of registration. As project developers can change the start date of a project’s 
crediting period once after registration by simple communication to the CDM Executive Board, a delay of implementation 
for an already registered project does not lead to an overall loss of CERs during the crediting period, but to a loss 
compared to the quantity estimated to accrue by a specific date. 
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would thus theoretically have to be summed up case by case. This also applies to those registered 
projects whose crediting period only starts in the future. Therefore, the impact of delays depends on 
the shape of the CER inflow over time. Assuming that the crediting period of all projects coming in 
during a year would on average begin in the middle of this year, the discount of CERs due to delay 
can be quantified using the function provided in Equation 3.3: 
 
 
,                  (3.3)  
 
where: 
ddelay,year = share of pre-2021 CERs in terms of projected CER level for projects submitted during the 
current year remaining due to delay of project implementation 
durationpre-2021 = number of months between July of year until end of December 2020 
delay = delay of project implementation (months) 
 
We assume, for all projects, that the delay in project implementation averages 6 months. 
 
Using the equations and parameters described above, we generate seven CER supply scenarios for 
the period 2013-2020. In a very strict scenario (Scenario A), only the credits generated from projects 
registered up to 2012 would be accepted in the global carbon market. In a status quo scenario (B), 
the CDM would continue with the same rules, stringency, range of host countries and project types 
as today, continuing to increase credit supply beyond 2012. Following a ‘high quality CERs’ demand 
policy by the EU, Annex I countries could agree to no longer accept credits from industrial gas 
projects (Scenario C). Annex I countries could agree to only accept CERs from LDCs for projects 
registered after 2012 (Scenario D). Additional measures to create appropriate incentives that 
promote CDM development in LDCs, added to the rule depicted in Scenario D, would form an 
active LDC-promotion scenario (Scenario D2). Stronger pressure by developing countries to accept 
REDD (reduced emissions from deforestation and degradation) and CCS projects and clarify rules 
for programmatic CDM could lead to a larger CDM supply (Scenario E). Finally, a stricter ‘high 
quality’ scenario would allow CERs from post-2012 projects with stricter additionality considerations 
and again without industrial gas projects (Scenario F). 
 
Table 3.3 provides an overview of these scenarios, their assumptions and calculations. In all cases, 
we deduct the CER demand projected for 2008-2012, which we have previously estimated will total 
3300 MtCO2e (Michaelowa 2008a), from the overall CER supply for 2008-2020. Based on the 
current geographical distribution of CDM projects, we estimate supply from the following five 
regions: LDCs, Latin America, Europe and Middle East, Asia-Pacific other, and Africa other. For 
scenario D2, to account for the extra inflow of CDM projects from LDCs resulting from active 
CDM promotion in these countries, we take 50% of the theoretical potential estimated by a World 
Bank Study for LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa (De Gouvello et al. 2008) and add it to the CERs 
projected from the CDM pipeline. The results of our projections are shown in Table 3.4. 
 
 
! 
ddelay,year =
durationpre"2021 " delay
durationpre"2021
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Table 3.3: CER supply scenarios 2013-2020: assumptions 
Scenario Description Values for parameters 
A 
Only CERs up 
to 2012 
Only CERs generated from 
projects registered up to 
2012 are considered for 
supply up to 2020 
pvalid =  70% 
prej   =  10% 
pperf =  98% 
supply = CERsum2020 – demand2008-12  
B 
CDM same 
CDM continues with same 
rules, same stringency and 
same countries 
pvalid =  70% 
prej   =  10% 
pperf =  98%  
supply = CERsum2020 + CERadd2020 – demand2008-12  
C 
No new 
industrial gases 
CDM continues with same 
stringency and countries 
after 2012, but without 
industrial gas projects 
pvalid =  70% 
prej   =  10% 
pperf =  98%  
supply = CERsum2020 + CERadd2020 (w/o ind gases) – demand2008-12  
D 
After 2012 
only LDCs 
For projects registered after 
2012, only CERs from 
LDCs are accepted 
pvalid =  70% 
prej   =  10% 
pperf =  98%  
supply = CERsum2020 + CERadd2020 (only LDCs) – demand2008-12  
D2 
After 2012 
only LDCs 
with active 
promotion 
For projects registered after 
2012, only CERs from 
LDCs are accepted. 
Measures to incentivize this 
supply are in place 
pvalid =  70% 
prej   =    10% 
pperf =  98%  
supply = CERsum2020 + CERadd2020 (only LDCs) +  
 CERLDC additional – demand2008-12  
E 
CDM enlarged 
CER generation between 
2013 and 2020 with 50% 
higher potential each year 
pvalid =  70% 
prej   =  10% 
pperf =  98% 
CERinfl is multiplied by 150%  
supply = CERsum2020 + CERadd2020 – demand2008-12  
F 
CDM strict 
rules 
From 2013 stricter 
additionality, no industrial 
gases: less validations, more 
rejections, smaller CER 
issuance rate 
Up to 2012:   After 2012: 
pvalid =  70%   pvalid =  50% 
prej   =  10%   prej   =  15% 
pperf =  98%   pperf =  82% 
supply = CERsum2020 + CERadd2020 (w/o ind gases) – demand2008-12  
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Table 3.4: Carbon credit supply scenarios 2013-2020: 
Projected supply from CDM projects (MtCO2e) 
 
 
 
3.5 Estimating quantitative impact of scenarios on CER demand from LDCs 
3.5.1 Supply-demand balance 
The combination of our CER supply and demand scenarios is shown in Table 3.5. In this analysis we 
have disregarded the potential supply from JI projects. We do this because this instrument suffers 
from delays in host country approval, because the size of the JI portfolio is very small in comparison 
to the CDM (with 122 ktCO2e emission reductions per year expected to be delivered by all active JI 
projects, it represents about 15% of the CDM pipeline), and because it also constitutes mitigation 
effort in Annex I countries.  
 
These figures show that the balance between supply and demand of CERs depends largely on 
whether there is an international agreement (resulting in larger demand) and on whether the CER 
contribution to abatement in Annex I countries is capped or not (supplementarity). The rules 
defining CER supply have a much smaller effect than the rules defining demand. For example, when 
comparing the strictest supply scenario (CERs supplied only from LDCs after 2012) with the most 
lenient one (CDM enlarged), CER supply increases by about 50%. This is much smaller than the 
differences found above across the different demand scenarios.  
 
Without an agreement and with a cap to the use of CERs of 50% of the mitigation effort in all 
Annex I countries, CER oversupply is very likely. With an agreement, it is very likely that the CDM 
would not provide sufficient credits to cover the potential demand during 2013-2020, even with 50% 
supplementarity. The scenario with the financial crisis – which also assumes an international 
agreement is reached – has similar results to the scenario with agreement. 
 
 
Scenario / Region 
A B C D D2 E F 
Only 
CERS up 
to 2012 
CDM same 
No new 
industrial 
gases 
Only LDCs 
after 2012 
Only LDCs 
after 2012, 
with 
incentives 
CDM 
enlarged 
CDM strict 
rules 
Africa other   132   171   189   132   132   190   164 
Asia-Pacific other 5108 6884 6808 5108 5108 7773 6060 
Europe/Middle East     25     35     38     25     25     40     32 
Latin America   780 1026 1007   780   780 1150   907 
LDCs     55     73     93     73   662     82     76 
Total supply 2012-
2020 (MtCO2e)     94   128   118     94     94   145   108 
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Table 3.5: CER supply-demand balance for 2013-2020 (MtCO2e) 
Scenario 
1 2 3 
No agreement International agreement Financial crisis 
A Only CERs up to 2012 -2699 to 1107 2461 to 8112 2035 to 7347 
B CDM same -4822 to -1016 337 to 5989 -89 to 5223 
C No new industrial gases -4758 to -952 402 to 6053 -24 to 5287 
D Only LDCs after 2012 -2717 to 1089 2443 to 8094 2017 to 7328 
D2 Only LDCs after 2012, with incentives -3306 to 500 1854 to 7505 1428 to 6739 
E CDM enlarged -5884 to -2078 -725 to 4927 -1150 to 4161 
F CDM strict rules -3852 to -46 1307 to 6959 881 to 6193 
Note: The ranges indicate the different supplementarity assumptions, from 50% supplementarity, to freedom 
to use the CDM for offsetting as much as desired. Negative figures indicate excessive CER supply.  
 
 
It should be noted that several of these combinations are unlikely. Under a scenario with no 
agreement, for example, it is unlikely that the CDM will be significantly enlarged, as Annex I 
countries will not be willing to finance further projects in developing countries. It is also unlikely that 
having not reached an agreement on climate change mitigation, all Annex I countries would then 
agree to only accept high quality CERs. However, some parties or groups (such as the EU) could 
decide to implement these limitations unilaterally. Thus, while not completely realistic, the 
combination of scenarios shows an overall picture of the range of possible balances in the future 
carbon credit market from the most optimistic to the most pessimistic possibilities.  
 
Figure 3.5 illustrates how the supply would be spread across regions and shows that under most 
scenarios, LDCs remain unimportant in the market.  
 
We expected that the scenarios without industrial gases, with strict rules, or with CERs only from 
LDCs after 2012 would have an impact on supply from LDCs. However, industrial gases are 
decreasing in the CDM pipeline, falling from close to half in 2004-2005 to just 4% of the new CER 
supply in 2008. Our projections for 2013-2020 reflect these trends and the fact that the current 
CDM rules do not allow new installations with industrial gas emissions to host CDM projects. Only 
if this rule is relaxed, the supply of CERs from industrial gas reduction projects would very likely 
increase again. The scenario with strict rules is similar. Finally, the scenario with preferential access 
and incentives that promote CDM development in LDCs after 2012 does show some improvement 
for these countries, but the supply from all other countries up to 2012 is still much larger.  
 
The scenario analysis has shown that, even under strict preferential access measures that do not 
allow for CERs from post-2012 projects from countries other than LDCs, the potential CER supply 
from LDCs is very small compared to the available supply from other countries. We should also 
remember that this supply from LDCs will only materialize if the existing barriers for CDM project 
implementation in these countries are overcome, as seen when comparing scenarios D and D2. This 
finding is in line with the conclusion reached by Bakker et al. (2011) that preferential treatment for 
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under-represented countries in the CDM will have a limited contribution to improving the 
geographic distribution of CDM projects.  
 
 
Figure 3.5: Supply-demand balance 2013-2020 
 
Note: For the demand, the main columns indicate the situation when countries are only allowed to cover up to 
50% of their emission reductions through CDM credits; the ‘error bars’ show demand when there is freedom 
to use the CDM for offsetting as much as desired. 
 
 
The promotion of PoAs, which can address the smaller and more dispersed emission sources that 
are more likely to exist in poorer countries, could provide an opportunity for incentivizing the CDM 
in LDCs. Special incentives could be provided through the provision of technical support for 
coordination entities that set up such programmes, and through the financing of their upfront costs 
(PDD development, methodology development, registration and validation, and coordination of first 
participating project activities). 
 
Generally, PoAs have a high “leverage”, i.e. if they are successful, they can expand quickly without 
any further delays in the CDM project cycle. For example, an Indian PoA aims at distributing 
400 million compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs). However, drawing on our knowledge of CFL 
projects, we estimate the total volume of lamps distributed by the end of 2012 by the three PoAs in 
the pipeline at 90 million. For stove PoAs, the total volume could reach 3.5 million stoves by that 
time. 1.7 million domestic biogas plants and 1350 swine farm digesters could become operational 
before 2013, which would be in the same order of magnitude as the most successful development 
assistance projects covering these technologies.  
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PoAs not only have to show that they actually generate the large reductions they foresee, they also 
need to demonstrate that they will allow LDCs to harness an eventual preferential access to the 
CDM market. A positive indicator of increased attention to LDCs is that some private sector 
companies like JP Morgan and C Quest Capital are entering the PoA market in countries that would 
never be appealing for such companies in a “normal” business context. Thus, eventually, the 
development target of the CDM and the aim to generate cheap CERs could be reconciled. 
 
Still, what are the potential risks that a preferential access measure may entail? What can experience 
tell us about how these policies work in practice? In the following section, a preferential access 
agreement in the international trade sector is analysed in order to draw lessons for the climate 
regime. 
 
 
3.6 Discussion of preferential access options 
In the world trade system, there is a case that could be used to illustrate the effect of preferential 
access options for a specific group of countries. The Lomé Convention, first signed in 1975 and 
renewed three times afterwards, is a trade and aid agreement between the European Community 
(EC) and 71 so-called ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries. It establishes the basis for 
trade and development cooperation between these two groups of countries, motivated both by 
Europe’s interest in guaranteeing the supply of raw materials, and by their wish to support ACP 
countries’ sustained development. The Lomé agreements set preferential access quotas for agreed 
agricultural products that were allowed henceforth to enter the EC market free of duty. While these 
agreements are no longer in place due to their incompatibility with World Trade Organization 
(WTO) rules, they are still an interesting case study for illustrating the limitations of preferential 
access policies.  
 
According to Cosgrove (1994), ACP exports to Europe accounted for 3.4% of total EC imports in 
1975, when the first Lomé Convention was signed. Due to the large growth in EC trade, ACP 
exports declined to 1.5% of EC imports in 1992. While ACP exports to the EC did grow in absolute 
terms, they could not keep pace with the growth in the European market. Cosgrove concludes that 
the Lomé Convention did not provide sufficient support to enable ACP countries to keep their 
market share, and that it therefore failed in its goals.  
 
The preferences generated by Lomé for ACP exports were highly dependent on the barriers that the 
EC placed for trade in general. For agricultural products, the general rule is that the more processed 
the product is, the more barriers it faces. Thus, ACP countries would have benefited most from 
adding value to their raw materials and exporting them to Europe in processed form. Trade also 
depends on the current prices of commodities. During the 1980s and 90s, the prices of agricultural 
products mainly fell, which also had a negative impact on ACP trade. Finally, the increase in trade 
from the preferred country group also depends on the elasticity of demand for the product. The 
elasticity of demand for most ACP products in Europe is low, meaning that a lower price for them 
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(offered by ACP countries as a result of the trade preferences) had little effect on their export 
volume (Cosgrove 1994).  
 
Some non-traditional products have been identified as benefiting from the Lomé Convention, 
among them canned tuna, leather and leather products, fresh flowers, some vegetables, textiles and 
garments. Many of these products were subject to levies from the European common agricultural 
policy (CAP), and thus profited from a comparative advantage under Lomé. In Mauritius, the strong 
specialization in sugar exports to the EC enabled the accumulation of funds that were used to shift 
the economy towards the textile industry, tourism and financial services (Laaksonen et al. 2007). 
Despite these successes, the main barriers inhibiting ACP export performance could not be 
overcome by a trade agreement: climatic conditions (droughts and desertification), crop and livestock 
diseases, lack of infrastructure leading to high transportation and communication costs, oil price 
increases, and AIDS continued to restrict the development and integration of ACP countries in the 
world market (Cosgrove 1994).  
 
The Lomé experience provides lessons for the climate regime. Through Lomé, not just access to a 
market was secured, but that access came with fewer costs (no tariffs or levies). In the climate 
regime, CDM projects from LDC countries benefit from a zero registration fee. However, 
registration is only a small fraction of CDM transaction costs, whose bulk encompasses PDD 
development, methodology development (if needed) and validation. Providing upfront financing for 
PDD development and validation in countries with little CDM development has been agreed on, but 
funds are limited and this provision not only targets LDCs, but all countries with less than ten 
registered CDM projects. If similar financing, for example, for the coordination of PoAs with high 
sustainable development benefits could be provided, not only could the CDM potential of LDCs be 
realized, but also a better contribution to local development could be made. It would be important, 
however, to keep these incentives targeted specifically at LDCs. 
 
In the EU climate package, some degree of preferential access for CDM projects from LDCs has 
been secured, but no provisions are yet in place for further supporting the implementation of these 
projects. As seen in the Lomé experience, the underlying causes of poor countries’ lack of 
competitiveness need to be addressed.  
 
Furthermore, in Lomé, success was observed for special types of products with added value. A 
parallel could be made here to CDM project types with added value (sustainable development 
benefits or stricter additionality, for example), but only if this added value is transformed into some 
kind of financial incentive that supports these projects. This kind of differentiation between project 
types is not yet in place in the climate regime. PoAs could constitute an opportunity in this context. 
These programmes seem to have a stronger focus on small-scale projects with higher sustainable 
development benefits than individual CDM projects, and so far represent a higher share in LDCs. 
Special quotas or special treatment for PoAs could be an opportunity to introduce such a 
differentiation, without explicitly differentiating between project types or host countries. As PoAs 
nonetheless run the risk of failing to deliver for LDCs if the costs of coordinating individual 
activities are too high, support for PoA coordination in LDCs could be offered in addition. 
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A further issue is the source of financing for such preferences. In the Lomé conventions, the EU 
was a relatively homogeneous group of countries that could agree on securing financing for the trade 
and aid components of the agreements. In the climate regime, the loan scheme for CDM project 
development in underrepresented host countries described above only covers the costs of the 
paperwork required to comply with the project cycle. Finance for the project implementation itself 
still needs to come from external equity or debt investors. The Copenhagen Accord provides an 
opportunity, as it led to a generic pledge by industrialized countries to finance mitigation and 
adaptation in developing countries. However, the modalities for this finance are still unclear (see 
Roberts et al. 2010 for a discussion on open questions about the finance promise, and World 
Resources Institute (WRI 2010) for a summary of the financial pledges with comments on whether 
they are new and additional). In addition, this finance pledge does not include specific provisions for 
LDCs. 
 
The discussion of compatibility of preferential access measures with the rules established in the 
international trade regime is a final lesson that can be learned from the Lomé experience. The trade 
preferences for ACP countries were abolished due to their incompatibility with the WTO regime. In 
the carbon trading area, conformity with WTO rules is still an under-developed and under-
researched topic. Howse and Eliason (2009) provide a short exposition of possible ways to rule 
carbon trading, including the CDM, under WTO. According to them, the WTO has so far not 
decided whether (and how) it will tackle carbon markets. Thus, trading of Kyoto Protocol units is 
currently governed by the Kyoto Protocol and the UNFCCC, and trading of other carbon permits 
(such as EU ETS allowances) is so far not addressed by any international agreement.  
 
If WTO were to rule carbon trading, it first needs to be defined what type of assets are emission 
permits or credits. Depending on whether they are treated as financial services, other services or 
goods, different trade rules would apply. If emission credits are considered as goods or services, then 
the WTO’s ‘most-favoured nation’ and ‘national treatment’ provisions would become applicable to 
the CDM. In this case, unilateral discrimination by buying countries (for example, the EU deciding 
not to buy CERs from countries that do not apply certain sustainability criteria) would not be WTO-
conform. Under this lens, even the current discrimination against forestry CERs in the EU ETS 
could be considered to violate WTO rules (Wiser 2002). Similarly, the preferential treatment options 
discussed in this chapter would mostly not be WTO-conform. However, Wiser agrees with other 
authors (e.g. Kim 2001) in the opinion that CERs cannot reasonably be regarded as goods (they are 
not tangible things) and that, if clearly defined as a licence or permit issued by an authority (the 
CDM Executive Board), they cannot be considered services either. In this case, it is the COP/MOP 
who has the sole authority to decide how CERs are traded between parties. Regarding CERs as 
licences would also allow parties to enact domestic regulations that restrict their use in ways not 
specified under the international rules, as in the case of the EU climate package.  
 
In summary, while it is not clear whether the CERs deriving from CDM projects can be considered 
as “goods” or “services” that are regulated under the WTO, analysts suggests that, in this case, 
preferential treatment towards CERs from specific origin could be deemed non-WTO conform. 
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Thus, authors discussing the interface between the Kyoto Protocol and the WTO suggest that 
caution should be taken to avoid potential disputes between both regimes – for instance through 
clear definition of the nature of emission reduction credits. 
 
 
3.7 Conclusions 
The current and potential supply of CDM projects from Least Developed Countries is low as many 
barriers prevent their participation in the carbon market. However, the case of Honduras shows that 
with limited international financial sources, local entrepreneurship and leadership can bring successes 
in the CDM when coupled with external aid to set up appropriate institutions. LDCs have a 
substantially higher share in CDM Programmes of Activities (PoAs) than in individual CDM 
projects.  
 
Both in the international climate negotiations and by the EU, options have been proposed for 
fostering CDM development in LDCs. While the financial incentives agreed internationally are 
available for all countries hosting less than 10 CDM projects, preferential access to part of the 
European carbon market is granted to CERs from LDCs through the new EU climate and energy 
package.  
 
By projecting possible CER supply and demand scenarios for the period 2013-2020, we find that the 
supply-demand balance largely depends on the level of ambition of Annex I countries’ targets and on 
the degree of supplementarity on the use of CERs for meeting them. A restriction on the supply of 
CERs from CDM projects registered after 2012 to only LDCs would not have an important impact 
on CDM project distribution across host countries if the existing barriers for project implementation 
in LDCs are not overcome and the current trends in project submission from these countries are 
maintained. Other likely limitations in CER supply on the basis of project quality would have an 
even smaller effect. Given the little abatement potential available in LDCs this is not surprising, and 
raises questions on the appropriateness of offsets for fostering mitigation in less developed 
countries. Perhaps other approaches, such as Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions, which 
would be financed through international cooperation, are more promising.  
 
Drawing a comparison between preferential access agreements in the agricultural trade system (Lomé 
Conventions) and the climate regime, we find further evidence that not just preferential access is 
important, but also reduced access costs. The current registration fee exemption for LDCs 
represents only a small fraction of CDM transaction costs and is probably not enough. The now 
agreed loan for PDD development and validation of CDM projects will be applicable to all countries 
with less than ten CDM projects, diluting the benefit for LDCs. An opportunity could arise if similar 
financing could be provided for PoAs, which have a substantially higher share in LDCs. 
Furthermore, the limited impact of the Lomé agreements on ACP trade was partly due to the fact 
that the underlying causes of lack of competitiveness were not addressed. In the climate regime, if 
CDM implementation barriers are not directly addressed, the CDM might remain a dream for poor 
countries. Increased incentives for products with added value led to the few success stories in the 
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Lomé framework. For the climate regime, this could be translated into added financial incentives for 
CDM projects with added value – however this may be interpreted. Again, PoAs could constitute an 
opportunity here, as they so far seem to focus on project types with higher sustainable development 
benefits. Finally, financing was identified as a critical issue for undertaking these measures: if 
financial incentives for special projects or specific regions are to be created, clear rules for their 
provision and distribution will need to be reached and enforced.  
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4. THE IMPACT OF DISCOUNTING EMISSION CREDITS ON THE 
COMPETITIVENESS OF DIFFERENT CDM HOST COUNTRIES21 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Through the CDM, greenhouse gas emission reductions from projects in developing countries can 
be acquired by industrialized countries to comply with their Kyoto Protocol emission reduction 
targets. Each tonne of CO2-equivalent emission reductions achieved by the CDM generates one 
emission credit, which is then used by industrialized countries (or companies in them) to offset their 
own emissions. Thus, each tonne reduced by a CDM project allows increasing emissions in 
industrialized countries by one tonne. Theoretically, this is not a problem as long as the reduction 
from the CDM project is real and as long as incentives for introduction of emission reduction 
policies in developing countries are not distorted.  
 
The key criterion for ensuring that emission reductions from CDM projects are real is 
“additionality”. Additionality means that a CDM project has to be outside the “business-as-usual” 
development scenario for its region or country. This is, there are financial, economic, technical or 
other barriers for its implementation, which only the CDM incentive manages to overcome. This is a 
necessary condition for CDM projects to really contribute to reducing global GHG emissions: If a 
CDM project is not additional, using its emission credits to offset emissions in industrialized 
countries will lead to an actual increase in emissions. There is substantial criticism that a significant 
amount of CDM projects does not have a very credible additionality argumentation (see e.g. 
Michaelowa and Purohit 2007; Schneider 2007; Castro and Michaelowa 2008). 
 
The CDM was designed with the aim of introducing developing countries to climate mitigation in a 
voluntary manner, without affecting their development objectives. It could be regarded as a 
transitional step before these countries also commit to own emission reduction targets. Nonetheless, 
as described in the previous chapters, poorer countries face substantial barriers for accessing the 
mechanism, and hence the CDM project portfolio is very unevenly distributed across potential host 
countries.  
 
 
                                                      
21 This chapter is based on an article previously published as: Castro, P. and Michaelowa, A. (2010), ‘The impact of 
discounting emission credits on the competitiveness of different CDM host countries’, Ecological Economics, vol. 70, no. 1, 
pp. 34-42. 
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While economic efficiency considerations dictate that the emission reductions should first take place 
wherever they are cheaper, equity concerns suggest that the CDM incentive should be more 
proactively directed towards less developed countries. These concerns are politically founded on the 
second goal of the CDM, which is to contribute to sustainable development in its host countries. In 
addition, more autonomous climate mitigation action by advanced developing countries (beyond just 
offsetting) is needed to achieve the long-term environmental goals of the climate convention, which 
would mean that a system for gradually phasing out the CDM in these countries is needed (Cosbey 
2005; Schneider 2009). 
 
Discounting the value of emission credits with a differentiation between host countries has been 
proposed as another possible approach for addressing not only the geographical distribution of 
CDM projects, but also concerns about long-term incentives for host countries and about unclear 
additionality. As we will elaborate further below, discounting could be used to compensate for 
fictitious reductions from non-additional CDM projects; it could be designed to increase the 
incentive for advanced developing countries to move from the CDM to own mitigation 
commitments; and it could also be applied to improve the competitiveness of less developed 
countries as hosts for CDM projects.  
 
Discussion on the benefits of discounting for shifting incentives in the CDM has been very limited 
in research so far. Bakker et al. (2011) use aggregate data for the whole non-Annex I region to 
compare the potential impacts of several systems of differentiating CDM host countries or project 
types (including discounting) on the carbon market; however, their analysis provides very little 
insight on their effects on the geographic distribution of the CDM. This chapter seeks to address this 
gap by assessing the impact that discounting could have on the distribution of CDM projects across 
several host countries or regions, with a special focus on Least Developed Countries and Sub-
Saharan Africa. Methodologically, a large component of the work in this (and the following) chapter 
pertains to the estimation of CDM projects’ abatement costs and the construction and comparison 
of CDM-specific Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) curves for four major countries or regions within 
non-Annex I with and without discounting of emission credits. Thus, the methodological 
contribution of this chapter is the definition of a method for estimating these abatement costs in a 
credible and comparable manner, the elaboration of a dataset that provides this information for all 
project types with sufficient financial information available, the consolidation of this information by 
means of MAC curves, and the analysis of how discounting would affect such MAC curves.  
 
Section 4.2 briefly summarizes the existing research on discounting emission credits and its possible 
impacts on carbon markets. In section 4.3 we discuss the relationship between discounting of 
emission credits and host country competitiveness in the CDM. In section 4.4 we define our 
methodology for estimating CDM-specific abatement costs and potentials, and present results for 
different project types in Africa and other CDM host regions. Section 4.5 analyses the impact of two 
emission credit discounting schemes on the competitive position of these CDM host regions by 
looking at the remaining CDM potential in these country groups on the basis of MAC curves. 
Section 4.6 discusses the results and draws the conclusions from this chapter.  
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4.2 Discounting emission reduction credits 
Discounting CDM emission reductions means that not all reductions generated by a project enter the 
carbon market, so that part of the effort is not used to offset emissions elsewhere. For example, if a 
CDM project generates 100 tonnes of CO2 emission reductions, applying a 20% discount factor 
would imply that only CERs for 80 tCO2 of reductions would be generated. As a result, from the 
100 tonnes of emission reductions achieved only 80 enter the carbon market, and the remaining 
20 tonnes of reductions can be considered to be real global GHG emission reductions beyond 
offsetting (Schneider 2009).  
 
Why could such a discounting policy be desirable, if the CDM is intended to make emission 
reductions cheaper? Discounting was first proposed by Greenpeace (2000) as a measure to safeguard 
the environmental integrity and the additionality of the CDM. This was a response to the widespread 
critique that it is very difficult to prove that a project proposed as CDM is not a business-as-usual 
situation and is thus leading to “real” emission reductions. Using discounting to safeguard 
additionality is however a complex task, as it would imply knowing the share of non-additional 
credits being issued despite all quality checks, and modifying the discount factor over time to reflect 
possible changes in this share. This would deter investors and, more importantly, penalize both non-
additional and truly additional projects. For a numerical example of how additionality-based 
discounting could work, see Michaelowa (2008b). 
 
The early discussion on discounting also suggested that it could be used to compensate for the 
uncertainty related to establishing baselines, to provide an incentive for greater domestic action in 
countries with reduction targets, and to penalize negative social and environmental effects of CDM 
projects (Jackson and Begg 1999). Ten years later, the discussion still focuses on using discounting 
for improving the CDM’s environmental integrity, while influencing other shortcomings of the 
mechanism as well. Environmental Defense (2007), for example, proposed to differentiate discount 
rates across countries in order to ‘discourage further use of the CDM by large emitting developing 
countries and to direct the mechanism towards poorer developing countries’ (p. 2). This is in line 
with the political objective, enshrined in the Kyoto Protocol itself, that the CDM should assist 
developing countries in achieving sustainable development, and that it should do it in an equitable 
manner (UNFCCC 2001b). It is also in line with the now recognized fact that the current system of 
emission reduction targets for industrialized countries and the CDM for developing countries is not 
enough for ensuring a long-term stabilization of the climate system (Gupta et al. 2007a). More 
climate mitigation action by developing countries, especially the large and advanced ones, is needed. 
 
Chung (2007) proposed discounting as contribution of developing countries to global emission 
reductions without having to resort to country-specific commitments. This idea could be developed 
into a system where discounting provides an incentive for advanced developing countries to take up 
emissions reduction commitments beyond the CDM. Discounting would build such an incentive, as 
taking up a commitment means that reductions achieved through domestic reduction projects count 
100% (nationally and in the international carbon market), whereas under the discounting scheme, 
they would be valued less. The incentive would increase if the discount factor were progressively 
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linked to the level of development of the host country (Michaelowa 2008b). Discounting by 
countries could also be used to promote CDM project development in African and Least Developed 
Countries by applying lower or no discount rates (or even granting more credits than reductions 
actually achieved) for projects in these countries (Schneider 2009). 
 
Discounting could also be varied according to project types, as suggested by Chung (2007) and 
elaborated by Schneider (2009). Thus, projects with beneficial characteristics could be favoured over 
less desired ones by assigning them a lower discount rate, no discount rate or even a multiplier above 
one. For example, projects with large sustainable development benefits or using innovative 
technologies could be favoured, while projects with very large windfall profits or questionable 
additionality could be burdened. Despite these promising features, agreeing upon such a set of 
different discount rates could become very challenging at the UN level. Sustainable development 
priorities are defined differently by each country and their valuation is still very subjective and 
complex. The level of innovativeness of a technology is subjective to contextual factors, e.g. to the 
host country. Additionality depends not only on project type, but also on country-specific factors. 
This complexity would make it difficult even for technical experts to set appropriate discounting 
factors. Therefore we do not assess this type of discounting.  
 
There are basically two approaches for implementing a discounting policy in the CDM. Supply-side 
discounting implies that only a certain fraction of the verified emission reductions leads to issuance 
of emission credits. This type of discounting would require an agreement at the UN level, but would 
have the advantage of being applicable to the whole carbon market. Demand-side discounting means 
that a percentage of the issued credits is retired from the market by the buyers, sending it for 
example to a cancellation account. Demand-side discounting allows for different credit buyers to set 
different discount rates, which would complicate the linking of different emission trading schemes 
and could distort emission credit prices (Schneider 2009).  
 
While demand-side discounting makes little sense from a business point of view, as demanding 
countries are expected to aim at getting as many credits as possible for the lowest price, political and 
environmental reasons are influencing these decisions. The EU’s qualitative restrictions for CERs 
from 2013 onwards discussed in the previous chapter are an example of a politically motivated move 
away from the rationale of “the more, the cheaper, the better”. Similarly, the American Clean Energy 
and Security Act that was passed in the US House of Representatives in June 2009 included a 
discounting provision for international offsets (which would include CDM credits): from 2018 on, 
one international offset would be equivalent to 0.8 emission allowances in the US market (Pew 
Center 2009). The reasons for such a demand-driven discounting scheme are threefold: improving 
the environmental integrity of the scheme, promoting domestic green jobs by favouring domestic 
reductions (or domestic offsets) over international ones, and addressing fears about the 
competitiveness effects of financing foreign industry through the purchase of international offsets. 
As the American market, if such a law is ever approved, would become the largest carbon market in 
the world, carbon credit sellers would not be able to escape such a unilateral discounting provision.  
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Whether discounting is implemented through an agreement at the UN level, or established 
unilaterally by large CER buyer countries, the effect will be similar: CDM projects will be awarded 
less emission reductions than they achieve. As we are interested in the proposals that seek to use 
discounting to shift incentives for mitigation in developing countries, in the following analysis we use 
Environmental Defense’s and Chung’s suggestions that discounting could be used to improve the 
geographical distribution of CDM projects as a starting point, and elaborate on Michaelowa’s 
proposal for a differentiation between host countries. On this basis, we try to answer the question 
whether such a discounting scheme with differentiation between host countries could really have an 
impact on host country competitiveness in the CDM market, with focus on LDCs. 
 
 
4.3 Discounting emission credits and host country competitiveness 
Discounting emission credits will have an impact on the value and on the amount of emission 
reductions from different CDM host countries. The higher the discount rate, the less credits are 
issued or traded for the project, and thus the higher becomes the abatement cost per credit. At the 
same time, the higher the discount rate, the less emissions reductions are credited, so the more the 
mitigation potential is penalized. Increased costs and reduced potentials are likely to lower the 
competitiveness of the CDM host countries affected by discounting. 
 
As detailed in Chapter 3, the competitiveness or attractiveness of individual CDM host countries 
depends on several general and CDM-specific factors, among them, the availability of emission 
reduction options; the host country’s business environment; the institutional framework relevant for 
investments in general and the CDM in particular; the availability of capital and finance; the existence 
of historical business or aid relationships with potential credit buyers; and the capacity to handle the 
technologies and/or the baseline methodologies needed for the CDM.  
 
Discounting emission credits will clearly have no effect on the host country’s business environment, 
on the institutional framework or on technological and methodological capacity. Some other 
measures have been undertaken in several countries to overcome at least the institutional barriers, so 
that these aspects will not be included in the analysis in this chapter. Discounting could contribute to 
further improve project-specific and cost-related factors by shifting the financial incentives of the CDM 
towards more backward countries, and could thus contribute to fostering CDM development in, for 
example, Sub-Saharan Africa or the Least Developed Countries. However, more structural factors, such 
as political and economic stability, mitigation potential, technical capacity, and infrastructure are more 
difficult to change in the short term.  
 
As discounting will not have an impact on the institutional criteria but rather on the value of 
emission reductions from different countries, we will focus our subsequent analysis on the host 
country potential for specific abatement technologies, and their abatement cost, which will be used 
to construct CDM-specific marginal abatement cost curves.  
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4.4 Estimating emission credit costs and CDM potentials  
4.4.1 Marginal abatement cost curves 
As explained above, discounting will affect both the amount and the value of emission reductions 
from the CDM. We can model these on the basis of abatement costs and potentials and the resulting 
marginal abatement cost curve. Abatement costs describe the costs society has to bear to reduce one 
tonne of CO2 emissions – or the equivalent amount of other greenhouse gases – using a certain 
mitigation activity. They determine the cost-effectiveness of individual policy or project choices. 
Abatement potentials – the volume of emissions reductions that can be achieved by applying a 
specific technology in a specific region or country in a certain period of time – describe the amount 
of mitigation that is feasible. Costs and potentials for different technologies in a country or region 
are usually displayed graphically together to form a marginal abatement cost curve (MAC).  
 
MAC curves are used extensively in environmental economics to link a firm’s (or a country’s) 
pollutant emission levels and the cost of each additional unit of pollution reduction (McKitrick 
1999). Examples of the use of MACs at the firm and at the country level can be found in Ellerman 
and Decaux (1998), Criqui et al. (1999) and McKitrick (1999). MAC curves for climate mitigation can 
be derived using a top-down approach by means of macroeconomic models with a detailed energy 
sector component. They can also be obtained on the basis of engineering data of emission reduction 
technologies using a bottom-up approach (Criqui et al. 1999).  
 
Climate-economy models use these curves systematically (see e.g. Kuik et al. 2009 for a meta-
analysis). However, abatement cost estimates are frequently based on expert opinion, or on model 
assumptions regarding, among others, the climate policy target, the emissions baseline, discounting 
rates, and future technological options. Further, there are only a few abatement cost and potential 
studies that focus on developing countries. Two good examples are the efforts by Wetzelaer et al. 
(2007) and Bakker et al. (2007) to build an abatement cost curve for these countries in the years 2010 
and 2020, respectively. Recently, the consultancy McKinsey has started to develop global and 
country-specific MAC curves for the year 2030, which have eagerly been taken up in the 
international climate policy debate (see Enkvist et al. 2007 for an overview). However, as the 
assumptions and methodology used in the McKinsey curves are not publicly accessible, in this study 
only bottom-up MAC curves and abatement cost and potential estimations, with more transparent 
assumptions that are easier to control for and discuss, were used.  
 
Still, a drawback of the reliance on abatement cost curves is that they usually only include the direct 
investment and operation costs of the abatement options, overlooking potential information and 
transaction costs that can make them much more difficult to implement in practice. 
 
Right now, some individual CDM host countries or regions have sufficiently large CDM project 
portfolios to be able to empirically estimate the cost of emission credits for specific project types, 
and possibly, regions. In addition, assessments of GHG mitigation potentials in different regions, 
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including Africa, are available from the literature (Bakker et al. 2007; Vattenfall 2007; Wetzelaer et al. 
2007; De Gouvello et al. 2008).  
 
On the basis of empirical MAC curves for specific regions, we can estimate how different 
discounting schemes could affect those regions’ competitiveness in the emission credit market, if we 
assume that abatement costs and potentials are the main criteria for locating CDM projects (and that 
the institutional issues described in section 4.3 are (at least partially) captured in the project cost 
estimations, e.g. through larger financial discount rates in less business-friendly countries, or through 
larger costs of debt in countries with small financial markets).  
 
4.4.2 Sample selection 
We are interested in the effect of a scheme that introduces discounting of CDM emission credits 
with a differentiation across host countries according to their level of development, as the literature 
argues that such a differentiation will contribute to improving the geographical distribution of the 
CDM portfolio. 
 
As will be described in detail in section 4.5, such a discounting and differentiation scheme will apply 
the strongest discount factors on countries that the highest per capita emissions and GDP levels, and 
the lowest on countries with low emissions and income levels. For getting an empirical idea of the 
potential impacts of such a discounting scheme, thus, we compare how discounting would affect the 
emission reductions of four non-Annex I countries or country groups that are representative of the 
range of effects of discounting: 
- High income, high emissions countries (Israel, Qatar, Singapore, South Korea, United Arab 
Emirates): in this group of countries, discounting factors will be highest 
- China: as the major CDM host country, which, due to its rapid economic and emissions 
growth and its size is expected to act more proactively to mitigate climate change soon, it is 
interesting to see how discounting may affect its portfolio 
- India: the second largest CDM host country, which however, has still low per capita income 
and emission levels, so that discounting may not affect it significantly 
- LDCs: with generally very low income and emissions per capita, they will not be affected 
directly by discounting, but are expected to benefit indirectly because discounting will make 
the other countries lose competitiveness in the CDM. 
 
For building the CDM MAC curves that will be used to compare the effects of discounting between 
these four regions, we need to gather cost data from CDM projects that are representative of them. 
We focus for this purpose on the project types22 that are more relevant for these groups of countries, 
and concentrate on collecting cost data that covers as many of these project types as possible. For 
project types that still have very few projects with cost information (and even no projects with cost 
 
                                                      
22 In the CDM, projects are classified in ‘project types’, which provide a broad indication of both the generic technology 
used to reduce emissions (e.g. wind energy, hydro energy with a dam, biogas production, energy efficiency improvements) 
and of the sector in which it is applied (e.g. energy, waste management, industry, forestry).  
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information within the country groups described above), data was gathered also from countries 
outside these groups.  
 
4.4.3 Emission credit costs 
General CDM project information is available from a public database, the CDM pipeline, which is 
maintained and updated monthly by UNEP Risoe Centre (UNEP Risoe Centre 2009). More specific 
information for each project is also publicly available in the Project Design Documents (PDDs) that 
can be downloaded from the CDM website of the UN. This documentation often includes a 
financial analysis, as this is one possible method for demonstrating that a project complies with the 
CDM requirement of additionality: if the analysis shows that the project needs the subsidy from the 
CDM to be financially attractive, then it is deemed additional.23  
 
Project financial information can be provided in the PDDs as Internal Rate of Return (IRR), as Net 
Present Value (NPV), as full cash flows or not at all. As shown in Equation 4.1, we define a project’s 
abatement costs as the net present value of the project costs (investment and operation) minus its 
revenues (e.g. income from electricity sales), all divided by the amount of GHG emission reductions 
it expects to achieve (which is indicated by the amount of emission credits the project expects to 
generate over its crediting lifetime, also time-discounted).24  
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Where C(CDM)i is the abatement cost of project i in USD/tCO2e, t the time period, n the operative 
lifetime of the project and m its crediting period (all in years); Ct and Rt the operation costs and the 
non-carbon revenues in year t, and I0 the initial investment; At is the abatement achieved by the 
project in year t (in tCO2e); and r is the discount rate. All costs are expressed in US dollars, calculated 
either using the current interbank exchange rate at the time the project was proposed, or using the 
exchange rate provided by the project developer in the documentation. This cost calculation 
approach is similar to the one used by Rahman et al. (2009) in a recent empirical study on the cost 
structure of CDM emissions abatement, but our calculations differ on the treatment of the annual 
abatement, which are discounted in order to be able to interpret abatement costs in constant terms 
(however, our main results are not affected if undiscounted emission reductions are used in the 
denominator). 
 
                                                      
23 The demonstration of additionality is a crucial step for CDM project approval. It is usually performed by applying a 
standardized tool, whose central pieces are either a ‘barrier analysis’ or an ‘investment analysis’. The first one is intended to 
describe the barriers of technological, financial or other nature that would prevent the implementation of the project in the 
absence of the CDM, while the latter should show that the financials of the project (e.g. internal rate or return or net 
present value) are not attractive without the CDM. It is up to the project developer to choose which one of these analyses 
he wishes to apply. 
24 In this definition, the savings in energy consumption or the cost of alternative investments are also considered as 
revenues, so that the incremental costs of emission reductions constitute our abatement costs. 
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Overall abatement costs provide a measure of the profitability and attractiveness of the project. If 
the costs are negative, the project is profitable even without the CDM revenue; if they are low 
enough, they can be compensated through the sale of credits; and if they are too high, the project is 
not profitable even with emission credit sales. However, not only this overall profitability is relevant 
for the decision to undertake a project, but also the upfront costs, since they need to be covered by 
financial resources that are frequently scarce, risky and difficult to access in developing countries. 
Therefore, in this chapter we also analyse project investment costs per credit. 
 
Abatement and investment cost estimations were carried out for a sample of CDM projects in 16 
host countries that, as explained above, covers the most important project types in the groups of 
countries that are focus of analysis.  
 
The data collection effort was started in projects in China, due to its large project portfolio, which 
makes it easy to compare similar projects and their abatement costs and thus find possible outliers; 
its tendency to use the investment analysis for additionality demonstration rather than the barrier 
analysis, which rarely provides sufficient financial information; and the large diversity of project 
types and sizes being implemented there. Next, cost data was collected from LDCs and other poor 
countries (e.g. those in Sub Saharan Africa), with the aim of having projects that respond to the 
characteristics of these countries. However, as of end of 2008 there are only 26 registered projects in 
LDCs and other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), few of which contain sufficient financial 
information. Hence, we also collected data from other countries hosting types of projects that are 
also frequent in LDCs. Finally, cost data was also collected from any other project types that were 
had been developed in the other groups of countries in our sample (here again, when necessary 
looking at projects in other host countries), so that coverage in terms of project types was as 
complete as possible. The sample consists thus of 108 projects from 17 project subtypes in 16 
countries, as can be seen in Table 4.1.  
 
Full abatement costs 
We assume that abatement costs depend mainly on the technology (i.e. the CDM project type) 
involved, and that the host country has relatively little effect on abatement costs (this assumption 
relies on the fact that clean technologies are usually state of the art technologies that are traded 
internationally, and thus have relatively homogeneous costs worldwide). This allows us to pool the 
project cost data by project type. Ideally, to account for possible differences in abatement costs 
across countries, we would have built separate databases for each country. This is not possible 
because the cost data information for several project types is not yet sufficient. However, we try to 
control for two factors that may affect abatement costs independently of the technology in use.  
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Table 4.1: Project sample 
Project subtype Sample size 
Project financial 
discount rate(s) 
(%) 
Median 
project 
lifetime 
(years) 
Host countries for data collection 
Biogas power 7 7, 8, 10, 15, 16 10 China, S. Africa, Guatemala, Honduras, India 
Biogas flaring 4 10 8.5 Brazil, Armenia 
Biomass energy 8 7, 8, 10, 15 20 South Africa, Kenya, China 
Cement blending (*) 2 - 25 India, Indonesia 
Coal mine methane 5 8, 11.8, 13.5 15 China 
Energy efficiency generation 8 8.5, 10, 12, 13, 15 19 China 
Fugitive gases 4 10, 15, 20 15 Qatar, India, Indonesia, Nigeria 
Hydro existing dam 6 4, 8, 12, 14, 15 25 China, Brazil, South Korea, Peru 
Hydro new dam 6 8, 10, 12 26 China 
Hydro run of river 5 8, 10 27 China 
Landfill gas composting 7 8, 8.5, 10, 12, 15 10 China, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia 
Landfill gas flaring 4 8, 10, 13.75 10 China, South Africa, Indonesia, Malaysia 
Landfill gas power 9 8, 8.5, 10, 12 15 Bangladesh, China 
N2O (adipic) 4 0 - 15 26 China, Brazil, South Korea 
N2O (nitric) 10 0 - 15 21 Brazil, South Africa, Colombia, China 
New gas power plant 6 8 20 China 
Wind 13 8 21 China 
 
 
These two important factors in the abatement cost calculations of a project – also shown in Table 
4.1 – are its expected lifetime and the financial discount rate used for obtaining its present value. 
Cost calculations in CDM projects have the tendency to consider a lifetime equal to its crediting 
period, even if the project will have a longer life.25 As most CDM projects choose a 3x7-year 
crediting period, the lifetime considered in the calculations tends to be 20 or 21 years. Some projects 
even consider just 7 years, especially those where the only income stream is the emission credit 
revenue. Some others – especially hydro projects – acknowledge a longer operational lifetime, but 
consider the CDM revenue only during the crediting period. We do not homogenize project 
lifetimes, but take the lifetime that most likely informed the investment decision by the project 
proponent: the CDM crediting period, in the case of projects with only income from emission 
credits, or the whole operational lifetime, in the case of projects with other revenue streams.  
 
Project financial discount rates and financial benchmarks are also chosen by the project proponent, but 
need to be justified. Financial discount rates appear to be relatively constant within countries and sectors, 
at least within the energy sector in China, where most projects use a factor of 8%, and smaller or riskier 
ones apply 10 or 12%. Still, there is significant variation in the financial discount rates chosen for projects 
in the energy efficiency category, for example, maybe due to the high variety of industries implementing 
 
                                                      
25 The crediting period is the period of time during which a CDM project is entitled to receive emission credits. Project 
developers can choose between a fixed 10-year crediting period or a 7-year crediting period that can be renewed up to two 
times (thus totalling 21 years).  
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these efficiency measures (cement, chemicals, iron and steel, coke ovens, etc.). In order to have 
comparable information and to avoid the possible effect of financial discount rates being manipulated by 
project developers to obtain more convincing financial figures, we homogenize the financial discount 
rates in each host country.26 The choice of financial discount rate is guided by the rates proposed by most 
CDM projects in the respective country. In countries where the project documentation does not supply 
this information, a default 10% has been taken. See Table 4.2 for an overview of host countries, financial 
discount rates used in them, and standardized financial discount rates.  
 
 
Table 4.2: Host countries and financial discount rates 
Host country 
Number of 
projects in 
sample (*) 
Range of financial 
discount rates 
used in project 
documents 
Standardized 
financial discount 
rate for abatement 
cost calculations 
Source 
Armenia 1 10% 10% Project documents 
Bangladesh 2 12% 12% Project documents 
Brazil 7 0 - 25% 10% Project documents 
China 68 7 - 13.5% 8% Project documents 
Colombia 1 not available 10% By default 10% 
Guatemala 1 7% 8% Project documents 
Honduras 2 not available 10% By default 10% 
India (*) 4 14.72 - 16% 15% Project documents 
Indonesia 4 10 - 18% 10% By default 10% 
Kenya 1 15% 15% Project documents 
Malaysia 5 8 - 10% 10% Project documents 
Nigeria 1 20% 15% Adjusted for comparability 
Peru 2 12 - 14% 12% Project documents 
Qatar 1 10% 10% Project documents 
South Africa 4 10 - 13.75% 10% Project documents 
South Korea 4 0 - 15% 8% Project documents 
(*): The project sample has been constructed to be balanced by project types and not necessarily by host 
countries. For example, there are very few projects from LDCs with reliable financial information. Similarly, 
Indian projects have a tendency to exclude the investment analysis from their project documentation, and in 
those projects with investment analysis, the variance of the resulting costs is very high and thus we preferred to 
leave these data out of the sample.  
 
 
To obtain the abatement cost per tonne of CO2e emissions reduced, we take in the denominator the 
amount of emission credits the project expects to generate over its lifetime (thus, over 10 or over 21 
years, depending on the choice of crediting period by the project developer), discounted with the 
same financial discount rate as the one used for the costs. In this way we obtain constant emission 
credit costs.27 CDM transaction costs have not been included in the estimations. Even though 
 
                                                      
26 Project developers have an incentive to manipulate their figures and try to show low revenues, so that the project appears 
financially unattractive, which is a requisite for being considered additional.  
27 In a previous version of this study, we made the cost estimations on the basis of the full (non-discounted) amount of 
emission credits, but just from the first crediting period (this is, over 10 or over 7 years). This approach was chosen due to 
the uncertainty involved in crediting period renewal, and the resulting high likelihood that project developers calculated 
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transaction costs represent a significant sum, especially for small-scale projects, we have opted for 
simplifying the calculations in this assessment.  
 
Another important consideration in the abatement cost calculations is the treatment of the baseline 
costs. The baseline is generally conceived as the situation without project. This situation without 
project may imply a different investment or the continuation of the current situation without a new 
investment. Many energy-related CDM projects argue that their baseline is the status quo, the 
continuation of the present situation without investment. In some cases, this implies expenses, such as 
buying energy from the grid or buying coal. In these cases, avoiding or reducing these expenses is 
considered as revenue for the project and is included in the abatement cost calculations. But in some 
other cases, the baseline situation does not imply costs for the project owner, and thus is not included 
in the calculations. In very few cases, the baseline represents a new investment, e.g. in a new fossil fuel-
based power plant. Avoiding this investment is again considered as a saving achieved by the project.  
 
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 show box plots of the estimated abatement costs of the projects in the 
sample, both with the original financial discount rates and with the financial discount rates 
standardized by us, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Abatement cost per emissions credit by project subtypes  
with original financial discount rates (US$) 
 
Note: Calculation based on projects' net present value and time-discounted amount of emission credits over 
their lifetime. ‘EE’ means energy efficiency.  
 
 
                                                      
their profitability on the basis of the emission credits from just the first crediting period. However, time-discounting also 
controls for this uncertainty and leads to a clearer interpretation of the cost estimates. The results from both cost 
estimation approaches do not differ substantially.  
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Figure 4.2: Abatement cost by project subtypes with  
standardized financial discount rates (US$) 
 
Note: Calculation based on projects' net present value and time-discounted amount of emission credits over 
their lifetime. ‘EE’ means energy efficiency.  
 
 
In these results, it is clear that even within project subtypes there is still a high variability in cost 
estimations, and that thus these estimations need to be used with care. However, even with this high 
variability, our results reproduce very closely the range and ranking of costs reported in other 
abatement cost studies (US EPA 2006; Vattenfall 2007; Wetzelaer et al. 2007): Methane and 
industrial gas reduction projects are cheaper than CO2-reduction projects, basically due to the higher 
global warming potential of these other gases; renewable energy projects, specifically wind and hydro 
projects including the construction of dams and also natural gas power plants are among the costlier 
ones. All this is consistent with other abatement cost curves and supports our results. The abatement 
costs of most of these CDM projects are below US$ 13, which is an indication that the emission 
credit income could make them attractive.28 The standardization of discount rates results in 
important shifts in the cost estimation for some technologies, in particular for energy efficiency in 
power generation. This results from the fact that even if all the energy efficiency projects analysed 
are located in China, they apply very different financial discount rates, even very high ones (from 8.5 
to 15%). In Figure 4.2, Chinese discount rates were standardized at a 8% level (as most projects 
 
                                                      
28 According to the monthly newsletter ‘CDM Highlights’ issued by GTZ, CDM credit prices fluctuated between US$ 12 
and US$ 33 in the spot market during 2008 and 2009, with an average of US$ 20.7. The World Bank’s State and Trends of the 
Carbon Market (Kossoy and Ambrosi 2010) cites an average price of $12.7 per CER in the primary market during 2009. 
While it is difficult to choose between primary and secondary prices as the correct threshold for defining a cheap 
abatement option (as project developers in different countries have different CER selling strategies), the conclusion 
remains unchanged if the $12.7 or the $20.7 average price is used. The conclusion also remains unchanged if it is 
considered that CDM transaction costs should be added to the pure abatement costs before assessing the financial 
attractiveness of the project. 
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located in China convincingly argue that this discount rate is reasonable for the country in the energy 
sector), thus resulting in a shift downwards for the estimated costs of the energy efficiency projects.  
 
The variability of costs within project subtypes stems from various factors. Above we have already 
discussed the impact of project lifetimes and financial discount rates on the cost estimations, and these 
figures can be manipulated easily to make projects appear non-attractive. However, there are also large 
differences in the technologies used within project subtypes. For example, biogas power projects can 
consist of a sophisticated bioreactor, or just of a plastic membrane covering the already existing 
anaerobic lagoons, which allows to capture the methane. Further, biodigesters can be imported or can 
be manufactured domestically, which will also have an impact on costs. Biomass projects include 
energy generation from rice husks, bagasse, palm oil residues, forest residues, and a variety of other 
agricultural or industrial by-products. Energy efficiency projects take place in cement, steel, chemical, 
petrochemical and other industries and can encompass different efficiency measures. Hydroelectric 
projects have very different sizes, and smaller ones (among those including a dam) typically imply 
higher abatement costs. Finally, different countries can have different cost structures, with differing 
energy prices, taxes or financial incentives for specific technologies that may have an impact on overall 
abatement costs. Ideally, we should have a different project sample for each host country and estimate 
country-specific CDM abatement costs, however, due to time constraints and to the fact that most 
countries still have too few registered CDM projects, this has not been possible. 
 
Another important point to discuss in these results is the existence of CDM projects with net 
negative abatement costs. If we consider the financial discount rates used by the project proponents 
in the project documentation, these negative-cost projects are only two, just one biomass energy and 
one energy efficiency project. The biomass project substantiates its additionality through a barrier 
analysis, but includes an annex showing the cash flow of the project with a positive Net Present 
Value. The energy efficiency project substantiates additionality through the comparison with an 
alternative project: even if the CDM project activity has a positive NPV, the alternative has an even 
better one, so that it would be the preferred course of action.  
 
If we take country-standardized financial discount rates, also some other projects have negative 
costs, and surprisingly, run-of-river hydroelectric projects and own-generation energy efficiency 
projects even have a mean negative cost. Our whole sample in these project categories is from China, 
where most projects originally used 8% as financial discount rate, while some hydro projects used 
10% and energy efficiency ones even higher rates. We standardized all Chinese financial discount 
rates to 8%, on the grounds that most energy-related projects in this country use this figure. But 
then, half of the energy efficiency projects and all hydro projects that originally took 10% financial 
discount rate become financially attractive. MAC curves from the literature show that many energy 
efficiency projects have negative abatement costs and are thus theoretically financially attractive (e.g. 
Vattenfall 2007). The reason why these project opportunities are not realized is that they face 
important market imperfections (information asymmetries, misaligned incentives, lack of priority, 
and financial risks). We thus believe that the standardized costs most likely reflect standard 
engineering costs of such projects, while the non-standardized ones may reflect different perceptions 
about project risks. 
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Up-front investment costs  
One of the main barriers for investing in infrastructure in Least Developed Countries and Sub-
Saharan Africa is the availability of up-front financing. The main costs of renewable energy projects 
are investment costs, as they do not bear annual fuel costs. Whether CDM revenues can cover a 
substantial amount of the up-front investment costs could constitute an important factor in the 
decision to undertake a project or not.29 For these reasons, we have repeated our empirical 
estimation using total investment costs per CER. The results are shown on Figure 4.3. 
 
Here again, we observe a high variance in the investment costs of the different project subtypes. As 
in the case of the full abatement costs, this reflects the variability in technologies used, their origin, 
and the project sizes. On the other hand, the sequence of project types according to investment 
costs is again consistent with the previous assessments: projects involving new infrastructure, such as 
large renewable energy projects or gas power plants have larger investment costs. Projects involving 
a relatively small change in a process, such as N2O reduction, landfill or biogas projects have smaller 
costs.  
 
 
Figure 4.3: Investment cost per emissions credit by project subtypes (US$) 
 
Note: Calculation based on projects' total investment costs and time-discounted amount of emission credits 
over its lifetime. 
 
 
 
                                                      
29 In this context, again the consideration of which credits are considered in the cost calculations (just pre-2012 credits, 
those expected from the first crediting period, or those from all crediting periods) is critical for investment decisions. For 
similar reasons as above, the discounted amount of credits projected for the whole project’s lifetime is used in these 
calculations.  
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4.4.4 CDM emission abatement potentials 
There are few comprehensive studies on the emissions abatement potential in developing countries. 
Notable exceptions are the studies by Wetzelaer et al. (2007), Bakker et al. (2007) and, more recently, 
De Gouvello et al. (2008). 
 
Based on data from climate mitigation studies in 30 countries, Wetzelaer et al. (2007) developed an 
abatement cost curve for the non-Annex I region in the year 2010, focusing mainly on CO2 and to a 
lesser extent on CH4 emission reductions. The study concluded that the total abatement potential for 
the whole non-Annex I region in the year 2010 amounts to about 2 GtCO2e/yr at a price of 
US$ 50/tCO2e or less. About one third of this potential is expected to be achievable at negative or 
zero incremental costs. Approximately 1.7 GtCO2e/yr appear feasible at costs of up to 
US$ 4/tCO2e, including transaction costs. 66% of the total abatement potential was found in China 
(37%), India (23%), Brazil (4%) and South Africa (2%) (Wetzelaer et al. 2007).  
 
Building on the above-mentioned study, Bakker et al. (2007) tried to find the market potential of 
abatement options in non-Annex I countries by 2020. Their study differentiates between technical 
abatement potential (reductions that can be realized based on technical and physical parameters), 
economic potential (reductions that can be realized below a certain cost level) and market potential 
(reductions that can be realized considering other barriers). Bakker et al. (2007) updated and 
completed the abatement cost curves, by including information from new country studies, 
extrapolating them from 2010 to 2020, and adding new technology options (carbon capture and 
storage, and forestry) and non-CO2 GHGs. In order to find out the market emissions reduction 
potential, they included a scenario-based analysis of the impacts of different CDM-related factors on 
the abatement potential: the eligibility of technologies under the CDM, the future application of the 
additionality criterion, the success of programmatic CDM, the investment climate and institutional 
environment in the host countries, and the existence of non-financial barriers related to the uptake 
of technology. In the scenarios, only the abatement potential of the options was varied, not the cost. 
Accounting for the uncertainties related to eligibility decisions, additionality criteria, programmatic 
CDM and technology adoption, the market potential for CDM projects was estimated at 1.6 - 
3.2 GtCO2e/yr at costs up to 20 !/tCO2e in 2020.  
 
The study by De Gouvello et al. (2008) looked at the abatement potential in the energy sector in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, using the existing CDM methodologies to identify technologies that could 
promote GHG emission reductions and at the same time support energy development in the region. 
They thus built a bottom-up inventory of clean energy projects applying 22 technologies in 44 
countries in SSA, which includes over 3200 projects, among them 361 programmes of activities. 
These projects would amount to more than 170 GW of additional power-generation capacity, which 
is more than twice the region’s current installed capacity, providing about four times the region’s 
current modern-energy production. The resulting GHG emissions reduction potential would total 
about 740 million tCO2 per year, and would be mainly related to the biomass sector.  
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This study also included estimated investment costs for many of the technologies found, but did not 
include a full economic analysis. Even investment data were unavailable for projects representing 
36% of added power-generation capacity and 21% of emission reductions (2008). 
 
4.4.5 Costs and potentials – MAC curves 
Combining the information on standardized abatement costs for emission credit generation and 
CDM potential in different countries or regions, we obtain our basis for the comparison of CDM 
competitiveness: MAC curves. Figure 4.4 shows abatement cost curves for China, India, LDCs, and 
a group of selected high-income high-emissions Asian countries (Qatar, United Arab Emirates, 
Singapore, South Korea, Israel) without discounting the emission credits.  
 
As abatement costs we use the median standardized abatement cost obtained for each project sub-
type from our sample. HFC-23 reduction projects, very prominent in China and India, typically lack 
financial data in the project documentation, as their additionality (the main reason why financial 
information is disclosed) is guaranteed due to the fact that the only income stream for these projects 
is the sale of emission reduction credits. For this type of projects, abatement cost estimations from 
secondary sources (Harnisch and Hendriks 2000; UNEP TEAP 2002; Jimenez 2005) have been 
used. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Abatement cost curves without emissions credit discounting  
 
Sources: Cost data from Project Design Documents; for HFC-23 projects from Harnisch and Hendricks 
(2000); UNEP TEAP (2002); Jimenez (2005). Potentials from UNEP Risoe Centre (2009) and De Gouvello et 
al. (2008). Own calculations. 
 
 
The abatement potential is estimated simply by summing up all emission reductions projected to be 
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very approximate estimate. On the one hand, it does not include CDM projects not yet submitted 
for validation, so the potential may increase over the following years. On the other hand, it includes 
projects that may fail validation or registration, whose potential will thus not materialise. Finally, this 
estimation does not take into account the fact that credit issuance is for most project types actually 
less than the estimations provided in the project documentation. However, as these sources of bias 
are present in CDM projects over all host countries, we deemed these figures to be precise enough 
for our comparison.  
 
For the group of Least Developed Countries, we include two estimations. The first one (“LDCs 
existing”) is, as above, the sum of all emission reductions projected from the current CDM pipeline 
in this region. The second estimation (“LDCs potential”) additionally includes the abatement 
potential estimated by De Gouvello et al. (2008) for the LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa, excluding the 
potential from biofuel projects, which so far do not have any approved methodologies. This 
provides an optimistic estimation of the abatement potential in these countries, which could be 
achieved if the technical, financial and institutional conditions were substantially improved.  
 
It should be noted that these curves include project types without cost information. These appear at 
present at the left end of the curves, as having zero abatement costs. The projects without cost 
information represent 1.7% of the abatement potential in China, 8.6% in the advanced host 
countries, 7.3% in LDCs existing, 7.9% in LDCs potential and 26.5% in India. In the Indian case, 
about one third of this potential comes from supply-side energy efficiency projects, for which 
abatement costs should be similar that those in own generation energy efficiency projects, which 
have net negative costs when standardizing the financial discount rates. Unfortunately, the financial 
information for supply-side energy efficiency is either non-existing or not very credible in the project 
documents analysed. While this inclusion might provide the wrong impression of a large quantity of 
low-cost (or zero-cost) project options, we opted for not omitting these data from the curves as they 
allow for a more realistic picture of the overall abatement potential.  
 
 
4.5 Empirical assessment of the effect of discounting in selected countries 
In this section we include the effect of two possible discounting schemes on the CDM abatement 
cost curves of the selected regions and countries. 
 
4.5.1 Discounting scheme 1 
We use per capita GDP and per capita emissions as the criteria for defining the discount factor for 
emission reductions, which captures the principles of capability to pay and responsibility towards 
climate change. Each country’s GDP per capita and emissions per capita are compared to the 
average values for the whole world, using the data from IEA (2007a). Both proportions are given the 
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same weight, as both principles are equally important and are not directly correlated. Thus, the 
discount factors30 are calculated as indicated in Equation 4.2: 
  
 
 
Negative discount factors are not permitted, since this would imply issuing more than one emissions 
credit per tonne of emissions reduced. Table 4.3 shows the resulting discount factors for some 
countries included in this study. See Michaelowa (2008b) for a more detailed description of this 
discounting scheme, including the calculations for other countries.  
 
 
Table 4.3: Discount factors for the emission credits 
Host country GDP/cap (PPP, 2000 US$) 
Emissions/cap 
(tCO2e/year) 
Discount factor  
under scheme 1 
Discount factor  
under scheme 2 
World   8492   4.22 - - 
Qatar 38556 44.90 87% 93% 
United Arab Emirates 22715 24.37 76% 88% 
Singapore 26401   9.93 63% 82% 
Israel 23022   8.65 58% 79% 
South Korea 19837   9.30 56% 78% 
China   6012   3.88   0% 39% 
India   3072   1.05   0%   0% 
Zimbabwe   1813   0.79   0%   0% 
Cambodia   2503   0.27   0%   0% 
Yemen     827   0.89   0%   0% 
Mozambique   1105   0.08   0%   0% 
Tanzania     662   0.11   0%   0% 
Source: IEA (2007a). Own calculations. 
 
 
With this scheme, of our selected countries only those in the “Other Asia” group (Qatar, United 
Arab Emirates, Singapore, South Korea, Israel) are affected by the discounting. As can be seen when 
comparing Figure 4.5 with Figure 4.4, their abatement cost curve shifts to the left and upward as a 
result of the increase in costs per credit and the reduction in credit generation potential. Further, 
with this discounting scheme about 95% of the projects in the current CDM pipeline of these 
advanced countries would still be feasible with credit prices up to 20 US$ on average. Only a 
hydroelectric project in South Korea and a project for the reduction of fugitive natural gas emissions 
 
                                                      
30 Discount factors are to be understood as the percentage of emission reductions that is not credited. For example, a 30% 
discount factor would imply that only 70% of the measured emission reductions receive emission credits. 
Discount factor = 1  -   
2
Country’s emissions/cap Country’s GDP/cap 
World average emissions/cap World average GDP/cap 
+
, (4.2) 
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in Qatar would be lost. While projects in advanced countries become less competitive, current 
projects in LDCs are still non-significant at a global level, and future potential is still small compared 
to the Chinese pipeline. This shows that discounting cannot serve as a “magic bullet” that suddenly 
frees up a large CDM potential. Other barriers such as availability of domestic capital and skilled 
workers are so entrenched that the revenue from credit sales cannot remove them. CDM alone 
cannot overcome the legacy from decades of failed policies – even if getting some advantages 
compared to projects with a more development-oriented governance. 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Abatement cost curves with discounting scheme 1 
 
Sources: Cost data from Project Design Documents; for HFC-23 projects from Harnisch and Hendricks 
(2000); UNEP TEAP (2002); Jimenez (2005). Potentials from UNEP Risoe Centre (2009) and De Gouvello et 
al. (2008). Own calculations. 
 
 
4.5.2 Discounting scheme 2 
In this case, the discounting of emission credits is again based on an index composed of per capita 
GDP and per capita emissions, taking as basis the world average of both indicators. But discounting 
starts already when the country reaches half of the world’s average emissions and GDP. This scheme 
is designed to include China among the countries affected by discounting. Overcrediting is again not 
possible. See Table 4.3 for the resulting discount factors and Michaelowa (2008b) for a further 
description of this discounting scheme.  
 
Under this scheme, both China and Other Asia are affected by discounting. Figure 4.6 shows the 
result: while the potential in the Asian tigers is greatly reduced and the costs rise sharply, making a 
larger portion of its abatement potential uncompetitive (now also a couple of wind energy projects 
become infeasible, with costs slightly over 20 US$), still most of China’s potential – albeit reduced 
and more expensive – remains competitive with credit prices below 20 US$. Under these conditions, 
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all CDM projects in the current pipeline in LDCs have smaller abatement costs than those in 
advanced countries. Their volume is however still unimportant. There is some hope if we look at the 
“LDCs potential” curve: assuming the barriers are overcome and these projects are implemented, 
their potential reaches half of the Chinese one, with costs below 5 US$/credit. This shows that once 
the purely technical potential becomes available due to the mobilization of capital and removal of 
political barriers the higher credit revenue compared to other CDM host countries could make the 
difference. Countries that have reformed their policies and enabled the creation of domestic capital 
could use the CDM as lever to accelerate development.  
 
 
Figure 4.6: Abatement cost curves with discounting scheme 2 
 
Sources: Cost data from Project Design Documents; for HFC-23 projects from Harnisch and Hendricks 
(2000); UNEP TEAP (2002); Jimenez (2005). Potentials from UNEP Risoe Centre (2009) and De Gouvello et 
al. (2008). Own calculations. 
 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
Country-based discounting will of course have an impact on the competitiveness of individual CDM 
host countries in the carbon market, however, as shown above, this impact will depend on emissions 
abatement potentials and costs in the country.  
 
Discounting could become an interesting instrument for incentivizing advanced developing countries 
to leave the CDM and engage in other farther-reaching climate-related commitments, as a result of 
the steep credit cost increases that a discounting factor might generate.  
 
However, this study shows that even under discounting schemes designed to include China, Least 
Developed Countries remain unimportant in terms of abatement potential from the CDM pipeline.  
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While there is a theoretically large abatement potential to be exploited in Africa, its materialization 
requires overcoming financial, technical and institutional barriers. Given the large cheap potential in 
China and other countries, it is unlikely that discounting on its own will provide sufficient financial 
incentives to achieve this. But once countries start removing barriers, the CDM incentive could play 
a non-negligible role in development. Nevertheless, even under the optimistic scenario, where the 
financial, technical and institutional barriers in these countries are overcome and a larger potential 
becomes feasible, the larger abatement potential and the cheap abatement costs in China and other 
more attractive host countries will be harvested first.  
 
Thus, discounting would only marginally contribute to enhance the competitiveness (in terms of 
abatement potential and costs) of LDCs within the CDM market. 
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5. DOES THE CDM DISCOURAGE EMISSION REDUCTION TARGETS IN 
ADVANCED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES? AN ANALYSIS OF THE LOW-
HANGING FRUIT ISSUE31 
 
 
 
‘As with perishable produce, low hanging fruit will rot, if they are not harvested. Therefore: the rule of "sell them or smell 
them" is true for CO2-credits, too’ 
(World Bank 2003, p. 32) 
 
‘The commission is saying we must watch out that the off-setting mechanisms (such as the current CDM) do not take away the 
low-cost options for developing countries. The commission does not want these countries to be left with only very high cost ways 
of reducing emissions […].’ 
(Tomas Wyns, CAN Europe, quoted by Garside 2009) 
 
‘Lower cost mitigation opportunities (low hanging fruits) should be left for the developing countries, as part of their voluntary 
endeavor to contribute to the global mitigation effort.’ 
(Government of Saudi Arabia 2011, p. 80) 
 
‘Under the current market based paradigm, developed countries that have exhausted their own low-cost mitigation options may 
rely on low-cost mitigation options in developing countries to meet their obligations. This renders these options unavailable to 
developing countries forcing them to rely on remaining high-cost options.’ 
(Government of Malaysia 2011, p. 12) 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters looked into shortcomings of the CDM that affect its ability to encourage 
emission reductions in the less developed countries, and analysed the potential effects of measures 
that have been proposed to address these shortcomings. The following two chapters will be 
dedicated to the role of the CDM in those countries in which it has been more successful, i.e. the 
more advanced developing countries. The focus will be on aspects of the CDM that influence its 
ability to generate positive incentives for generating emission reductions – beyond offsetting – in 
these countries.  
 
One of the concerns that have surrounded the CDM since its establishment and even until today – 
as can be seen form the quotes above – is the fear that engaging in CDM projects would imply 
 
                                                      
31 This chapter is based on Castro, Paula (2011), ‘Does the CDM discourage emission reduction targets in advanced 
developing countries?’, Climate Policy, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 198-218. 
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selling off developing countries’ cheap emission reduction options (the so-called “low-hanging 
fruit”) to industrialized countries, with the result that developing countries would have to invest in 
more expensive measures to meet their own future reduction targets.32 While the CDM is a cost-
containment mechanism and as such is supposed to target the cheap emission reduction options, the 
low-hanging fruit focus of the CDM has also been criticized from a developed-country perspective, 
on the grounds that the subsidy granted by the mechanism to very large, low-cost projects is 
disproportionately large compared to the cost of implementing the emission reductions (Wara, 
2008). Despite these concerns and criticisms, the CDM has grown successfully, and its largest host 
country, China, is one of those that were initially most sceptical of it (Tangen and Heggelund 2003; 
Bang et al. 2005).  
 
In the international negotiations towards a new climate regime post-2012, there is considerable 
pressure on fast-growing developing countries to take up some kind of emission reduction 
commitments. Firstly, it is now recognized that future global emissions reduction targets need to be 
much more ambitious than the Kyoto target for avoiding dangerous climate change. Secondly, some 
large and fast-growing developing countries already emit such high levels of greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) that their participation is regarded as crucial for avoiding dangerous climate change (Bang et 
al. 2005; Höhne et al. 2007; Gupta et al. 2007a; Parry et al. 2007; WRI 2008).33 Thirdly, concerns 
about the impacts of climate policy - on a country’s competitiveness in the global markets and the 
likelihood that energy-intensive industries migrate to countries without emission reduction targets - 
have been prominent in research and policy debates (Hourcade et al. 2001; Baumert and Kete 2002; 
Cosbey 2005; Barker et al. 2007; High Level Group on Competitiveness, Energy and the 
Environment 2007). All these concerns have led to increasing demands by industrialized countries 
that advanced developing countries take up emission reduction commitments.  
 
Developing countries, however, oppose committing to reduction targets. Their main arguments are 
the historical responsibility of industrialized countries for existing carbon concentrations in the 
atmosphere; the negative impact that reduction targets might have on their development, poverty 
alleviation and growth expectations; and notions of fairness in the amount of emissions a person is 
allowed to generate in developing countries as compared to industrialized ones. For detailed 
accounts of different countries’ positions in the international negotiations towards new climate 
commitments, see Bang et al. (2005) and, more recently, Höhne et al. (2007) and WRI (2009). 
 
The CDM experience plays a role in these negotiations as well. Some developing countries and 
environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) consider the CDM to be a means for 
industrialized countries to shift their emissions reduction responsibility to other countries. Based on 
its project-by-project nature, critics argue that it creates disincentives for developing countries’ 
 
                                                      
32 See Narain and van’t Veld (2008) for a review of occasions when the low-hanging fruit issue was discussed in the Kyoto 
negotiations. 
33 Recent calculations suggest that China is now the largest CO2 emitter in the world, surpassing even the USA (MNP 
(Netherlands Environmental Agency) 2008; IEA 2010a). However, per-capita emissions in this and other large developing 
countries are still very low in the global ranking. 
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governments to pass climate-friendly legislation.34 Due to the large financial flows achieved by the 
CDM, industrialized countries feel uncomfortable that the desire to continue receiving these funds is 
itself a reason for advanced developing countries not to take more ambitious climate change 
mitigation actions (US Government Accountability Office 2008; European Commission 2009). 
Moreover, the costs of mitigation actions, coupled with the above-mentioned fear that the CDM has 
already captured the cheapest ones, make developing countries even more unwilling to commit. 
 
In this chapter, I test this last argument empirically, thus contributing to the discussion on the role of 
offset mechanisms in achieving global GHG emission reductions. So far, most of the research on 
this so-called low-hanging fruit claim has been theoretical and model-based, and thus no empirical 
evidence for its validity has yet been presented. With the large number of CDM projects in the 
current portfolio, this is now possible. 
 
The existing literature on the low-hanging fruit claim is first reviewed. The approach for testing this 
claim using marginal abatement cost curves is then detailed and the emissions abatement cost of 
CDM projects using the financial information provided in their Project Design Documents (PDDs) 
is estimated. A dataset of projects, technologies, estimated costs and expected amount of emission 
reductions is built for eight CDM host countries and summarized in the form of CDM-specific 
abatement cost curves. These curves are compared with existing abatement cost curves from the 
literature, in order to determine whether only or mostly the cheapest abatement options are being 
captured by the CDM. Conclusions for the CDM, the low-hanging fruit argument and its relevance 
for the ongoing climate negotiations follow.  
 
 
5.2 Literature review  
The low-hanging fruit issue – also known as the “sold-out” hypothesis, the “cherry-picking” or the 
“cream-skimming” problem – was already a discussion topic during the negotiations that led to the 
implementation of the CDM. It is the claim that developing countries will be worse off after selling 
their cheapest abatement options (the low-hanging fruits) to industrialized countries through the 
CDM, because they will have to invest in more expensive options later, when they assume own 
emission reduction targets. 
 
So far, only theoretical analyses of the low-hanging fruit problem have been available in the 
literature. The results of these studies imply that the existence of a low-hanging-fruit problem 
basically depends on the evolution of carbon credit prices, the way in which future abatement 
commitments for developing countries are set, whether CDM projects are developed unilaterally or 
 
                                                      
34 In order to be registered, CDM projects need to demonstrate that they would not have happened without support from 
the CDM (the additionality rule). Thus, if in country X there is a piece of legislation that mandates, for example, the use of 
energy saving lamps, then country X cannot propose a CDM project to replace incandescent bulbs with energy saving ones. 
The additionality rule discourages countries from passing climate-friendly legislation, because they do not want to lose the 
potential revenues from possible CDM projects. To avoid this perverse incentive, the CDM authorities created the E+/E- 
rule in November 2005, which states that climate-friendly policies passed after the year 2001 are not to be counted towards 
the additionality constraint of CDM projects. 
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bilaterally, the market power of the participating countries and the possibility to bank credits from 
one commitment period to the next (Olsen and Painuly 2002; Akita 2003; Bréchet et al. 2004; 
Germain et al. 2007; Narain and van't Veld 2008).  
 
But several more general characteristics of the climate regime give shape to this interpretation. First, 
it assumes a necessary condition that developing countries, especially the more advanced ones, will 
eventually “graduate” and commit to their own GHG emission reduction targets (Akita 2003). This 
has been one of the most controversial debate topics in the international negotiations towards a 
post-2012 agreement. While the Kyoto Protocol presupposes such a transition and industrialized 
countries are trying to push for it, the existing rules do not explicitly include it, and most developing 
countries are currently against it. 
 
Second, the availability of CDM project options is not only influenced by the cost of the abatement 
measures, but is also constrained by financial, technical and institutional barriers in the host countries 
and by the CDM rules themselves. In particular, the high CDM transaction costs and cumbersome 
registration procedures may prevent attractive abatement options from accessing the mechanism 
(especially if they are small-scale). While this situation is expected to improve with new CDM 
modalities, it is likely that some of these cheap abatement options will contribute to the host 
country’s own reduction targets in the future. This also applies to project types that are currently not 
accepted in the CDM, such as avoided deforestation and many other land use change projects, and 
the use of nuclear energy. Further, only those projects considered additional can be registered as a 
CDM. If currently expensive mitigation options become cheaper, they might no longer fulfil the 
additionality criterion – if one uses low-hanging fruit terminology, the fruit starts to ‘rot’ (World 
Bank 2003, p. 32).  
 
Furthermore, new emissions abatement options may appear and become cheaper in time as 
technology evolves and as economies grow. The pool of abatement options is thus not a static one 
but may grow in the future, especially in developing countries.  
 
Finally, there is an international market for carbon reduction certificates. Assuming a continuation of 
the current regime, even after a country graduates, there will be other developing countries still under 
the CDM system, which may continue to deliver cheaper carbon credits (Narain and van't Veld 
2008). Similarly, as abatement options in some countries become scarce or more expensive, other 
countries now under-represented in the CDM will become more mature and enter the market more 
actively. 
 
 
5.3 The low-hanging fruit issue 
To model the low-hanging fruit issue, Rose et al. (1999) draw on the theory of resource exhaustion, 
whereby there is a resource stock (carbon emission mitigation options) that is exploited and gradually 
depleted, which results in rising costs of implementation for emission mitigation projects over time. 
This approach is followed here and it is assumed that part of the stock of emission reduction options 
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in developing countries is captured by the CDM. By comparing the complete stock to the portion 
captured by the CDM, conclusions are drawn on whether the low-hanging fruit argument holds. 
 
This approach implies a strong simplification of reality, as it does not take into account the carbon 
market dynamics that, according to the literature, influences the availability of emission reduction 
options. Both emissions trading and banking – the possibility to save carbon credits earned today for 
using them in a future period – relax the problem of exhaustion of emission reduction options, as 
they increase flexibility in achieving reduction targets. Economic growth and technological change 
will make new emission reduction options appear, so that the abatement stock is replenished. 
Learning effects and technology diffusion will make these new emission reduction options become 
cheaper in time, so that there will be new low-hanging fruits to pick.  
 
However, at a given moment in time, it can be assumed that the stock of abatement options available 
is fixed. As a result, our test of the low-hanging fruit problem relies on two hypotheses: 
- Size hypothesis: The larger the portion of the country’s mitigation potential (measured in 
tCO2e) that has been captured by the CDM, the more likely there is a low-hanging fruit 
problem. 
- Cost hypothesis: The larger the portion of the country’s cheap emission reduction options 
that has been captured by the CDM (measured in tCO2e), the more likely there is a low-
hanging fruit problem. 
If the CDM is not exhausting the stock of abatement options under the extreme assumption of no 
dynamics, the actual situation must be even better, because the stock will grow in the future. Thus, 
this assumption leads us to a strong, robust conclusion. 
 
Our conceptualization of “cheap emission reduction options” relies on the carbon market: “cheap” 
is defined as all those emission reduction options whose abatement costs are below the average 
carbon market price for CERs. This is in line with the notion that the market will influence the 
choice of emission reduction actions: if the market price does not compensate for the cost of 
mitigation, then it is not financially attractive to engage in this action, and it is preferable to trade 
carbon credits in the market.  
 
 
5.4 Data and methods 
5.4.1 CDM cost data 
The analysis in this chapter relies partly on an extended version of the self-compiled database on 
CDM project costs described in Chapter 4, and on the construction of MAC curves for six of the 
most important CDM host countries. Accordingly, CDM project information was obtained from the 
UNEP Risoe Centre’s CDM pipeline (UNEP Risoe Centre 2010) and detailed cost data were 
compiled from the documentation available for each CDM project on the UNFCCC website, which 
often includes a financial analysis in the section about demonstration of additionality.  
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While this is the only CDM-specific source of financial data that is easily available for compiling a 
comprehensive dataset, there is a risk of selection bias because information comes only from those 
projects choosing to use a financial analysis for additionality demonstration. Indeed, one could think 
that it is precisely the projects using the barrier analysis which are the low-hanging fruits, and that 
they do not present their financial data because they are so cheap that they would not pass the 
additionality test if they did. This suspicion is shared by the CDM regulators, as can be seen in the 
proposal by the CDM Methodology Panel to enhance the barrier test for projects that are likely to 
have high revenues (CDM Methodology Panel 2008) and in the recently adopted ‘Guidelines for 
objective demonstration and assessment of barriers’ (CDM EB 2009). 
 
A quick exploration of the data provided by the IGES CDM Project Database (IGES 2010), which 
includes information on what type of financial analysis is used in each CDM project, shows that of 
all the CDM projects already registered, or seeking registration, by the end of 2009, around 35% do 
not provide any financial data in their public documentation. The factors affecting the decision to 
include a financial analysis in the CDM project documentation are, as will be discussed in detail 
below, not only the technology involved in the project, but also the size of the project, the host 
country and notably the time passed since the CDM was initiated. This leads us to believe that the 
data do not suffer from selection bias.  
 
It can be assumed that the technology involved in the project is the main determinant of the 
project’s cost such that, if the cheap technologies never provide financial information, there will be 
selection bias. In CDM projects, the technology used is roughly determined by the “project type”, 
which is a classification that includes both the economic sector involved (e.g. energy, agriculture, 
forestry, cement industry) and the generic technology used to reduce emissions (wind energy, hydro 
power, reforestation, energy efficiency improvements). In the IGES data, it can be seen that in terms 
of project types, only the projects reducing the industrial gas HFC-23 (a very potent GHG) never 
perform the financial analysis, which is because they are almost automatically considered additional, 
as they do not have any revenues other than the CERs. In all other project types (except in those 
that have only one or two projects registered), at least 30% of the projects provide some kind of 
financial data. Thus, for almost all project types there is some cost data available. This minimizes the 
risk of selection bias.  
 
The size of the project is also an important variable affecting the decision to include a financial 
analysis in the documentation.35 Almost 80% of the large CDM projects include a financial analysis, 
while only 45% of the small ones do. This is related both to the simplified modalities for 
additionality determination that exist for small projects, and to the above-mentioned regulatory 
mistrust against the barrier test. With respect to countries, in all main CDM hosts both projects with 
and without a financial analysis are found but there are considerable differences: in China, for 
example, over 90% of projects include some kind of financial data, while in Mexico and India only 
 
                                                      
35 In the CDM, the size of the project is determined either in terms of its output capacity (for renewable energy projects), 
the amount of energy consumption reduced (for energy efficiency projects), or the amount of emission reductions achieved 
(for all other projects) (CDM Rulebook, 2010). Projects considered to be small according to these criteria can use simplified 
baseline and monitoring methodologies, which include, among others, a simplified demonstration of additionality. 
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71% and 45%, respectively, do so. Finally, the time elapsed since the first CDM project was 
submitted for validation (December 2003) increases the likelihood that a new project includes a 
financial analysis in its documentation, and this is applicable to most project types. Indeed, as the 
CDM rules have become clearer and stricter over time, more projects have chosen to perform an 
investment analysis to demonstrate additionality. 
 
5.4.2 CDM-specific abatement cost calculation 
As in Chapter 4, CDM projects’ abatement costs were calculated, following Equation 4.1, as the net 
present value of the project costs (investment and operation) minus its revenues (e.g. income from 
electricity sales), all divided by the amount of GHG emission reductions it expects to achieve 
(indicated by the amount of emission reduction credits the project expects to generate over its 
crediting lifetime, also time-discounted).  
 
Time discounting is critical in cost calculations. In capital budgeting, time discounting is used to 
reflect the interest rates the project is subject to, plus any financial risks applicable to either the 
country where the investment is taking place or the type of investment being made (Brealey and 
Myers 2000). In the CDM, discount rates are chosen by the project participant, but need to be 
justified. Still, as discussed in Chapter 4, there is a significant variation in the financial discount rates 
of projects in different technological categories and in different countries. Hence, the discount rates 
have been standardized for each country in order to have comparable information and to avoid the 
possible effect of discount rates being manipulated to obtain less attractive financial figures. The 
discount rate chosen for each country is the median of the discount rates utilized in the CDM 
projects within the sample taking place in the respective country, which was then rounded to the 
closest integer. As project developers have to substantiate the parameters they choose for the 
financial analysis, we consider the median to be a good indicator of the real discount rate applicable 
in the country. This is preferable to the mean because it avoids the influence of outliers, and to the 
mode because in several countries no mode was found and in most cases the median and the mode 
were identical. See Appendix 5A.1 for an overview of the standardized discount rates applied. See 
also Chapter 4 for further details on the methodology used for the cost calculations. 
 
In this chapter, we use a larger sample of abatement cost data, covering a more detailed set of 
emission reduction technologies (project types) and a different range of host countries. Abatement 
cost information was extracted from 304 CDM projects, covering 36 emission reduction 
technologies.36 These projects are mainly located in the eight host countries included in the sample 
(see below). For technologies where no sufficient financial information was found in these countries, 
the sample was extended to other countries. For the reason described above, HFC-23 reduction 
projects, which contribute a large percentage of the CERs generated in advanced developing 
countries, typically lack financial data in the project documentation; thus, abatement cost estimations 
 
                                                      
36 94% of the analysed projects are already registered under the CDM Executive Board of the UNFCCC. Projects at an 
earlier stage of the registration process were analysed only if no sufficient information was available from registered 
projects for a certain technology. In this case, care was taken that any requests for review were not related to the financial 
analysis of the project. 
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from secondary sources (Harnisch and Hendriks 2000; UNEP TEAP 2002; Jimenez 2005) were 
used.  
 
The resulting abatement cost data were summarized in terms of the median abatement cost 
estimated for each technology (or CDM project type) included in the sample. 
 
5.4.3 Expected size of CDM emission abatement 
As an estimation of the amount of mitigation opportunities the CDM is expected to capture in a 
country, the annual amount of carbon credits that all the CDM projects currently proposed in the 
country estimate was aggregated. This information was taken from the CDM pipeline as of the end 
of December 2009 (UNEP Risoe Centre 2010). This is a rough estimation, as it does not include 
new projects that could be proposed in the future, but does include projects that have been 
proposed but not yet registered so far. Following project proposal rates at the time of analysis (91 
projects/month)37, about 1092 new projects are expected to enter the CDM pipeline by the end of 
2010. Project registration rates (47 projects/month)28 imply that only about 564 existing projects will 
be registered. As the CDM pipeline includes 2838 not-yet-registered projects as of the end of 
December 2009, the estimation is likely to be larger than the real size of the CDM by the end of 
2010, because many projects in the pipeline will not yet start generating emission reduction credits 
(unless the registration process accelerates significantly in the following months, which is unlikely). 
Finally, this estimation does not take into account the fact that the emission reductions actually 
achieved are – for most project types – less than the estimations provided in the project 
documentation (Castro and Michaelowa 2008; UNEP Risoe Centre 2010). This all implies that, for 
our discussion of the low-hanging fruit argument, we are again on the safe side: if an overestimated 
CDM does not capture a large proportion of the theoretical abatement potential, then the low-
hanging fruit issue is not likely to be a real problem.38 
 
5.4.4 Comparison with theoretical abatement cost studies 
From the cost and the size information, marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves for the CDM were 
built. In order to test the size hypothesis, these curves were compared with MAC curves showing the 
technical emissions abatement potential in the respective country. These theoretical MAC curves 
were built by merging the information from several studies that have performed bottom-up 
assessments of the technologies available for reducing GHG emissions in individual countries, their 
costs, and the amount of emission reductions that could potentially be achieved (the details of the 
studies used appear in Appendix 5A.2). Care was taken to avoid overlaps between the different 
studies. In order to test the cost hypothesis, a more detailed analysis of the portion of the abatement 
potential captured by the CDM for different cost categories was performed.  
 
                                                      
37 Average over the last 3 months of 2009. 
38 It should be noted that performance in terms of actual generation of emission reductions differs between CDM project-
types, with industrial gas projects clearly generating more reductions than initially projected, and methane reduction 
projects generating less. While taking this into account affects our estimation of CDM size for specific technological and 
cost categories (shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 below), it does not affect the main conclusion that the low-hanging fruit 
argument is weak. Calculations using issuance-corrected CER volumes are available on request. 
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5.4.5 Case selection 
The low-hanging fruit argument is of interest to those developing countries under pressure to take 
more action to mitigate climate change. Action towards climate change mitigation is subject to the 
principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ of countries 
(UNFCCC 2008c, p. 3), which means that countries with more responsibility for causing climate 
change and with better capabilities to take action should do more. Responsibility can be measured in 
terms of GHG emissions levels, in absolute terms or per capita. Capability can be measured in terms 
of GDP per capita, which is an indication of the economic wealth of the country. Further, the low-
hanging fruit problem is potentially relevant only to those countries in which the CDM has become 
significant.  
 
Thus, from the countries that are hosting at least 10 registered CDM projects, those that ranked 
highest, in terms of absolute CO2 emissions, CO2 emissions per capita and GDP per capita, were 
taken by building an index that incorporates these three indicators with equal weights. Data was 
obtained from IEA (2007b) and IMF (2008). The resulting sample includes China, South Korea, 
Mexico, South Africa, Thailand, Argentina, Malaysia and Israel. For Malaysia and Israel it was not 
possible to collect sufficient information for building theoretical abatement cost curves, hence they 
are discarded from the analysis.39 However, they have been used for extracting CDM project cost 
information. India and Brazil, two important CDM host countries, are not covered in the sample: 
India has very low levels of emissions per capita and GDP per capita; Brazil has very low levels of 
emissions per capita and its emissions come mainly from the land use sector, which is currently not 
covered under the CDM. Chile had an index value very similar to the one of Argentina. As Argentina 
has higher absolute emissions, this country was preferred for the analysis. 
 
 
5.5 Results 
5.5.1 CDM abatement costs 
Figure 5.1 shows box plots of the estimated emissions abatement costs of the projects in the sample, 
after standardizing their financial discount rates. This graph is very similar to the one shown in 
Figure 4.2, but relies on a larger dataset of projects and host countries. Again, the results are 
consistent with cost curves reported in other studies, in that reducing emissions of methane and 
industrial gas reduction projects appears generally cheaper than reducing emissions of CO2. Again, 
despite high variability in some project types, most projects seem to be financially viable at primary 
(on average US$ 13 for 2009) or secondary (about US$ 20) carbon prices.  
 
 
 
                                                      
39 The consultancy McKinsey has prepared a MAC curve for Israel, but the full report is only available in Hebrew, and the 
executive summary in English does not provide sufficient information for our purposes. Further, it focuses on the year 
2030, which is too far away in the future to compare with the CDM now. 
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Figure 5.1: Estimated abatement costs of CDM projects (US$/tCO2e), by technology 
 
Sources: CDM projects’ Project Design Documents, own calculations. For HFC projects: Harnisch and 
Hendricks (2000); UNEP TEAP (2002); Jimenez (2005). The figures in parentheses show the sample size for 
each technology. 
 
 
5.5.2 CDM abatement cost curves 
Figure 5.2 (a) and (b) shows the estimated GHG abatement cost curves for the CDM of China and 
the other countries. As explained, these curves were built by taking the median abatement cost of 
each technology (shown in Figure 5.1) and the amount of emission reductions expected to be 
achieved annually by all CDM projects in the pipeline as of December 2009 in the respective 
countries, also classified by technologies.  
 
In these curves again, there are some project types without cost information. These appear at the left 
end of the curves, as having zero abatement costs. The projects without cost information represent 
5.2% of the CDM abatement potential in South Korea, 2.2% in Thailand, 0.7% in Israel, 0.1% in 
China and 0% in Argentina, Malaysia, Mexico and South Africa. While this inclusion enlarges the 
quantity of low-cost (or zero-cost) project options, these data were not omitted from the curves as 
they allowed for a more realistic picture of the overall abatement potential. This enables us again to 
be on the cautious side of the estimations. 
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Figure 5.2: GHG abatement cost curve for the CDM pipeline 
(a): China (b): South Korea, Mexico, Malaysia, Thailand,      
Argentina, South Africa, Israel 
 
Sources: Cost data from PDDs, potentials from UNEP Risoe Centre (2010), own calculations. 
 
 
5.5.3 Comparison with theoretical abatement curves: size 
Based on data reported in 18 climate mitigation studies in the countries included in the sample (see 
Appendix 5A.2), theoretical GHG abatement cost curves were built, trying to cover as many 
emission reduction options from as many economic sectors as possible, and including CO2, methane 
and, when information was available, industrial gas emissions. In all countries, the curves were built 
to reflect the emissions reduction potential in the year 2010, which should be comparable to the 
current CDM in which a static stock of mitigation options is assumed. In the Chinese case, an 
abatement curve for the year 2020 has also been included, to provide an idea of how the emissions 
reduction potential is expected to grow in the future.  
 
The indicator of the size component of the low-hanging fruit argument is provided by the horizontal 
difference between the CDM-specific and the theoretical abatement cost curves in each country. 
This is shown in Figure 5.3 (a)-(f). Table 5.1 presents a summary of calculations regarding how much 
of the theoretical abatement potential in each country is being captured by the CDM, by dividing in 
each case the total abatement expected from the CDM by the total theoretical abatement potential. 
 
Figure 5.3 and Table 5.1 show that, in all cases, the CDM is capturing only a portion of the estimated 
emissions reduction potential in the respective countries. In China this portion is around 32%, thus 
it could be said that there is a risk that the CDM is exhausting the stock of emission reduction 
possibilities in the country. However, as time passes, new mitigation opportunities arise, so that the 
current CDM represents only about 22% of the Chinese emission reduction potential in 2020. In 
South Korea and Argentina, the CDM has captured less than 20% of the potential identified up to 
2010, and in Mexico, South Africa and Thailand this portion is below 10%. Thus, we see that in 
most countries, the risk of a “low-hanging fruit issue” is, at least in terms of the current size of the 
CDM, weak. 
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Figure 5.3: Comparison between expected CDM abatement and potential abatement  
 
Note: The potential abatement curves are built on the basis of data from the studies listed in Appendix 5A.2. 
They do not include emission reduction opportunities that were uncovered by the CDM and had not been 
previously forecast in the mentioned studies.  
 
 
Looking in more detail at which technologies have been taken up by the CDM, Table 5.2 shows the 
portion of the theoretical potential that is being captured by each technological category. The table 
shows that, in some sectors, such as agriculture and energy efficiency, very little of the identified 
potential has accessed the CDM. In other sectors, on the contrary, much larger emission reductions 
are being realized through the CDM than those identified in the theoretical studies, mainly in energy 
generation from renewable or other sources, or in reduction of industrial gases.  
 
While it appears that the CDM concentrates in specific technological niches, it is clear that the 
theoretical abatement studies did not uncover all the existing potential. The projections have been 
too conservative, especially in energy generation, where many countries have experienced an 
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unprecedented growth (for example the explosion of wind power capacity in China since 2006, 
which was not foreseen by the analysts) and where the potential for renewables is difficult to 
estimate. Again, because of this, the conclusions that are drawn remain on the cautious side of 
whether the CDM is exhausting the mitigation potential.  
 
 
Table 5.1: Emissions abatement potential captured by the CDM 
Country Percentage of abatement potential captured by CDM 
China 
31.9% of 2010 potential 
21.7% of 2020 potential  
South Korea 18.4% of 2010 potential 
Mexico 2.4% of 2010 potential 
South Africa 1.9% of 2010 potential 
Thailand 9.4% of 2010 potential 
Argentina 17.7% of 2010 potential 
Note: Percentages based on the incomplete theoretical abatement potential (without including emission 
reduction opportunities that were uncovered by the CDM and had not been previously forecast). 
 
 
Table 5.2: Emissions abatement potential captured by the CDM, by technologies 
Technological category 
Percentage of abatement potential captured by CDM 
China South Korea Mexico South Africa Thailand Argentina 
Agriculture     0.0%     0.0%     0.0% - - - 
Coal mine methane   15.9% -   25.7%     0.0% - - 
Energy efficiency in 
households / buildings     0.1%     0.0%     0.0%     0.0%     0.0% - 
Energy efficiency in 
industry     0.3%     0.2%     3.4%     0.3%     0.0%     2.2% 
Energy efficiency in own 
generation   19.0%     0.0%     0.4% infinite   20.2%   75.4% 
Thermal power   27.7%     0.0%     0.1%     2.9%     0.0% - 
Forestry     0.4%     0.0%     0.0%     0.0%     0.0%     2.2% 
Fugitive emissions     3.2%     0.0%     2.2% infinite - - 
Industrial gases   73.5% 218.6% 171.9% infinite infinite infinite 
Renewable energy 678.2% infinite     4.4%     4.5% infinite     0.9% 
Other energy 880.7%     6.6%     0.0%     0.1%     0.0%   35.0% 
Waste     7.6%     9.4%   38.1%   64.4% infinite   48.5% 
Transport Infinite     0.0%     0.0%     0.0%     0.0%     0.0% 
Note: Percentages based on the incomplete theoretical abatement potential (without including emission 
reduction opportunities that were uncovered by the CDM and had not been previously forecast). ‘Infinite’ 
denotes a category, for which the theoretical abatement studies did not identify any emission reduction 
potential, but the CDM did nonetheless. ‘-‘ denotes a category where no emission reduction opportunities were 
identified, neither in the CDM, nor in the theoretical studies.  
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Figure 5.3, Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 compare the CDM to theoretical abatement curves that were 
built on the basis of literature research, but resulted in some mismatch because the CDM uncovered 
significant emission reduction possibilities that had not been identified by the previous theoretical 
abatement potential studies. A more correct comparison would thus be between the CDM and a 
completed theoretical abatement that includes both the forecasts from the literature and the extra 
abatement (beyond the forecasts) achieved by the CDM. Such a comparison would imply that the 
CDM has captured even a smaller portion of the abatement potential than estimated in Table 5.1 and 
Table 5.2, strengthening our conclusions.  
 
 
Figure 5.4: China: Comparing actual CDM, potential CDM,  
theoretical potential and completed theoretical potential 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 illustrates this situation for the case of China. Four abatement cost curves were compared: 
that of the CDM projects registered up to December 2009, which represents the lower range of 
annual abatement that will be achieved by the CDM; that of all CDM projects in the pipeline by 
December 2009, representing the higher range of abatement that will be achieved by the CDM under 
current rules up to 2012 (this is the same curve as in Figure 5.3); that of the incomplete theoretical 
abatement potential by the year 2010, gathered from the literature (same curve as in Figure 5.3); and 
that of a completed theoretical abatement potential that results from adding the extra abatement 
opportunities uncovered by the CDM to the previous curve. If this last curve is taken as being the 
real theoretical abatement potential in China, the CDM would capture 28% of the theoretical 
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potential under the high-range CDM abatement scenario, which shows again that the results 
presented above are conservative in terms of the relevance of the low-hanging fruit problem. 
 
5.5.4 Comparison with theoretical abatement curves: costs 
In all countries analysed, the cost range of the CDM projects (vertical axis in the abatement cost 
curves) covered only a fraction of the theoretical abatement cost range. This is explored in more 
detail in Table 5.3. In China, South Korea and Thailand, it is observed that the CDM captures some 
very costly emission reduction options. These are solar energy projects, subsidized in the latter two 
countries through feed-in tariffs. In China and South Africa some CDM projects reach abatement 
costs of nearly US$ 50-70, which is also above the market price for emission reductions. In Mexico 
and Argentina, finally, the CDM mainly stays below the US$ 13 threshold, so that the CER primary 
price makes most projects attractive. From this analysis, it can be concluded that in Mexico and 
Argentina the CDM seems to be focusing almost exclusively on the cheaper projects, while in the 
other countries there is also some (albeit marginal) exploration of higher cost emission reduction 
opportunities. 
 
 
Table 5.3: Emissions abatement potential captured by the CDM, by cost categories 
Cost category 
Percentage of abatement potential captured by CDM 
China South Korea Mexico South Africa Thailand Argentina 
< 0 US$/tCO2e       3.0%     0.1%     0.1% 0.4%   8.6% 18.9% 
0 - 10 US$/tCO2e     27.9%   82.6%   11.0% 2.5% 10.2% 30.2% 
10 - 20 US$/tCO2e   148.5% 288.7%     0.2% 0.3% infinite 55.8% 
20 - 30 US$/tCO2e     89.4%     0.0% 137.8% 0.0% -   3.7% 
30 - 40 US$/tCO2e   126.9%     2.6% - - - - 
40 - 50 US$/tCO2e       0.0%     0.0% - 0.0%   0.0%   0.7% 
50 - 60 US$/tCO2e 2392.1%     0.0%     0.0% - -   0.2% 
60 - 70 US$/tCO2e       0.2%   65.8% - infinite   0.0% - 
70 - 80 US$/tCO2e       0.2%     0.0%     0.0% - -   0.0% 
> 80 US$/tCO2e       2.7%   13.8%     0.0% 0.0% infinite   0.9% 
Note: Percentages based on the incomplete theoretical abatement potential (without including emission 
reduction opportunities that were uncovered by the CDM and had not been previously forecast). ‘Infinite’ 
denotes a category, for which the theoretical abatement studies did not identify any emission reduction 
potential, but the CDM did nonetheless. ‘-’ denotes a category where no emission reduction opportunities were 
identified, neither in the CDM, nor in the theoretical studies. Cost categories were defined by matching 
technologies used in the CDM with technologies included in the theoretical studies, and taking the abatement 
costs estimated in the theoretical studies. For technologies appearing in the CDM and not in the theoretical 
studies, our estimation of abatement costs was taken.  
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In several theoretical GHG abatement cost studies consulted (ADB 1998a; ADB 1998b; UNDP and 
GEF 1999; World Bank 2002; US EPA 2006; Bakker et al. 2007; Enkvist et al. 2007; Wetzelaer et al. 
2007; Johnson et al. 2010), the estimated potential of GHG reduction options with net negative 
costs is significant. Such “no-regret” reduction options seem to conflict with rational behaviour: if an 
investment entails negative costs, it is financially profitable, and this business opportunity should 
have been captured. The reasons for the existence of this negative-cost potential are market 
imperfections leading to lack of knowledge about the reduction options, misaligned incentives of 
companies and consumers, social preferences, lack of priority, insufficient capital availability and 
differing definitions of cost (e.g. social versus financial cost). The least-cost abatement measures – 
especially demand-side energy efficiency measures – imply mobilizing billions of diffuse emission 
sources across many sectors and regions, and thus achieving them may be politically challenging. It is 
often suggested that in order to remove these market barriers, high transaction costs are incurred, 
which are normally not included in abatement cost studies.  
 
The CDM imposes further costs to these abatement options, especially to small-scale ones: 
monitoring methodologies need to be designed and approved; project design, validation, registration 
and verification of emission reductions need to be paid for; monitoring plans and equipment need to 
be put in place. It is thus not too surprising that the large reduction potential from energy efficiency 
and transport, typically with abatement costs below zero, is not being taken up by the CDM.  
 
The observation that many theoretically cheap abatement options remain on the table in developing 
countries reflects the limitations of the CDM for overcoming non-market barriers to these 
abatement options. From this point of view, it is argued that the CDM has grasped the cheap 
abatement options that have been easy to obtain, while mostly leaving alone the abatement options 
that are more difficult to implement in practice.  
 
 
5.6 Conclusions and limitations of the chapter 
An attempt to use empirical data to test the low-hanging fruit hypothesis regarding the CDM – the 
claim that it is using up the cheaper emission reduction options in its host countries, thereby leaving 
them without future opportunities for cost-effective emission reductions when they adopt climate 
change mitigation commitments – was presented. By comparing the portion of the emissions 
reduction potential in six countries captured so far by the CDM with the potential available 
according to several studies, it is concluded that the low-hanging fruit argument is weak. 
 
It was found that the CDM is not yet taking up a large portion of the identified theoretical 
abatement potential in most of the countries assessed, with the exception of China where it reaches 
about 32%. In terms of costs, while most of the emissions reduction opportunities grasped by the 
CDM are below the average market price, there is still plenty of low-cost opportunities to be 
harvested. Finally, while Mexico and Argentina appear to use the CDM almost exclusively for 
harvesting the low-hanging fruit, more expensive projects are accessing it in the other countries 
analysed (China, South Korea, Thailand and South Africa). A more detailed study of why these more 
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expensive projects are being captured could shed further light on how to direct the CDM for both 
promoting technologies that are usually difficult to access and encouraging learning effects, thereby 
creating new “low-hanging fruits”. Further, recognition of the transaction costs and non-market 
barriers involved in the implementation of many theoretically cheap abatement options may explain 
why many of these options are still left untouched. 
 
Even with these results, if the CDM (or a similar offsetting mechanism) is expanded significantly, 
there is a risk that cheap abatement options may become scarce in the countries involved. 
Programmatic CDM, which is only just taking off, can open the door for projects in rarely covered 
sectors (e.g. households and small-scale renewables). Potential changes in the rules of the CDM, 
allowing for the inclusion of carbon capture and storage (CCS); nuclear energy; avoided 
deforestation; other land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) projects; and the abatement 
of GHGs currently not covered by the Kyoto Protocol, could also lead in this direction. The market 
mechanisms currently under discussion in the negotiations– sectoral crediting, or credited NAMAs 
(Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions) – could also expand offsetting significantly. While these 
new approaches will only materialize if new demand for emission reduction credits from countries 
with emission reduction targets is created, careful design is needed to keep positive incentives for 
mitigation in developing countries.  
 
Finally, a note on the limitations of this chapter. While data on emission reduction costs and 
potentials was collected from as many sources as possible, the theoretical potential identified is quite 
conservative, as illustrated by the many emission reduction options that the CDM has captured 
without first being identified in the theoretical studies. This implies both that the MAC curves 
presented here are to be used with care, and that our result – that the CDM is not yet capturing a 
large portion of this potential – is robust. Further, cost data from CDM projects is likely to be biased 
downwards for costly technologies and upwards for cheap technologies. The reason for this bias is 
that CDM projects need to demonstrate that they are financially unattractive without the CDM 
revenues, but the input of CDM revenues make them attractive. The few, very expensive, projects 
found in the CDM acknowledged that they were not financially feasible, but were intended for 
demonstration purposes. Finally, even if this possible bias is disregarded, CDM cost information was 
mainly gathered from the six countries the study focuses on. This renders the project sample by 
technologies or project types quite small in some cases. Thus, it is likely that geographical and 
technological differences lead to more variability in terms of abatement costs within project types 
than is reflected here. Further effort in collecting data from more countries could lead to more 
detailed technological categories with more accurate cost data.  
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Appendix 5A.1: Standardization of discount rates 
Country Standardized discount rate 
Argentina 11% 
Brazil 15% 
China   8% 
Ecuador 12% 
India 11% 
Indonesia 17% 
Israel 10% 
Jordan   8% 
Kenya 15% 
Malaysia 10% 
Mexico 12% 
Moldova 10% 
Morocco 10% 
Mozambique 13% 
Peru 12% 
Philippines 12% 
Qatar 10% 
Rwanda 12% 
South Africa 12% 
South Korea   7% 
Thailand 10% 
United Arab Emirates   8% 
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Appendix 5A.2: Sources of data for theoretical MAC curves 
Country Data sources 
Argentina NSS Program (1999) 
UNDP and GEF (1999) 
China Yamaguchi (2003) 
Yamaguchi (2005) 
US EPA (2006)  
Wetzelaer et al. (2007) 
Cai et al. (2008) 
Mexico Sheinbaum and Masera (2000) 
US EPA (2006) 
Bocanegra (2009) 
Johnson et al. (2010) 
South Africa World Bank (2002) 
Winkler et al. (2008) 
South Korea ADB (1998a) 
Roh (2005) 
Roh (2006) 
Roh and Kang (2004) 
US EPA (2006) 
Thailand ADB (1998b) 
Shrestha and Bhattacharya (2002) 
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6. DO DOMESTIC RENEWABLE ENERGY PROMOTION POLICIES LEAD 
TO MORE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM PROJECTS?  
 
 
 
6.1  Introduction 
In Chapter 5, the CDM portfolio of eight countries was analysed in terms of the size and abatement 
cost of the emission reduction options that have been captured. It was found that, while the CDM 
mostly focuses on cheap emission reduction options so far, these have not yet been exhausted in its 
main host countries. The empirical findings support the hypothesis that the CDM’s reliance on the 
market makes it focus on the mitigation options that are cheaper – and easier to realize – first.40 This 
is efficient from the economic point of view and is actually the intended role of the CDM: the 
mechanism was designed as a cost-containment instrument that would provide industrialized 
countries with emission targets the opportunity to seek cheaper emission reduction options abroad 
and count them as their own (Werksman 1998; Toman et al. 1999). 
 
Nevertheless, this is not exactly what we observe. While most of the mitigation achieved by the 
CDM so far is clearly low-cost in nature, the analysis in the previous chapter clearly showed that 
there are some high-cost abatement options that have been proposed (and registered) as CDM 
projects. Specifically, expensive renewable energy (RE) projects, such as photovoltaic plants, are – 
albeit still in small numbers – in the CDM portfolio. One possible explanation for this observation is 
that the CDM is not the only source of financial incentives for these projects, so that other financial 
incentives are acting as a complement to the CDM subsidy. In this chapter, I argue that, while the 
CDM by itself is likely not sufficient to spur investment in high-cost renewable energy power plants 
in developing countries at current carbon credit prices, domestic RE support policies can be 
complementary to the CDM incentive, resulting in more RE investment within the carbon market 
being observed.  
 
                                                      
40 Cheap abatement options may not be equal to easy abatement options. Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) curves usually 
show a large available potential of negative-cost emission reduction options that have not been realized yet (see e.g. Enkvist 
et al. 2007 or Wetzelaer et al. 2007). However, these curves usually incorporate only engineering and operational costs of 
abatement, disregarding potential information, financial and other transaction costs, as well as other non-market barriers 
(such as technological risks) and market imperfections that may prevent the adoption of these measures. Lütken and 
Michaelowa (2008) criticize the MAC approach of modelling emission reduction priorities, and posit that corporate 
decision-making (i.e. relevance towards core business, geographical or market priority, and risk perceptions) and 
microeconomic considerations are more relevant to CDM investment than macroeconomic abatement cost estimations. 
Moreover, the CDM process incorporates additional transaction costs that are higher for small projects, such as the 
theoretically cheap disaggregated energy efficiency measures (Michaelowa and Jotzo 2005). This all leads to the empirical 
observation that cheap options are not always realized.  
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I test this hypothesis empirically by analysing econometrically the effect of domestic RE support 
policies on the amount of RE CDM investment in developing countries, controlling for all those 
country characteristics that may more generally affect RE investment and CDM participation, and 
applying panel two-part and Heckman selection models. To control for the potential endogeneity of 
the support policies, instrumental variables estimation is also applied.  
 
In the next section, I discuss the current status of the adoption of RE support policies in developing 
countries, and of its interaction with the CDM. Section 6.3 details the theoretical framework for the 
study, and the resulting hypotheses. In section 6.4 I describe the data and operationalization, before 
explaining the empirical estimation procedures and discussing the results in section 6.5. In section 
6.6, finally, the conclusions are presented. 
 
 
6.2 Current status of RE in developing countries 
The world is currently witnessing an accelerated development in the field of renewable energy. 
Nonetheless, the growth in renewables is just keeping pace with the rising needs for energy and is 
not yet resulting in a visible turn away from fossil fuels at the global scale (IEA 2010b). Renewable 
energy now accounts for about 19% of final energy consumption (REN21 2010), but most of this 
supply is still provided by traditional biomass used for cooking or heating in developing countries 
(13%) or by large-scale hydroelectric power (3.2%). Still, some of the modern renewable energy 
sources – small-scale hydro, wind, solar, geothermal, tidal and biofuels – are growing very fast. For 
example, for the past 5 years, solar photovoltaic and wind electricity capacity have grown at an 
average annual rate of 60% and 27%, respectively. These trends are being witnessed both in 
industrialized OECD countries and in some emerging economies. 
 
Fundamental economic and political developments accompany these trends. Rapidly increasing 
energy needs in developing and emerging economies, coupled with rising costs of fossil fuels and 
energy security concerns are some of them (US EIA 2009). At the same time, R+D investments and 
the accelerated market growth of renewables are leading to technological improvements, economies 
of scale, learning effects and cost reductions (Junginger 2005; Junginger et al. 2005; Nemet 2006; 
Jamasb and Köhler 2008). Finally, climate change concerns are leading some governments and 
stakeholders to promote an increased reliance on non-fossil energy sources (Goldemberg 2006).  
 
These developments are supported by changes in the political arena. The fierce competition for 
market power in the renewables sector is leading governments to invest in research and development 
(R+D) and other technology-push policies. Indicative or mandatory renewable energy targets, 
coupled with financial incentives that set the price, lower the cost or provide capital for renewable 
energy are increasingly used to support market development (REN21 2010). Internationally, 
emission targets for industrialized countries and the Clean Development Mechanism in developing 
countries seek to tackle climate change mitigation. As one of the main contributors to greenhouse 
gas emissions, the energy sector is also responding to these international incentives. In the following 
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paragraphs, we describe the main existing international and domestic policy instruments related to 
renewable energy deployment in developing countries, which are the focus of analysis of this article. 
 
6.2.1 Renewable energy in the Clean Development Mechanism 
As of December 2011, 5661 projects involving the use of renewable energy technologies have been 
proposed under the Clean Development Mechanism.41 If successfully registered and implemented, 
they would reduce about 570 million tCO2e per year and result in the installation of 207 GW of 
electricity capacity. This represents about 75% of the CDM portfolio in terms of projects, and 56% 
in terms of annual emission reductions (UNEP Risoe Centre 2012).  
 
The power capacity that would be added by these CDM projects represents about 15% of the global 
renewable power capacity (1360 GW) (REN21 2012). The contribution of the RE CDM projects to 
RE capacity is thus significant. How much of this expected capacity addition can be attributed solely 
to the CDM is however a difficult question to answer. CDM-related revenues are relatively small: a 
carbon price of 17 US$/tCO2e implies a subsidy of 1.0 to 31.9 US$/MWh of electricity produced, 
depending on the carbon intensity of the underlying electricity grid.42 With typical generation costs at 
50-90 US$/MWh for wind, 50-120 US$/MWh for biomass and 150-300 US$/MWh for utility-scale 
photovoltaic energy (REN21 2010), and retail electricity prices between 22 and 207 US$/MWh 
including taxes in various developing countries (US EIA 2011), the CDM margin is not always 
sufficient to secure profitability. Domestic-level incentives are thus needed to make up for the 
remaining difference between profits and costs. 
 
6.2.2 Domestic RE support policies 
There are many types of domestic policies that can generate positive incentives for RE deployment 
by addressing different types of barriers. R+D and other technology-push policies are undoubtedly 
important for fostering innovations and long-term cost reductions in renewable energy. Broader 
electricity-sector restructuring policies may also affect RE deployment, depending on their design 
(Kozloff 1998; Martinot 2002). For example, Martinot et al. (2002) and Martinot (2002) argue that a 
liberalized energy system allowing the participation of private actors in electricity generation may 
already encourage a diversification of electricity production towards renewable sources, but that 
more specific promotion policies are also needed nonetheless.  
 
However, the focus of this chapter is on policies that are intended to directly influence the 
deployment of RE technologies for power generation. These are policies that set a target for RE 
capacity (e.g. renewable portfolio standards or renewable energy targets), that set preferential prices 
for RE sales (feed-in tariffs, competitive bids), or that reduce the costs (or other barriers) of RE 
 
                                                      
41 Counting projects registered, in the process of registration and under validation, and excluding those already rejected or 
withdrawn. 
42 This calculation was made on the basis of the average secondary CER price over the period 2004-2009 (US$ 17.04), 
obtained from the GTZ CDM Highlights (http://www.gtz.de/de/themen/umwelt-
infrastruktur/umweltpolitik/18324.htm); as well as the lowest (0.06 tCO2e/MWh) and the highest (1.874 tCO2e/MWh) 
grid emissions factor listed by the IGES grid emissions factors database (IGES 2011).  
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generation (capital subsidies, investment and production tax credits, public loans) (Beck and 
Martinot 2004; REN21 2008; REN21 2010).  
 
Several reasons explain this focus. While R+D incentives undoubtedly contribute to cost reductions 
and thus increased RE investment, these effects take place in the medium to long term. 
Furthermore, investments in R+D may not just influence the domestic market, because technologies 
can be exported and used in other countries as well. So, it is difficult to argue for a direct, short term 
effect of R+D incentives in a country on CDM investments in the same country. With respect to 
broader energy policies, such as the reform and liberalization of energy markets, they can both 
encourage and discourage the deployment of new RE technologies, as discussed by Martinot (2002). 
Thus, we do not have a clear theoretical argument on their potential effects on CDM-related RE 
deployment. Data on electricity sector reform in developing countries is incomplete and available 
only for the year 1999 (ESMAP (Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme) 1999), so that 
it is unsuitable for our analysis. However, it is likely that these broader policies are correlated with 
the more direct RE support measures we are considering, because both sets of measures may come 
in one legislation package, so that our variable for the RE support measures may already be capturing 
some of the effect of electricity sector reform. In contrast, the market-push policies described above 
are expected to have a direct and relatively short-term impact on RE investment at the domestic 
level, and information on their implementation in developing countries is being reported regularly.  
 
69 developing countries have been identified by the latest REN21 report (2012) as having a 
renewable energy target, and about the same amount of them have some sort of policy to incentivize 
renewable power generation financially. Among developing countries, the most common incentive is 
the reduction of sales, energy, excise, or value added tax, but other frequent policies are feed-in 
tariffs, investment or other tax credits, and the provision of public investment, loans or financing 
(see Table 6.1). 
 
 
Table 6.1: Amount of non-Annex I countries that have enacted renewable energy support policies, 
2011 
Type of policy Number of non-Annex I countries 
Feed-in tariff 36 
Renewable Portfolio Standard/quota 10 
Capital subsidies, grants or rebates 27 
Investment or other tax credits 19 
Sales tax, energy tax, excise tax, or VAT reduction 47 
Tradable RE certificates   3 
Energy production payments or tax credits   7 
Net metering 15 
Public investment, loans, or financing 31 
Public competitive bidding 23 
Source: REN21 (2012)  
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For RE support policies to be successful, they need to be carefully designed to tackle the real barriers 
that prevent RE deployment in each situation, and to avoid undesired effects. Rajsekhar et al. (1999) 
and Martinot et al. (2002) show, for example, that investment-based (instead of generation-based) 
incentives for wind power in India led to large investments with low operating performance, and 
sometimes not operating at all. In some cases, even if promotion policies are in place, they do not 
suffice to overcome some crucial barriers to RE development. An important example is the 
accessibility to the grid: due to its intermittent character, renewable power frequently faces higher 
grid connection costs than conventional thermal electricity, or even unwillingness of utilities to 
provide grid access (Rajsekhar et al. 1999). Promotion policies sometimes have negative effects, too. 
It has been discussed, for example, that the high German feed-in tariffs, and the Indian investment 
depreciation incentives for wind energy may have resulted in inflated turbine prices, because the 
subsidization of energy production reduced the incentives to save in investment costs (Rajsekhar et 
al. 1999; Junginger et al. 2005). In other cases, changes in pricing policies or tax incentives can stop 
investments, as experienced in Tamil Nadu with wind power tariffs in 2001 and in Sri Lanka with 
small hydro power in 1999 (Jagadeesh 2000; Martinot et al. 2002). Benecke (2009) goes further and 
posits that not only policy design, but also implementation practices, political will, institutional 
effectiveness, and, more importantly, stakeholder attributes and interrelations – in the form of 
networks – determine effective renewable energy governance in non-OECD countries. Although we 
are aware of these challenges, this article will assume that RE promotion policies do fulfil their goals. 
In addition, by looking at RE capacity deployment and not at power generation, the analysis avoids 
some of the generation-related barriers described in this paragraph.  
 
Rising trends both in the enactment of RE support policies and in the use of renewable electricity 
sources in developing countries are evident, as well as in the diffusion of the CDM as an 
international mechanism that provides additional funding for, e.g. RE projects. The fact that many 
RE support policies provide a financial incentive that can be added to the CDM’s financial incentive 
to make RE more attractive speaks for such a positive effect of policies on CDM project 
development. Regulatory hurdles may however prevent such effect. The CDM relies on the 
assumption that the emission reduction projects it finances are additional to any reductions that 
would have taken place on a business-as-usual scenario. For example, emission reduction credits may 
be granted to projects envisaging the distribution of energy-saving lamps in places where they are not 
commonly used. If, however, the use of such lamps is mandatory by law, then distributing them 
would not be additional. While this concept of additionality seeks to ensure that the emission 
reductions achieved through the CDM are real, it may have the perverse incentive of preventing 
governments from enacting policies that support emission reduction activities in order not to risk 
CDM-related revenues. In response to this trade-off, the CDM Executive Board (EB) established at 
its 16th meeting that policies or regulations that provide a positive comparative advantage to less 
emissions-intensive technologies, enacted after 2001, would not need to be taken into account when 
establishing CDM project baselines (CDM EB 2004). Since this was clarified, RE CDM projects 
have been allowed to profit from incentives provided by new RE support policies.  
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New controversy arose during 2009, when the CDM EB put under review and rejected several 
Chinese wind projects, after it noticed that power tariffs paid to these projects were decreasing, 
making it fear either that China was decreasing the tariffs to make the projects look less financially 
attractive and thus more “additional”, or that the CDM was being used to replace government 
subsidies (He and Morse 2010). After discussions on the way forward, the EB has now decided that, 
excluding some exceptions, project proponents should use, for their additionality determination, the 
highest tariff that a project has ever received in the same region (CDM EB 2011). Thus, the 
fundamental paradox between additionality concerns and broader incentives for developing 
countries still subsists: while including domestic promotion policies in the baseline for additionality 
creates perverse incentives by discouraging those policies, not including them generates the risk that 
business-as-usual projects will be credited (He and Morse 2010).  
 
Not only may the CDM rules constrain projects that have been supported through national RE 
promotion policies from accessing the carbon market, as in the Chinese case, but also the way these 
policies have been designed may have a similar effect. An example is the case of the Brazilian 
PROINFA (Programa de Incentivo às Fontes Alternativas de Energia Elétrica) programme, which 
was launched in 2002 with the goal to promote RE deployment by providing guaranteed tariffs. In 
2006 the Brazilian Government decided that all CERs earned by independent power producers 
participating in the PROINFA programme would belong to Electrobras, the state utility that 
manages PROINFA. This effectively discouraged private investors from accessing the PROINFA 
programme, especially after regular tariffs rose above the price guaranteed by PROINFA and the 
CDM subsidy became comparatively more attractive (Friberg and Castro 2009). 
 
The Chinese and the Brazilian examples described above show cases in which the CDM and 
domestic policies can act as substitutes of each other, rather than complements as it was 
hypothesized earlier in this chapter. However, this evidence is still case-specific and limited. This 
chapter thus attempts to assess the effect of domestic RE policies on renewable energy CDM 
projects by looking at all developing countries participating in the CDM empirically. 
 
 
6.3 CDM-related RE investments and RE promotion policies: possible 
determinants 
In order to assess the effect of RE promotion policies on CDM RE investment, we need to control 
for all other factors that may be influencing such investments as well. Additionally, as enacting RE 
promotion policies may be endogenous to investment in CDM projects, we need to find suitable 
instruments for our main explanatory variable. In this section we outline the theoretical background 
that supports our choice of control and instrumental variables later on. 
 
Firstly, we look at studies that assess the conditions generally leading to investment in renewable 
energy, with focus on grid-connected electricity. They show us the factors that may affect RE 
investment in addition to the effect of RE promotion policies or of the CDM. Secondly, we utilize 
the more recent literature on the barriers for CDM investment and the geographical distribution of 
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CDM projects to find the factors that facilitate CDM investment, which we will also need to control 
for.43 Finally, we use the literature on the factors leading to the adoption of environmentally-friendly 
policies to find possible explanations for the increased adoption of RE promotion policies in 
developing countries. This will enable us to find suitable instruments for RE promotion policies. 
 
Factors leading to investment in renewable energies 
We are not aware of any cross-country study that systematically analyses the factors leading to 
investment in renewable energies, especially in developing countries. Some case studies have looked 
at the effectiveness of specific RE promotion policies in individual European countries and US states 
(Gouchoe et al. 2002), and there are a few qualitative comparative analyses of renewable energy 
deployment in the same countries (Bird et al. 2005; Mitchell et al. 2006; Gan et al. 2007). Menz and 
Vachon (2006) and Carley (2009) assessed econometrically the effectiveness of Renewable Portfolio 
Standards in promoting the deployment of renewable energy in US states; Marques et al. (2010) look 
at general drivers of RE deployment in European countries. Benecke (2009) and Jagadeesh (2000) 
evaluated the conditions leading to wind energy deployment in Indian states.  
 
These studies describe the importance of RE promotion policies for renewable electricity 
deployment, but also the need for renewable energy endowments, and the effect of electricity trends, 
other energy policies, political institutions, interest groups, socioeconomic characteristics and 
external stimuli. We will assume that these factors affect in the same way the deployment of RE 
within the CDM in developing countries. 
 
In terms of RE promotion policies, it is frequently argued that feed-in tariffs (FITs) have been the 
most effective policy for achieving capacity goals, as they are very good at providing market certainty 
and setting incentives for electricity production. Successful experiences have been seen in Denmark, 
Germany and Spain. Renewable portfolio standards (RPSs) establish a quota for RE contribution to 
electricity production, and are the main type of non-financial RE promotion instrument. Although 
they provide less market certainty than FITs, if coupled with renewable energy certificates they can 
promote competition and cost reductions. Their effectiveness depends on reliability of the target and 
on other policies that improve renewables’ competitiveness. This system is mainly being applied in 
industrialized countries, such as the UK and several US states. Investment-based or production-
based incentives have been effective as complements to other, stronger policies (Menanteau et al. 
2003; Gan et al. 2007; Butler and Neuhoff 2008). Accordingly, we hypothesize that the existence of 
RE promotion policies in a country leads to increased RE deployment, and that the more of these 
 
                                                      
43 The more general literature analysing the determinants of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is also relevant for the case 
of investment in RE in developing countries, although it usually focuses on the manufacturing sector. This literature finds 
market size (measured as total GDP or GDP/cap) as the most robust factor affecting foreign investment flows positively, 
but it also suggests that infrastructure, level of industrialization, labour costs, political and economic stability are important, 
with evidence mixed on trade openness and the role of more specific investment-related policies and regulations, such as 
fiscal incentives. As will be seen below, most of these factors are also recognized by the more specific RE investment and 
the CDM project distribution literatures as relevant. Others, for example labour costs, will matter for manufacturing 
industries that are export-oriented, but not necessarily for electricity infrastructure, which is always for the domestic 
market. See Root and Ahmed (1978; 1979), Lim (1983), Schneider and Frey (1985), Crenshaw (1991), Singh and Jun (1995), 
Tsai (1994), Gastanaga et al. (1998) and Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007) for empirical examples of the FDI literature, and Lim 
(2001) for a review. 
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policies are in place, the more complementarities are likely, and the better the support for RE 
deployment is.  
 
Still, even if the policies to promote RE deployment are in place, these energies rely heavily on 
natural endowments, such as sun irradiation or strong wind, which need to be present in sufficient 
quantity and quality to make the investments competitive (Bird et al. 2005). Thus, we will add 
measures of renewable energy potential as controls, expecting that the more potential is available, the 
more renewable energy can be deployed.  
 
Furthermore, the deployment of new electricity plants will clearly be affected by the trends in 
electricity markets. If demand is already satisfied, the market for new power plants will be limited to 
just replacing old and inefficient installations; if demand is growing, more capacity will be needed. 
Associated with electricity trends are the costs of substitute technologies – e.g. conventional thermal 
power generation. Volatile or rising fossil fuel prices make renewables more competitive and 
attractive for utilities, and may make governments more willing to promote renewables due to 
energy security concerns, especially if they rely on fuel or electricity imports (Bird et al. 2005; 
Marques et al. 2010). Indicators of unsatisfied electricity demand and of energy security concerns 
may thus also be needed as controls with a positive effect on RE deployment.  
 
Stable political institutions are needed to attract investors: they need certainty that the incentives 
provided today will be in place tomorrow, so that the return to their long-term investments is secure. 
Authors have also discussed that democracy leads to better institutional performance and thus create 
a more favourable business environment (Benecke 2009). Thus, we expect that indicators of 
democracy and of political stability and effectiveness will result in more investment in RE.  
 
Socio-economic characteristics may also affect the affordability of RE and the preferences of the 
consumers. Higher income levels usually lead to stronger environmental preferences of the 
population and could lead to increased demand for cleaner energy sources (Elliott et al. 1997; 
Vachon and Menz 2006). They also enable the government, through tax revenues, to enact and 
implement costly policies such as those involving RE support. Finally, income and, more specifically, 
the availability of capital, determine a country’s capacity to invest in infrastructure projects such as 
power plants (Martinot 2002; Lütken and Michaelowa 2008; Marques et al. 2010). 
 
Benecke (2009) identifies foreign direct investment (FDI) and the Clean Development Mechanism as 
sources of external stimuli for RE deployment. FDI is a channel of finance, technology and know-
how related to new technologies such as RE. The CDM, as a supra-national governance structure 
that sets up financial incentives for low-carbon technologies in developing countries, not only 
provides external finance, but also generates awareness of climate change as a problem and 
renewable energy as a potential solution; an international market for emission reductions that looks 
for supply from developing countries; and substantial capacity building. In our case, where the focus 
of analysis is the investment in renewable energy through the CDM, we will consider that the more 
open an economy is towards FDI flows, the more open it will also be towards CDM investment.  
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Factors influencing the geographical distribution of CDM projects 
There is a growing body of literature that deals generally with the barriers existing for CDM 
investment in developing countries, and more specifically with the geographical distribution of CDM 
projects. Ellis and Kamel (2007) describe four general types of barriers that may prevent CDM 
investment: policy or legislative, CDM-related, financing and international barriers. The study shows, 
among others, that a stable regulatory framework and a clear and enabling CDM-specific policy 
framework are needed to spur CDM investment.  
 
In terms of general regulatory framework, we have seen above that a stable institutional framework is 
needed for attracting investments, and this is also true for the CDM. With regard to the CDM-
specific policy framework, two fundamental preconditions for CDM investment are that the host 
country has ratified the Kyoto Protocol and that it has established a national CDM authority (the 
Designated National Authority or DNA), with a clear process for the national approval of CDM 
projects. We thus expect that the earlier these preconditions were fulfilled, the higher the interest of 
the host country is on the CDM, and the more time it has had to propose CDM projects.  
 
A body of empirical research already shows that host country circumstances matter for the level of 
participation of the country in the CDM. In their study, Dol!ak and Bowerman (2007) demonstrate 
the importance of bilateral relationships – trade volumes or past colonial ties – for the 
development of bilateral CDM projects. We hence expect that trade volumes, past colonial ties, FDI 
levels and aid levels may positively influence CDM investment in a country. 
 
In terms of socio-economic characteristics, Flues (2010) finds that especially economic 
development (operationalized as GDP per capita), growth and population have a significant positive 
impact on the amount of CDM projects being pursued in a country. Winkelman and Moore (2011) 
conclude that countries with growing electricity markets and high carbon intensity generate more 
CDM-related emission reductions. Three arguments may be at play here. On the one hand, income 
and growth are indicators of the availability of resources to finance CDM investments,44 in a similar 
way as explained above. On the other, growth, but also population size, carbon intensity and other 
general indicators of the size of the economy indicate the existence of emission reduction 
opportunities (abatement potential). Finally, they create incentives for foreign investors to enter 
these attractive markets, which is relevant for the case of bilateral CDM projects. The three 
mechanisms play in the same direction: we expect that the larger the income and growth, the more 
CDM projects will be proposed. With respect to the specific influence of abatement potential, we 
also consider variables that more directly characterize the potential in the electricity sector, and also 
expect a positive effect of them on RE CDM projects. 
 
 
                                                      
44 While it can be argued that CDM projects can also be developed bilaterally, with participation of investors from 
industrialized countries, many CDM projects, especially RE ones, are proposed unilaterally, this is, only with participation 
of domestic investors (for a detailed discussion of the reasons, see Lütken and Michaelowa 2008). Flues (2010) finds that 
the positive effects of GDP and growth on the likelihood that a country develops a CDM project are stronger for unilateral 
than for bilateral projects, supporting this theory. 
 
 
 
120 
Factors leading to the adoption of environmentally-friendly policies 
An empirical challenge in the use of renewable energy support policies as an explanatory variable for 
the amount of CDM RE investment is that the direction of the causal link between RE support 
policies and CDM investment is not completely clear. It is likely that, after RE support policies were 
already in place, the CDM provides an additional incentive that results in more deployment. This is 
what we are trying to model. But it is also possible that, in some countries, the prospect of having 
the CDM led the government to enact other supportive measures that would be complementary. In 
both cases, the result would be (increased) RE investment within the carbon market, but the RE 
policies would have to be treated as exogenous in the first case, and as endogenous in the second. To 
address this issue, we will also apply an instrumental variable approach. The literature review in this 
section is used to search for variables that may become suitable instruments for the RE support 
policies.  
 
Several theories seek to explain which factors affect the adoption of public policies. 
Developmentalists argue that socio-economic factors determine the scope of policy outputs and 
outcomes that are possible; institutionalist approaches posit that the political institutions and 
organizations, such as the legal systems, the legislative and the bureaucracies structure policy 
decisions and outcomes; rational choice theory emphasizes the role of preferences and interests of 
different actors for decision-making and policy outcomes; sociological perspectives underscore the 
role of formal and informal relationships and networks within and outside of the political system in 
determining policy outputs and outcomes (John 1998). We will make use of these theories to find 
instruments that help us deal with the potential endogeneity of RE support policies in our empirical 
estimations. However, many of the factors that affect policy adoption are the same as those that 
affect CDM RE investments. Suitable instruments need to be correlated with support policies but 
not directly with CDM RE investments. Hence, we discard variables related to environmental 
pressures, wealth, level of education and democratic quality, as these are expected to influence both 
policy-making and the investment in CDM renewable energy projects, and focus our search for 
instruments among the institutional and interest-related factors.45  
 
Institutional theories posit that the characteristics of the political system influence policy 
adoption. There is an extensive literature on the effect of fractionalized political systems and of the 
number of veto players on policy adoption (Tsebelis 1995; Tsebelis 1999), arguing that the more 
decision-making instances are involved in agreeing a new policy, the less able is a government to 
adopt it. These theories have also been applied to the study of environmental policy adoption, for 
example by Knill et al. (2010) and Ashworth et al. (2006). The attractiveness of this theory is that it is 
applicable to any type of political regime, not only to democracies, and is thus more applicable to 
developing countries.46 It is also more suitable as an instrument than democratic quality, as 
 
                                                      
45 See Stadelmann and Castro (2012) for a more detailed review of the factors expected to affect policy-making in support 
of renewable energies.  
46 Partisan preferences are also usual predictors of environmental policy adoption (see e.g. Lester et al. 1983; Rohrschneider 
1993; Neumayer 2003; Carter 2007; Tosun 2011). However, as party systems are not so developed in developing countries, 
and data on partisan preferences is not available for them, we have not used this variable in our empirical analysis. 
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democracy is also expected to affect CDM investments by improving the country’s business 
environment (Benecke 2009).  
 
Not only may the types of institutions existing in a country influence policy adoption, but also the 
ability and capacity of the institutional actors. Lester et al. (1983) and Ringquist (1994), for 
example, hypothesize that more professional legislatures have more resources, time and capacity to 
deal with complex environmental problems and thus develop more innovative and comprehensive 
policy solutions. Sapat (2004) argues that the human resources quality within the bureaucracy 
influences policy adoption. We thus expect that countries having more agencies dealing with energy, 
air quality or climate change issues will be better prepared to adopt RE-related policies.  
 
As explained by rational choice theory, the interests and preferences of actors influence policy 
outcomes, and this is true also in the environmental domain. Congleton (1996) summarizes the role 
of voters, organized lobby groups and members of the government (legislators and bureaucracy) in 
devising environmental policy. Several studies (e.g. Ringquist 1994; Sapat 2004; Michaelowa 2004; 
Fredriksson et al. 2005; Vachon and Menz 2006; Marques et al. 2010) have analysed empirically the 
role of different lobby groups on environmental policy-making. Within the subfield of renewable 
energy promotion, while many stakeholders may be affected by such measures, those directly 
involved in the energy sector should be most important. It has been thus hypothesized that the 
polluting industry, in this case, fossil fuel producers, will seek to avoid regulation that imposes costs 
on them or, equivalently, that benefits their competitors (renewable energy producers). Hence, fossil 
fuel producer countries are likely to be subject to lobbying that reduces the chances of adopting RE 
support legislation. As fossil fuel production is expected to also influence CDM RE investments due 
to its importance for energy security concerns, it cannot be used as instrument. 
 
The strength of environmental groups has been positively linked with more or stronger 
environmental policy, including policies that support the deployment of RE energy (Fredriksson et 
al. 2005; Vachon and Menz 2006). It can be argued that environmental groups also lobby for or 
against specific investments that affect local environmental or social quality, and would thus 
potentially influence RE investment. This is specifically a concern for large hydro power projects, 
which may result in displacement of local populations and are thus opposed by environmental 
groups. As the CDM has a requirement to consult with relevant local stakeholders before project 
implementation, and as the main buyer, the EU, imposes further quality conditions on large hydro 
projects, we believe that the relevance of this aspect is, in the context of the CDM, limited. Thus, we 
expect that countries with high presence of environmental groups will be more likely to adopt RE 
support policies, and will use the amount of environmental groups existing in each country as an 
instrument for policy adoption.  
 
Ecological preferences of decision-makers and the public have been shown to be positively 
correlated with environmental policy-making (List and Sturm 2006; Vachon and Menz 2006; Knill et 
al. 2010). As we do not have a direct measure of ecological preferences for all countries included in 
our sample, we consider several local environmental quality indicators to proxy the level of 
environmental preferences of the public and the government. The rationale behind this is that a 
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government that generally cares about the environment is expected to also care about deploying 
more RE, and thus adopt policies to promote it. A possible concern is that a government with strong 
environmental preferences, including preferences for mitigating climate change, may also exhibit a 
strong support for the CDM. However, this support does not directly translate into more projects, 
but into an enabling framework for the CDM, such as the establishment of a good DNA with a 
rapid project approval process, a CDM promotion office, and the promotion of capacity building 
efforts to facilitate CDM project development. Many of these factors are already controlled for in 
our analysis by taking into account variables that characterize the government’s effectiveness. 
Capacity building is not accounted for, because data are not available for all countries, but research 
on capacity building for the CDM shows that capacity building follows donors’ interests (Okubo and 
Michaelowa 2010; Stadelmann and Michaelowa 2011), and that its effectiveness varies substantially, 
even within a relatively developed country like China (Schröder 2009; Stadelmann and Michaelowa 
2011). CDM project development itself is, in the case of RE, in the hands of utilities or private sector 
investors. Thus, their decision to invest in RE projects (and to submit them as CDM projects) will 
depend rather on energy needs, resource availability and project economics than on the preferences 
of the government, except if these preferences translate into specific policy-making, which is what 
we are trying to instrument with these environmental quality indicators. Therefore, we expect that 
our environmental quality indicators will not affect RE CDM projects directly, and can be used as 
instruments for the adoption of RE support policies. 
 
The theoretical expectations described in this section are summarized in Figure 6.1, which maps the 
direct and indirect factors that may affect both the enactment of renewable energy promotion 
policies and the investment in renewable energy CDM projects in a country. It is these factors that 
the variables for the empirical assessment will be drawn from. Factors for which no suitable variables 
have been found, are marked with a dashed border. Instead of these factors, however, we will either 
control for the underlying causes or for more specific manifestations. The expected effect of these 
factors, either on renewable energy CDM investment or on the adoption of renewable energy 
support policies, is indicated with a (+) or a (-). We choose the control variables for this study among 
those factors that are expected to influence both CDM investments and RE support policies (in 
blue), while the instrumental variables are those that only affect the policies directly (in green). 
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Figure 6.1: Factors affecting the adoption of RE CDM investment and RE support policies 
 
 
 
 
6.4 Data  
6.4.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is the size of the CDM investment in renewable energy projects in country i 
using a specific technology j at time period t, measured in MW of energy capacity proposed to be 
installed in each period. The source of this data is the CDM Pipeline database published monthly by 
the UNEP Risoe Centre, in its January 2012 version (UNEP Risoe Centre 2012).  
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Table 6.2 shows the renewable energy technologies included in the study, the amount of projects 
currently registered, the total projects in the pipeline (under validation, requesting registration and 
registered), and the amount of countries that have proposed such CDM projects. Technologies are 
defined on the basis of data on project types and project subtypes included in the CDM Pipeline.  
 
 
Table 6.2: Renewable energy projects under the CDM  
Technology Number of projects 
registered 
Total projects in 
pipeline 
Number of countries 
hosting projects 
Biomass energy   320   619 36 
Geothermal     12     21   9 
Hydro small (!20MW)   665 1142 42 
Hydro large (>20MW)   462   846 37 
Landfill gas – power   106   209 31 
Solar photovoltaic     46   155 13 
Solar thermal electric       2       4   3 
Tidal       1       2   1 
Wind   902 1921 38 
Total 2516 4919 73 
Source: UNEP Risoe Centre 2012 
Note: Bold letters highlight those project types that will be included in separate empirical estimations. 
 
 
While Table 6.2 displays the variety of renewable energy technologies that are being deployed 
through the CDM, it also makes clear that several of them are still represented by very few projects. 
We hence first aggregate the data into a dependent variable including all these RE technologies 
together, and have additional specifications looking specifically at wind, small hydro,47 biomass and 
photovoltaic power plants. Technologies with very few observations are excluded from this separate 
analysis, as well as landfill gas power projects, because these are closely linked to requirements, 
policy-making and actual practice about waste management, which is out of the scope of this study.  
 
We have specified the dependent variable in terms of projects submitted for validation (instead of 
projects already registered) for theoretical reasons: our aim is to assess whether domestic policies are 
having an effect on the amount of renewable energy CDM projects being proposed. By taking 
 
                                                      
47 For the specification looking at only hydro power, we have only included those projects with up to 20 MW of installed 
capacity. We focus on this subsample of projects because in several countries, promotion policies are directed specifically 
to small hydro projects. Because the definition of what is a small hydro project varies from country to country, our 
classification is somewhat arbitrary from the theoretical point of view. We chose 20 MW as a threshold because it nicely fits 
the frequency distribution of hydro projects by size: this distribution clearly has two peaks, one for small projects and one 
for large ones, with 20 MW representing a suitable separation between both peaks. A plausible explanation for this 
distribution is that the EU Commission, which regulates the main buyer market for CDM credits, decided that CERs from 
hydro projects larger than 20 MW would only be accepted in the EU ETS if they have been approved by the World 
Commission on Dams. As this is an additional step in the project cycle associated with extra transaction costs, project 
developers may not be willing to go beyond this size. Furthermore, 15 MW is the limit established by the CDM regulations 
for being allowed to use small-scale methodologies for energy projects, which may explain the higher frequency of projects 
up to this size. 
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submitted projects, we avoid including the effect of the complex CDM registration cycle and its 
regulatory barriers, and keep a cleaner link with country-level determinants (see Chapter 1 for a 
description of the CDM project cycle). The variable is expressed in terms of MW of power capacity 
installed by the CDM project, because considering only counts of projects would disregard the 
importance of project size. On the other hand, considering the emission reductions would generate a 
bias, as emission reductions are calculated on the basis of countries’ existing energy system and its 
grid emissions factor. 
 
The data is a panel that covers the period in which the CDM has been active (from 2004 to 2011), 
for 147 developing countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol.  
 
6.4.2 Explanatory variables 
Renewable energy promotion policies 
As explained above, there are several types of policies providing direct financial support for RE. As 
each of these policies can be designed in many different ways, there is no clear theoretical argument 
for distinguishing which of them is more effective in terms of RE deployment. Consequently, in 
order to capture the effect of all these policies and of possible complementarities between them, we 
create a variable that counts the amount of policies in place in each country in a specific year. We 
generate dummies for ten general types of RE promotion policies, as they are classified in the 
REN21 reports and shown in Table 6.1. The dummies indicate whether these policies are in place in 
the respective country, but they do not specify which renewable energy technologies they are 
applicable to. Still, they provide a clear indicator of a country’s level of effort to support RE 
deployment. This information is available every two years from the REN21 reports (2005, 2007, 
2009, 2010, 2012). We thus have created a panel with this data, assuming that, if in year t and in year 
t+2 a policy was in place in country i, then in year t+1 it was also in place in the same country. In 
years where there is a change in policy (e.g., policy in place in year t, but no longer in place in year 
t+2), we have filled the gap with a 0.5. The years before 2005 have been filled with the same 
information as in 2005. After having a complete panel, we have created a general RE support 
variable by adding up the dummies for all ten types of policies, with possible values between zero 
and ten. The higher the value is, the more RE support policies exist in the country, and the more 
favourable the conditions for RE investment are supposed to be. This explanatory variable was 
lagged by one year to account for the fact that the planning phase of a RE project usually takes 
several months if not years; so, if a policy signal is to be taken into account, it needs to be present 
already well in advance of the CDM phase, which typically takes place once all feasibility studies for 
the project are completed. Additionally, lagging the policies variable would to some extent ease the 
concern that the adoption of support policies is affected by the investments taking place, so that, 
under the assumption that there is no autocorrelation in the data, it would reduce the concerns about 
endogeneity arising from reverse causality problems.48  
 
 
                                                      
48 Note however that this approach would not control for endogeneity that arises from the fact that there may be 
unobservable variables that affect both CDM investment and RE support policies. 
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Still, we chose to use an instrumental variables approach to control for the possible endogeneity of 
the policies variable. According to the literature described above, general environmental quality 
indicators should be correlated with stronger RE support measures and not directly correlated with 
the CDM RE investment. Among several potential variables tested in preliminary analyses, we 
choose the percentage of country population with access to an improved water source, obtained 
from the World Development Indicators (WDI) (World Bank 2012), as a first instrument. The 
choice relies on the statistically observed strength and validity of the instrument, but also on the 
theoretical intuition that governments that care more about safe water provision are more likely to 
also care more about provision of clean sources of energy, but due to the completely different 
economic sector involved, it is not likely to have a relationship with CDM project investments. As a 
second instrument, we chose the country-level concentration of particulate matter in the air (PM10 
in micrograms per cubic meter), obtained also from the WDI (World Bank 2012). This was also 
found to be a valid and strong instrument related to the propensity of the country’s government to 
care for air quality. 
 
The other chosen instruments are related to the existence of civil society or public stakeholders that 
support environmental regulation or regulation in the energy and air quality domains. Data on the 
number of environmental NGOs present in the country was compiled from the Environment 
Encyclopedia and Directory (Europa Publications 2000; Hartley et al. 2009). This data was available 
only for the years 2001 and 2010 and interpolated for the years in between. As a more robust 
variable, hence, we also use the number of international NGOs with members in the country as an 
alternative instrument; this data is available for all years and was retrieved from the Yearbook of 
International Organizations (Union of International Associations 2012). 
 
Other instruments, measuring different environmental qualities and types of environment-related 
stakeholders in the countries, as well as indicators of political activity and cycles, including number of 
veto players, indicators of type of regime, electoral years, vote share of the opposition and level of 
fractionalization in the legislative were also tested. Either their strength was too limited, or they were 
not considered as valid instruments after a test of overidentifying assumptions.  
 
As the policies variable is used in lags, the instrumental variables were also lagged by one year. 
 
Controls 
We control for the other factors identified in the literature that could influence CDM investment 
and/or the adoption of RE promotion policies. To control for the effect of the power of the fossil 
fuel lobby, we measure the country’s overall production of fossil fuels (coal, gas and oil) in relation 
to its GDP. We normalize using GDP because otherwise the variable is highly correlated with other 
variables that seek to control for the size of the economy, like total GDP. This variable may also be a 
proxy for competitiveness of renewables: the more fossil fuels a country produces, the less 
competitive in terms of costs we expect renewables to be. The data for fossil fuel production are 
taken from IEA (2012b) and GDP is from the WDI (World Bank 2012). 
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Energy security concerns are measured by adding up the imports of electricity, coal and gas (in 
tonnes of oil equivalent per US$ of GDP). The rationale is that higher dependence on imported fuels 
for electricity production (we assume that oil is not usually used for producing electricity) or on 
imported electricity will lead governments to increase support for domestically produced renewable 
energy. The data for fuel and electricity imports are obtained from the US EIA (2012). 
 
Mitigation potential is modelled both through the emissions intensity of electricity and heat 
generation, and through the natural resource endowments for renewable energy. Data on CO2 
emissions per kWh of electricity and heat generation are obtained from IEA (2012a). For the 
specification including all RE technologies together in the dependent variable, the most suitable 
indicator of natural endowments is the country’s surface area: it should be able to proxy for area that 
could be used to capture solar energy; the more area a country has, the more likely it is that it will 
have good wind resources somewhere; the more area it has, the more area under crops or managed 
plantations is likely, which can provide biomass. Thus, the natural logarithm of the total surface area, 
obtained from the WDI (World Bank 2012), has been used as proxy for natural endowments.  
 
For the specifications looking at individual RE technologies, data on renewable energy endowments 
come from a variety of sources. For wind energy, we use data from the NASA Surface meteorology 
and Solar Energy Data Set (NASA 2005) on the percentage of time that the wind speed at 50 metres 
above the surface is above 6 m/s. The data are provided in a 1x1 geographical degree grid, which we 
have plotted against country coordinates to obtain a maximum value for each country in our dataset. 
For solar energy, we use data on latitude tilt radiation (in kWh/m2/day) from NASA (2008), which 
has been plotted in the same way as the wind speed data. For hydro power we use data on average 
annual precipitation from IPCC (Hulme 2001), obtained through the GEO Dataportal, and data on 
altitudinal difference from the CIA World Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency 2010). For biomass 
energy, we use data on the area covered with permanent crops (in thousands of hectares) from 
FAOSTAT. Other variables measuring the area under temporal crops, under sugar cane plantations 
and under forest plantations were tested, but they were available for far fewer countries or were too 
highly correlated with the previous ones.  
 
CDM awareness and technical capacity are modelled by two variables: a dummy indicating whether a 
national CDM authority (DNA) is in place, and a dummy indicating the years in which the country 
has had a member in the CDM Executive Board.49 The first variable signals both preparedness and 
interest in pursuing CDM projects, and was obtained from Axel Michaelowa (personal 
communication) and completed using the UNFCCC website; the second one tries to capture 
possible knowledge transfers from having a representative in the CDM’s international regulator. This 
variable was found by Flues et al. (2010) to be significantly related to project registration in a 
country. The data was obtained from Flues et al. (2010) and updated up to 2011 by looking at the 
reports of the CDM Executive Board meetings.  
 
                                                      
49 We do not include the variable indicating ratification of the Kyoto Protocol that was discussed in section 6.3, as this 
variable is a perfect predictor of having CDM projects. But we exclude all countries that have not ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol from our sample. 
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Two variables measure possible ties with industrialized countries. The sum of imports and exports as 
percentage of GDP is used to measure openness to trade, which is a usual indicator of insertion in 
the world economy. Net foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, as percentage of GDP, signals 
openness towards foreign investors, which is important for the CDM, which presupposes 
international flows of finance. These data are obtained from the World Development Indicators 
(World Bank 2012).50 
 
The quality of democracy in the country is measured using the Freedom House Polity 2 index, 
obtained from Teorell et al. (2011). Additionally, to capture the business-friendliness and stability of 
the economy, we include the indicators for government effectiveness and political stability from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al. 2012). 
 
The level of education is measured through the mean years of schooling of the population with age 
25 or more, obtained from the Human Development Report (UNDP 2010). We also control for the 
size of the country’s economy (measured as the natural logarithm of the real GDP, to correct for 
skewness), income (log of real GDP per capita), gross fixed capital formation and GDP growth, 
variables that are expected to capture the mitigation potential in the country, the capacity to invest 
and the need for energy resources, respectively. The data was obtained from the World 
Development Indicators (World Bank 2012).  
 
Appendix 6A includes the descriptive statistics of all variables included in the analysis for both the 
original and the imputed dataset, and a correlation table for the imputed data.  
 
 
6.5 Empirical strategy and results 
The dataset has a rather complex structure, consisting of a short panel, with a substantial amount of 
missing values (in developing countries, data is often not regularly updated or not available for all 
years). The dependent variable – the MW of renewable energy deployed through the CDM in 
country i using technology j in year t – is left-censored (there cannot be any negative values of 
renewable energy deployment) and highly skewed. To reduce the skewness, the lognormal 
transformation recommended by Cameron and Trivedi (2009, p. 532) was applied, in which the 
zeros are added back to the dataset once the positive data is log-transformed. All regressions were 
run on this log-transformed dependent variable. Two-part and Heckman selection models were used 
to model the effect of RE support policies on the size of the renewable energy CDM portfolio in 
each country.51 These models were chosen in consideration of the possibility that there are actually 
two different processes leading to CDM investment in renewable energy in a country: first, the 
 
                                                      
50 Colonial history and aid relationships were also tried as possible indicators of ties with industrialized countries, but they 
were never found to be significant. Data for colonial history were obtained from the Quality of Government dataset 
(Teorell et al. 2011), and for net official development assistance and official aid received from the WDI (World Bank 2010). 
51 Tobit models were used in preliminary regressions; due to the strong assumptions of the tobit model, however, only the 
results of the more general two-part and selection models are presented here. 
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decision in a country to engage in RE investments within the CDM at all is ruled by a specific 
process (the selection equation), and then, another process, with the same or other variables being 
relevant (and with the same variables potentially having different effects) determines how much 
renewable energy is deployed through the CDM in the country (the outcome equation). This 
approach follows a similar rationale as the one used by Flues for general CDM investment (2010), 
and consists of first estimating a probit or logit model on the likelihood that country i has submitted 
at least one CDM project employing renewable energy technology j during period t, pr(y=1), against 
the likelihood that it has not, pr(y=0). The outcome equation uses standard OLS to assess, for those 
countries that have submitted at least one CDM project, what factors affect the amount (in logs) of 
renewable energy deployed in that period. A problem found with this specification is that we have 
relatively few strictly positive observations for some of the technologies analysed. As a result, the 
estimations for the positive part of the models have few degrees of freedom.  
 
To deal with the problem of missing values, Stata’s new multiple imputation commands were used. 
Three different types of imputation models were compared: linear regression, chained equations with 
linear regression, and chained equations with predictive mean matching (PMM). They all performed 
similarly in preliminary regressions across all non-IV models. The imputations using PMM were 
eventually chosen for the analysis in this chapter, because the dataset has several variables that are 
clearly bounded (e.g. GDP, agricultural area, population or years of schooling with strictly positive 
values), which were modelled better by this algorithm. Ten imputation datasets were used, and 
inferences were made by using Stata’s mi commands to combine the results in all of them following 
Rubin’s (1987) rules for aggregating imputed datasets. Using multiple imputation increased the 
number of observations substantively (from 321 to 926). Regressions using the imputed data were 
compared with regressions with the original data. This comparison shows that as the number of 
observations increases, so does the significance of the estimated effects. But the direction of the 
effects and the variables that seem to matter most remain consistent across the models with and 
without imputations. As Stata’s mi commands are still fairly limited in terms of the postestimation 
statistics that can be calculated, regressions with just one imputation dataset were used for making 
tests of random versus fixed effects, and for testing the validity and strength of the instrumental 
variables.  
 
The regressions were estimated, whenever possible, in panel specifications. A test of overidentifying 
restrictions using the artificial regression approach described by Wooldridge (2002, p. 290) was used 
instead of the usual Hausman test to decide between random and fixed effects models (Stata 
command xtoverid, developed by Schaffer and Stillman 2010). This solved problems of negative test 
statistics and violation of assumptions of the Hausman test. Our interest lies in the effect of 
domestic RE support policies on CDM RE investment. Both our main explanatory variable and our 
dependent variable vary mainly across countries. Furthermore, once policies are adopted, they are 
likely to stay in place, and hence the variation of our main explanatory variable within units over time 
is small. This all speaks for a preference towards random effects models, which include both within 
and between variation in the estimation, so that random effects will be applied wherever they are 
found to be suitable according to the test. As a robustness check for the random effects 
specification, we also show models including the Mundlak (1978) correction for potential correlation 
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between the regressors and the country-level errors, which consists in adding to the list of regressors 
also country-level means of all time-varying variables (correlated random effects model).  
  
Time fixed effects were included in all models to control for potential shocks and general 
heterogeneity across time. The CDM is a volatile market, subject to external influences that cannot 
be fully controlled for otherwise. Time fixed effects are correspondingly significant.  
 
Finally, instrumental variable (IV) estimation was used to cope with the potential endogeneity in the 
RE support policies variable. IV was applied only for the two-part specifications, as this is the model 
that generated more reliable results. In the selection equations (the binary part of the two-part 
model), the IV regression is implemented in two ways: first, using the Rivers-Vuong (1988) control 
function approach as described by Wooldridge (2010, p. 586-87), which implies first regressing the 
policies variable against all explanatory variables and the instrument(s), and then using both the 
original policies variable and the residual from the first-stage equation in the main regression. The 
advantage of such an approach is that it allows for a direct test of the exogeneity of the instrumented 
variable: if the residual is found not to be statistically significant in the main regression, then the 
hypothesis that the instrumented variable is exogenous cannot be rejected. In addition, this method 
allows us to use random effects probit in the main regression and hence use the panel structure of 
our data. The disadvantage of this two-step approach, which was implemented manually in Stata, is 
that we are not able to adjust the standard errors to account for the sampling variability in the first-
stage estimation of the residual. Hence, we also apply a pooled maximum likelihood IV probit using 
clustered errors and controlling, as above, for the country-level means of all time-varying regressors, 
as suggested by Wooldridge (2010, p. 630-32). 
 
In the outcome equations (the positive part of the two-part model), the panel IV regression was 
implemented directly using the xtivreg command in Stata. In addition, again to avoid the random 
versus fixed effects debate, we estimated correlated random effects models (Mundlak 1978; 
Chamberlain 1980; Chamberlain 1982), both with normal and with clustered standard errors.  
 
The strength of the instruments was assessed using their predictive power in the first stage 
regression. Preliminary regressions (not reported) led us to discard several of the potential 
instruments considered, due to their weak correlation with the support policies variable. Only the 
regressions using instruments that were found to have sufficient predictive power are reported.  
 
All these models were run for a specification that includes all types of RE technologies listed in 
Table 6.2 in the dependent variable (so, the dependent variable becomes the logged MW of total RE 
capacity that has been proposed through the CDM, in country i, in year t). Once a final model was 
found, this was applied to specifications with four individual RE technologies: wind, biomass, small 
hydro and photovoltaic power. 
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Results: All renewable energy technologies in aggregate 
Table 6.3 presents the regression results for the selection equations, hence, for the effect of RE 
support policies on the likelihood that countries submit RE projects to the CDM at all. Tests of 
random versus fixed effects indicated that random effects models are appropriate, hence only such 
models are reported in the table. Table 6.4 presents the results for the outcome equations, i.e., for 
the effect of RE support policies on the amount of renewable energy deployed by countries through 
the CDM. Here, the test of overidentifying restrictions (test of random versus fixed effects) suggests 
that fixed effects models are necessary. We hence report the results of fixed effects regressions, in 
which the estimations only rely on the within-country variance over time, but also the results of 
correlated random effects models. 
 
The Heckman selection model is only available in a pooled version in Stata, so only pooled results 
are reported. As the Mill’s ratio was never found to be significant, we are confident that the two-part 
regression in panel specification is more suitable than the Heckman regression to model the 
determinants of CDM RE projects.52 Hence, we rely on the simpler two-part models for the 
instrumental variables (IV) estimations. The results of the first-stage regressions for the IV 
specifications can be found in Appendix 6B, Tables 6B.1 (outcome equations) and 6B.2 (selection 
equations). 
 
We have seven models for the selection equation (Table 6.3): a random effects probit (regression 
(1)); a correlated random effects probit, which allows us to correct for the potential correlation 
between the random effects and the other regressors (model (2)); the selection equation of a pooled 
two-step Heckman model (3); and four IV models: the Rivers-Vuong control function model and 
the maximum likelihood pooled IV probit with the instruments water access and international NGOs 
(models (4) and (5)), and the same two IV models with the instruments water access and environmental 
NGOs (models (6) and (7)). We show results for these two sets of instruments because they differ in 
their strength and in the assessment of the endogeneity of the instrumented variable. While in both 
cases the instruments were found to be valid according to the test of overidentifying restrictions, in 
models (4) and (5) the instruments are very strong according to the first-stage statistics, and the 
instrumented variable RE support policies is found to be endogenous according to the Smith-Blundell 
endogeneity test. In contrast, the instruments used in models (6) and (7) are somewhat weaker, and 
in this case the endogeneity test indicates that the RE support policies variable is exogenous. Hence, we 
cannot conclude with certainty whether there actually is an endogeneity problem.  
 
 
 
                                                      
52 Heckman models with an additional selection variable (Kyoto Protocol ratification, as only parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
can participate in the CDM), or with the DNA variable only in the selection equation (having a national authority for the 
CDM is relevant for a country being able to participate in the CDM, but it should not impact the amount of CDM 
investment it has), did not change the results substantially, and the Mill’s ratio remained insignificant. We only report the 
baseline model with the same explanatory variables as the two-part models.  
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Throughout the eight models, a clearly positive and almost always strongly significant effect of our 
main explanatory variable (RE support policies) on the likelihood that a country proposes a RE CDM 
project at all can be observed. In model (2), after controlling for the fixed effect (the coefficient on 
the RE support policies variable), we see that the cross-country variability of the policies variable (the 
coefficient on the country mean for the RE support policies variable) is again positive and significant. 
In model (6), the instruments are relatively weak and hence the effect of the instrumented RE support 
policies variable appears to be weaker.  
 
For the outcome equation (Table 6.4) we have five models: pooled OLS, fixed effects two-stages 
least squares, in both cases with clustered errors (models (8) and (9)); a correlated random effects 
model (10); the outcome part of the pooled Heckman model (11); and a fixed effects IV two-stage 
least squares model using the instruments particulates and international NGOs (model (12)). 
Endogeneity tests after the IV regression in this and alternative specifications reject the null that the 
instrumented RE support policies variable is endogenous. This is, IV regression is apparently not 
necessary at all in the outcome equation. Table 6.4 shows a consistently positive and significant 
effect of the main explanatory variable, RE support policies, on the amount of renewable energy to be 
deployed by CDM projects submitted to validation. These results hence support the hypothesis that 
the existence of domestic RE support policies is relevant both for the decision to propose a RE 
CDM project within a country at all, and for how much RE is to be deployed through the CDM; 
they are thus consistent with this chapter’s argument that domestic RE support policies can be 
complementary to the CDM incentive in incentivizing more RE investment in developing countries.  
 
Looking at the control variables, in terms of CDM-specific capacity and institutions we unexpectedly 
find a consistently negative effect of having a member in the CDM Executive Board on the initial 
decision to submit a CDM RE project (Table 6.3). One possible explanation is a time effect that we 
have not considered here: it is possible that, before applying for a position in the CDM EB, a 
country needs some expertise on the CDM, so that it will have EB members only once it has already 
proposed some CDM projects. However, in the outcome equations (Table 6.4), we do find that 
having a member in the Executive Board positively affects the amount of renewable energy 
investment deployed through the CDM, at least in the fixed effects specifications. Countries hence 
apparently tend to host more renewable energy CDM projects submitted for validation in the years 
in which they hold a seat in the Executive Board, which is consistent with our expectations. This 
positive effect, however, is no longer discernable in the pooled or correlated random effects models.  
 
Having a national authority for the CDM (DNA) has a consistently positive and significant effect on 
the initial decision to submit a CDM RE project, but no significant effect on the amount of projects 
deployed. This is consistent with our expectations, as having a DNA is a pre-requisite for projects to 
be registered, but once a DNA is in place, this by itself has little effect on how many projects are 
proposed (it may be that some DNA’s are more efficient and effective than others in approving 
CDM projects; this is however not measurable with our data).53  
 
                                                      
53 As we are here looking at projects submitted for validation, the sample includes a few countries in which projects were 
submitted before a DNA was established (probably in the expectation that it would be established soon). This makes this 
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With respect to the variables representing international ties, FDI inflows has a negative effect on the 
initial decision to submit a CDM RE project, but no significant effect on the amount of CDM RE 
investment. The first result may be an indication that CDM investment is regarded as some kind of 
substitute to FDI, so that countries with low FDI inflows are those more likely to engage in the 
CDM (within the renewable energy sector) at all. The insignificant result in the positive part of the 
models may be related to the fixed effects specification, or to fact that we do not differentiate 
between unilateral and bilateral CDM projects: Flues (2010) finds that FDI matters for bilateral 
CDM projects that rely on foreign investments, but not for unilateral ones. Trade openness seems to 
have a positive effect on the amount of CDM RE investment, as expected, but no effect on initial 
CDM investment; the observed effect is again only visible in the fixed effects specifications.  
 
Among the variables measuring domestic institutions – political stability, government effectiveness 
and democracy –, we only find consistently positive effects (of democracy and government 
effectiveness) on the initial decision to invest in RE CDM projects. No effect is apparent on the 
amount of CDM investment, which probably hinges again on the fixed effects model being used. In 
addition, the governance variables are quite highly correlated with each other, with GDP per capita 
and with years of schooling. Countries with good education and high income levels tend to have 
more effective and stable governments; thus, after controlling for education and income governance 
seems to have little (if at all) importance for CDM investment. 
 
The socioeconomic variables – years of schooling, total GDP, GDP per capita, capital formation and 
GDP growth – are clearly relevant for the decision to invest in renewable energy through the CDM. 
This is consistent with previous studies looking more generally at total CDM investment (e.g. Flues 
2010). More educated, larger economies with higher availability of domestic capital are more likely to 
be among the ones proposing CDM projects that deploy renewable energy. However, the relevance 
of these variables for the amount of CDM projects supporting renewables cannot be clearly 
established with our data: while schooling does not seem to be relevant, the size of the economy is 
positively related to CDM investment in the pooled specifications of Table 6.4, and negatively 
related in the fixed effects IV specification; capital formation displays a weak positive effect only in 
one specification. Again, this is likely a result of the fixed effects model. More interesting is the role 
of per capita income: we find an apparently not very intuitive negative effect of income on the 
likelihood that a country proposes a renewable energy CDM project at all, but a positive effect on 
the amount of CDM projects supporting renewables, particularly in the fixed effects specification. 
The first effect can be explained through the substantial amount of quite rich countries that do not 
participate in the CDM, such as some oil-producing states and several small island states (e.g. 
Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Kuwait, Qatar, St. Lucia, among others). The second effect implies 
that, once a country starts using the CDM to support RE projects, a higher per capita income leads 
to a larger amount of CDM projects in this area – richer countries tend to profit more from the 
 
                                                      
variable work at all in the binary regressions. Specifications omitting this variable were also tried out, and in general they 
showed a stronger effect of the policies variable on RE CDM. As the DNA variable appears to be very relevant in the 
regressions, we opted for presenting the (more conservative) results including it. 
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CDM. Finally, for GDP growth we do not find any significant effect in the selection equations, but 
we find that, after controlling for total GDP and GDP per capita, growth negatively affects the 
amount of renewable energy CDM project development. 
 
The imports of electricity, gas and coal (our measure for energy insecurity), as well as the other 
energy-related variables (emissions from electricity and heat, and fossil fuel production per GDP), do 
not seem to matter for either the likelihood to host RE CDM projects or the amount of such 
projects in the country. There is a negative and weakly significant effect of emissions in the selection 
equation of the Heckman model, but this effect disappears in the other specifications and its 
direction is against our expectations. 
 
Finally, a country’s surface area – our very general proxy for renewable energy potential – never has 
the expected positive effect on RE CDM investment. We even find a statistically significant negative 
effect in the fixed effects models for the outcome equation (Table 6.3), which we believe is related to 
corrections in several countries’ reported surface area, which may correlate spuriously with changes 
in CDM investment over time. 
 
In summary, it appears that, besides supporting policies for renewable energy and CDM-specific 
institutions or knowledge, only very general economic characteristics, as well as being a democracy, 
matter for hosting RE CDM projects.  
 
Results: Individual RE energy technologies in the dependent variable 
Table 6.5 displays the results when regressing our RE support policies variable on the amount of 
power from individual renewable energy technologies deployed through the CDM: wind, biomass, 
small hydro and solar photovoltaic. In these cases, no instrumental variable models are presented, as 
the instruments were not found to be strong enough. We are however quite certain, at least in the 
outcome equations, that the RE support policies variable is exogenous. In the selection equation this is 
not so clear, and hence the validity of these results may be reduced due to the endogeneity concern. 
Another caveat of these results is the significantly reduced number of observations in the outcome 
equations: when pooling all RE technologies together, we had 208 country-year observations that 
had submitted RE CDM projects for validation. In the case of individual technologies, we have for 
wind only 68 observations, for biomass 101, and for hydro and solar 116 observations, respectively. 
Inferences are hence much weaker in these regressions. To improve our degrees of freedom we thus 
exclude some variables from the outcome equations: fossil fuel production, DNA, political stability 
and emissions from electricity and heat. These variables were never found to be significant in the 
models shown on Table 6.4; additionally, the Wald test indicated that they were jointly not relevant 
for the regressions in Table 6.5. As discussed above, we do not have a theoretical expectation that 
having a DNA is relevant for the amount of CDM investment; political stability is quite highly 
correlated with government effectiveness and income, so its effect is likely already accounted for 
through these variables. In addition, the year dummies are excluded whenever none of them has a 
significant effect in the regression and a Wald test shows that they are not jointly significant either. 
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Despite these caveats, the results allow us to find details that were not possible to distinguish in the 
specifications with all RE projects together. When looking at the coefficient on the RE support policies 
variable, it is always positive, but only in some instances statistically significant. For wind energy, 
supportive policies seem to matter both for the decision to submit a first project to the CDM 
(selection equation) and for the amount of electricity to be deployed through the CDM (outcome 
equation), which is in line with the main hypothesis in this chapter: Wind power is a technology that 
is relatively new in many developing countries and not yet competitive with traditional, often 
subsidized thermal power plants. While the CDM may certainly help to make it more competitive, 
the existence of supportive policies and measures in the host country makes more deployment 
possible. The results for biomass power are somewhat different. In this case, RE support policies seem 
to be relevant only for the decision to submit a first project to the CDM, but not for the size of the 
CDM project portfolio. There may be several reasons for this. Supportive policies are not always 
applicable to all RE technologies. Several countries, for example, have FITs for solar and for wind 
energy, but not for biomass. Biomass projects also have a different financial structure than other 
renewable energies, as they depend on the availability and the cost of the biomass fuel. It is likely that 
it is rather the availability of fuel that determines the potential for these projects, and our control 
variable for this availability – agricultural area - is not capturing this dimension well enough. For small 
hydro power, the RE support policies variable is neither in the selection equation nor in the outcome 
equation significant; in this case only socio-economic variables and hydrological potential seem to 
matter. Finally, RE support policies matter for the amount of photovoltaic power to be deployed 
through the CDM, but not for being one of the countries involved in such projects at all.  
 
These findings are interesting. Photovoltaic is the most expensive renewable energy technology 
among those analysed in this study. The CDM subsidy is clearly not sufficient to overcome its 
financing gap. Our statistical results indicate that domestic support policies, by for example reducing 
the taxes or providing affordable loans for such projects, or by setting a higher electricity tariff for 
(specific types of) renewables, are a relevant enabling factor for the development of these particularly 
expensive renewable energy projects under the CDM. The second technology for which supportive 
policies are relevant in terms of amount of energy capacity deployed, wind energy, is more mature 
and no longer so expensive. Still, it is linked to technologies that are not known in many developing 
countries, and to an intermittent resource that makes its use more challenging. Hydro power is 
probably the other extreme. It is a mature technology, well known in many developing countries. 
More challenging are small hydro projects, particularly those that do not involve constructing a dam, 
due to the reduced economies of scale and the less secure hydrological resource. Still, they are more 
likely closer to profitability than other RE technologies, and hence supportive instruments do not 
seem so necessary. Biomass power is a more complex case. On the one hand, the thermal technology 
used to burn biomass for energy is similar to other thermal combustion technologies, and hence well 
known worldwide, so it can be argued that barriers to its use are relatively low. But the technology 
needs to be adapted to the new fuel type(s), and has also been improved to increase efficiency, allow 
cogeneration of heat and power, and allow co-firing of traditional fossil fuels with biomass. In 
addition, biomass CDM projects are typically located wherever the necessary fuel is abundant: sugar 
industries with bagasse as a by-product, oil palm plantations and processing plants, large animal 
farms with manure that can be composted into biogas (REN21 2012). It may well be that it is the 
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presence of these industries, which we cannot control for in detail with our variables, that is most 
important for the location of these projects, rather than the existence of supportive policy 
frameworks.  
 
With respect to the control variables, we can identify several patterns across all technologies. CDM 
knowledge and institutions appear to be of little relevance. Having a national authority for the CDM 
(DNA) seems to matter only for having biomass projects, probably because this is a relatively easily 
accessible technology, promoted strongly by international CDM project developers sourcing projects 
all over the world, so that countries starting to venture into the CDM do so by proposing biomass 
projects rather than other project types. In terms of ties with industrialized countries, these again 
seem to be relevant only for biomass projects. This seems consistent with the idea that biomass 
projects are pursued very commonly bilaterally, with strong presence of international project 
developers and investors. In this case, firms in host countries that are more open to international 
trade have more international ties and are more likely to enter into such joint ventures first. The 
negative sign in the FDI variable may be related to the fact that this variable measures net FDI flows, 
and hence it may be negative for countries that invest heavily in other countries themselves. Among 
the more general institutional variables, democracy is the only variable with a discernable effect: all 
else equal, more democratic countries are more likely to develop biomass and photovoltaic power 
projects.  
 
As in the more general equations in Tables 6.3 and 6.4, the socioeconomic variables are clearly the 
most robust. Total GDP has a consistently positive and significant effect in the selection equation – 
larger economies are the ones most likely to engage in CDM projects involving renewable energy at 
all. But once a country belongs to this group, it is per capita income the relevant variable that affects 
how much renewable energy is deployed in each of the technologies analysed. Total GDP even has a 
negative effect on the amount of renewable energy deployed. As we are using country fixed effects, 
this is not so surprising. With fixed effects, it is not the difference in total GDP between China or 
India and e.g. Vietnam that matters for the regression results, but the evolution of GDP (or GDP 
per capita) within each country from 2003 to 2010. In this case, income per capita seems to be a 
better indicator of the economic power of the country than total GDP. This was also corroborated 
in robustness checks excluding either of the two variables, where we found that the positive effect of 
GDP per capita is more robust than the negative effect of total GDP. A similar phenomenon may 
explain the negative sign for capital formation in some of the outcome equations (bearing in mind 
that it has a positive and significant effect in several of the selection equations).  
 
The energy-related variables are little relevant. We only observe a weakly significant and negative 
effect of fossil fuel production for the selection into wind CDM projects (this could be explained 
through a strong fossil fuel lobby that opposes renewable energy development), and a positive effect 
of gas, coal and electricity imports (energy insecurity) on the amount of biomass energy to be 
deployed through the CDM. The importance of having good renewable energy resources is also 
limited. More precipitation and altitudinal difference seem to increase the likelihood of having hydro 
power projects at all; as these variables are time-invariant, they are excluded from the fixed effects 
outcome equation. Solar radiation has an effect opposite to our expectation: it seems to decrease the 
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likelihood of having photovoltaic projects. It is probably technological and financial capacity rather 
than natural resources that are important for venturing into expensive photovoltaic projects.  
 
All in all, hence, Table 6.5 provides further evidence in support of this chapter’s hypothesis: that 
domestic renewable energy support policies complement the CDM subsidy in facilitating the 
deployment of RE technologies, in particular the most expensive or technologically challenging 
among them: photovoltaic and wind energy. It also emphasizes the findings in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 
that beyond support policies, mostly socioeconomic factors are relevant for renewable energy 
development under the CDM. 
 
 
6.6 Conclusions 
This chapter discusses and attempts to find empirical evidence for the idea that national-level 
renewable energy support policies may positively affect the investments in renewable energy capacity 
through the Clean Development Mechanism. This hypothesis is tested on a dataset of CDM 
investments in renewable electricity in developing countries, using the amount of RE support 
policies adopted in the country as main explanatory variable, while controlling for several other 
country characteristics that, according to the existing literature, may affect RE deployment or CDM 
investment. Panel two-part and pooled Heckman selection models were used, as well as instrumental 
variable two-part specifications to control for the concern about endogeneity of the policies variable. 
 
The results provide first evidence for such effect. In the models analysing the effect of support 
policies on the aggregate CDM RE deployment we find a consistently significant and positive effect 
of such policies, both in the selection equations modelling the likelihood that RE projects are 
submitted to the CDM at all, and in the outcome equations modelling the amount of RE energy 
capacity to be deployed through the CDM. The results are somewhat weaker in some IV 
specifications due to the relatively weak instruments used, but still positive and in several cases 
significant.  
 
When looking at specific renewable energy technologies, a more differentiated picture becomes 
evident. RE support policies seem to be relevant for the deployment of those technologies that are 
more expensive or technologically less known (photovoltaic and wind power), but not for those 
technologies that are already being used in developing countries (hydro power) or are strongly 
dependent on specific industries for their development (biomass power). The barriers to the 
deployment of RE power appear to be different for different technologies, so that different 
supporting mechanisms may also be needed.  
 
These results, while still exploratory, open ground for further research. It would be interesting to 
look in more detail at each RE technology, and in particular at the specific effect of each of the 
different support policies. For such purpose, more detailed data would need to be collected on the 
types of supportive policies in place, their importance in terms of the size of the financial incentive 
provided, and also on other general controls, such as electricity prices in developing countries. Such 
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research would be an interesting contribution to the public policy, environmental policy and 
environmental economics literature in developing countries, and, from the aspect of the interaction 
between domestic-level and international climate policies, to the literature on multi-level governance.  
 
These results are also relevant for climate policy practitioners. In the current debate over climate and 
energy policies, the relationship between national-level policies and the international regime is rapidly 
gaining in importance. Policy-makers are looking for international and national solutions to the 
climate change threat, and renewable energy is one of the options that may bring considerable co-
benefits for the climate and for domestic policy goals. They are also looking for possible sources of 
finance for climate change mitigation. The possibility to complement expensive domestic support 
mechanisms with international support through carbon markets may make governments in 
developing countries more willing to adopt such support mechanisms. On the other hand, concerns 
about the additionality of carbon credits in the market, if they are profiting from domestic financial 
support, are likely to continue. Developing countries may regard such an arrangement as a subsidy 
from the South towards compliance with emission reduction targets in the North. Industrialized 
countries may believe that the projects they are acquiring carbon credits from may not be additional 
to business as usual, because the financial support from the host government would have made them 
happen anyway. In a world in which climate change objectives are clearly intertwined with energy 
security and competitiveness concerns by both Northern and Southern countries, it is naïve to 
expect pure climate change goals. Compromise between these concerns is surely needed, and a better 
understanding, through research, of how such combinations of domestic and international regimes 
might work, can be helpful towards that goal. 
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7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
 
In this dissertation I analyse the potential effects of the CDM and some of its reform proposals on 
climate change mitigation in the South. I start from the assumptions that the CDM may provide 
positive incentives towards climate change mitigation in developing countries if it is successful in 
incentivizing (1) investment in low-carbon technologies in LDCs, (2) a transition towards non-offset 
mitigation instruments in advanced developing countries, and (3) investment in non-mature low-
carbon technologies.  
 
The theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2 shows that the CDM can have both positive and 
negative incentives on mitigation in developing countries. Five negative incentives were identified, 
which may affect the amount of emission reductions achieved through the CDM itself, the potential 
mitigation through domestic climate-friendly policies in developing countries, and the willingness of 
CDM host countries to adopt future emission reduction targets. Two positive incentives for 
mitigation were found: the first one is the potential of the CDM to capitalize on the window of 
opportunity in LDCs and contribute to fostering investment in clean technologies, thereby 
contributing to a lower long-term emissions path; the second one considers that the CDM may help 
expensive, immature emission reduction technologies achieve cost effectiveness earlier, by financially 
supporting their diffusion in developing countries.  
 
Chapters 3 to 6 analysed empirically different aspects of how the CDM – or proposals made for its 
reform – may affect some of the incentive mechanisms described above. Chapters 3 and 4 looked at 
two measures that have been proposed for addressing the geographical distribution of the CDM. In 
the incentives framework developed in this dissertation, by addressing this geographical distribution 
and promoting more CDM projects in LDCs, the CDM can be directed towards improving the long-
term emissions path of these countries. However, the empirical analysis showed that, even under 
quite strict preferential access or discounting schemes, LDCs cannot compete with other CDM host 
countries in terms of supply of CERs to the market. Hence, in practical terms, the analysis questions 
the ability of these two measures to achieve the goal of improving the geographical distribution of 
the CDM. More generally, it also questions the ability of the CDM itself to significantly address the 
long-term emissions path of LDCs. A future research question resulting from these conclusions is 
whether other instruments that have been more recently introduced in the climate change regime – 
for example, Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) that are funded internationally 
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but independently of the carbon market – may have better results supporting the low-carbon 
transformation of LDCs.  
 
Chapter 5 analysed the low-hanging fruit problem, i.e., the fear of developing countries that the 
CDM may exhaust their cheap emission reduction opportunities and leave them with only more 
expensive ones to fulfil future emission reduction commitments. The empirical analysis in this 
chapter concluded that, so far, the CDM has not been large enough to have such an effect, and that 
there are still many theoretically low-cost abatement opportunities in its main host countries. These 
results lead to the broader conclusion that at least in terms of the low-hanging fruit problem, the 
CDM should not have the effect of discouraging developing countries from taking up emission 
reduction commitments. This conclusion is however strongly dependent on the current size and 
scope of the CDM. If the CDM (or similar offsetting mechanisms) is expanded significantly in the 
following years, the conclusion might change. Such expansion depends crucially on how demand for 
carbon offsets will evolve in the future, which depends on the level of ambition of future emission 
reduction targets and on critical technical parameters such as the consideration of supplementarity in 
the use of offsets (see Chapter 3). The conclusion could also change if new offsetting instruments – 
for example, linking the reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation to the 
carbon market, or agreeing on sectoral crediting mechanisms – are created. In addition, this result 
leads to the question about why the carbon market is not yet capturing all cheap emission reduction 
opportunities. This would be another area for future research, as well as an analysis of whether other 
climate mitigation instruments (again NAMAs) might be better suited for reaching such cheap – but 
difficult – mitigation opportunities, and of how this would in turn affect incentives for developing 
countries. 
 
Chapter 6 looked at a way in which the CDM might be successful in contributing to the diffusion of 
more expensive emission reduction technologies, thus inducing learning effects and cost reductions. 
As the carbon price is still too low for such a purpose, but I nonetheless observe expensive projects 
within the CDM portfolio, I hypothesize that domestic climate-friendly policies might be adding a 
further financial incentive to these expensive technologies, which, coupled with the CDM subsidy, 
makes them attractive. I thus analyse whether domestic climate-friendly policies (specifically 
renewable energy support policies) are helping these expensive technologies to access the CDM, and 
find clear evidence for such an effect: I find a statistically significant and positive effect of renewable 
energy support policies on aggregate CDM renewable energy investment, both in equations 
modelling the likelihood that renewable energy projects are submitted by a host country to the CDM 
at all, and in equations modelling the amount of renewable energy capacity expected to be deployed 
by these projects. When looking at individual renewable energy technologies separately, a more 
differentiated effect becomes clear: supportive policies seem to be relevant for the deployment of 
those technologies that are more expensive or technologically less known (photovoltaic and wind 
power), but not for those technologies that are already being used in developing countries (hydro 
power) or are strongly dependent on specific industries for their development (biomass power). The 
barriers to the deployment of renewable power appear to be different for different technologies, so 
that different supporting mechanisms may also be needed.  
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Future research in this area could look in more detail at the effect of each supportive policy on each 
particular renewable energy technology. Such research would be possible provided more accurate 
data on the support policies and other general characteristics of the electricity market in developing 
countries becomes available. Another future research area, depending also on the availability of 
better data, would be to look at the effect that the CDM may have had on the support policies. Such 
analysis would shed some light on the perverse incentive described above that the CDM may 
discourage the adoption of domestic climate friendly policies due to additionality concerns. 
 
Turning back to the incentives framework described in Chapter 2, I can conclude that the CDM, in 
its current form, has not contributed substantially to the investment in low-carbon technologies in 
LDCs, as evidenced by its geographical distribution. Proposed measures to improve such 
geographical distribution, such as discounting the value of emission credits with differentiation 
across host countries, or the establishment of preferential access measures to certain demand 
markets, will, on their own, likely have a limited effect on such geographical distribution. Other 
approaches that are better suited for supporting small-scale technologies, which are arguably more in 
line with the needs in LDCs, such as Programmes of Activities, may have more success. In addition, 
support instruments that do not link emission reductions to the market, such as internationally 
supported NAMAs, may also be better suited for LDCs, as they may be less subject to the low-cost 
focus of the carbon market and to the CDM project cycle’s high transaction costs.  
 
In terms of creating incentives for a transition of advanced developing countries towards non-offset 
mitigation instruments, Chapter 5 shows that the “low-hanging fruit” argument does not hold yet for 
the CDM, meaning that this kind of negative incentive should not be in place. In broader terms, 
however, the theoretical framework in Chapter 2 demonstrated that there are other ways in which 
the CDM, with its financial transfers, may reduce the willingness of its host countries to engage in 
own mitigation actions.  
 
Finally, in terms of providing support for expensive, immature low-carbon technologies, Chapter 6 
provides evidence that expensive technologies are accessing the CDM, and that national policies that 
financially support such technologies are playing a role in allowing such investment in expensive 
technologies through the CDM.  
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